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Abstract
This doctorate is an attempt to show how music video presents a challenge to 
traditional modes of music aesthetics through its resistance to being categorized 
as an object. I attempt to show how music video, and by extension all music, is 
better conceived of as Text-event rather than as object, and hence formulate the 
notion of an aural paradigm based on material presence as opposed to a visual 
paradigm based on representation. This draws in particular on the writings of 
Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva, and the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, and also on the very different tradition from which Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy originates.
Within this framework the idea of a ‘fragmentary aesthetic’ is placed in relation to 
its nineteenth-century antecedents, and suggested as a possible methodology for 
future analysis. This theoretical base is then used to re-examine both the 
arguments surrounding the music aesthetics of Eduard Hanslick and Richard 
Wagner, and ideas drawn from modern physics, mathematics, and system theory, 
to develop the ideas of relationality and ‘gesture’ as a means of comparing 
different media without compromising the qualities specific to each. Also under 
discussion in this context are questions of meaning and narrative as they relate to 
music video and recent musicology, and an engagement with the Critical Theory of 
Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin regarding the role of social mediation in art. 
Finally the problems of ideological claims upon the realm of the aesthetic, as noted 
by Terry Eagleton, are considered, and the figure of the ‘technological body,’ 
inspired by Brian Massumi’s work on the concept of proprioception, is proposed as 





In a society which has not yet found peace, how could art cease being metaphysical, 
i.e signifying, readable, representative? Fetishist? How long till music, the Text?1
My nominal topic of study, the aesthetics of music video, poses two questions: why 
aesthetics, and why music video? I will return to the relevance of aesthetics later, 
but with respect to music video, my response does not take the form of a simple 
‘because it’s there,' after Edmund Hillary -  I do not seek to ‘conquer’ music video, 
bend it to my will -  but rather takes the form of the confessional. Something, I 
knew not what, pricked my consciousness as I encountered music video. The 
punctum , of which Roland Barthes speaks in Camera Lucida,2 caught my eye and 
my ear; there was, is, a quality of music video that is all its own, beyond the 
marriage of music and image alone. Music videos don’t begin to resemble opera, 
nor are they quite like films, nor even most television formats. This point was 
brought home to me in watching the film Annihilator,3 an execrable film in most 
respects, with the sole redeeming feature (at least for me) of having an entirely
1 Barthes, R., Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ in The Responsibility o f Forms: Critical 
Essays on Music, Art and Representation, trans. Howard, R., (University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), p. 97.
; Barthes describes the punctum  as a ‘sting, speck, cut, little hole -  and also a cast 
of dice. A photograph’s punctum  is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises 
me, is poignant to me).’ Camera Lucida, trans. Howard, R., (Vintage, London, 
2000), p. 27.
3 Annihilator, (1986), dir. Michael Chapman. The music track used here was David 
Bowie’s ‘Ashes to Ashes,’ itself the subject of a highly experimental music video 
several years previously.
2unexplained and unprepared music video-like section midway through the film. 
Despite being at least as badly done as the rest of the film, the disjuncture caused 
by the abrupt change in register, achieved without any use of visual or aural cues,’ 
was a vivid demonstration of just how different music video is from film. Indeed, 
the sensation of watching music video is probably closer to that of silent film, 
paradoxically, than sound film, in the active engagement of the viewer to make 
sense of what is presented. (Perhaps the exception to this is the musical number 
of the Hollywood musical -  the imitation of Busby Berkeley style choreography and 
camera angles is seen relatively often in music videos -  but even here the 
contextual setting of the number within a broader filmic context makes for a similar, 
but not identical, affective charge.) The visual effects of music video are frequently 
striking, even experimental, and yet if one compares their effect to the 
experimental films that Harry Partch set to his music in the 1950s and ‘60s, the 
difference between these and music video could not be more apparent.
The only other medium with a comparable aesthetic is that of the 
advertisement, drawing on similar visual codes, similarly abbreviated with respect 
to narrative convention, and also having a similarly schizophrenic relationship to 
the commodity: both advertisements and music videos are promotional tools for 
commodities (music videos are known as ‘promos’ in the music industry), and are 
thus intimately tied to the fetishized commodity form, but are themselves only 
rarely treated as commodities with exchange value. Music videos are explicitly 
designed to perform an action upon the world rather than to take on the status of 
passive object. Even with the degree of crossover seen between music video and 
advertisements, however, as in the frequent employment of music video directors 
to make adverts, there remains a clear distinction between the two formats in the 
prominence given to the music track.4 (There are of course exceptions -  witness 
the setting of Tony Kaye’s Dunlop tyre advertisement to the Velvet Underground’s
4 See Savan, L., 'Commercials Go Rock,’ Sound and Vision: The Music Video 
Reader, ed. Frith, S., Goodwin, A. and Grossberg, L., (Routledge, London and 
New York, 1993), pp. 85-90. Although the practice of directors moving between 
these mediums has become more common since this was written, the 
phenomenon of music videos as advertisements for non-music products described 
here was relatively short lived, and thus presumably commercially unsuccessful.
3‘Venus in Furs’ a few years ago, or the occasional success of the music tracks to 
Levi’s adverts -  but these are the exceptions that prove the existence of a rule.)
Having been ‘hooked’ by the punctum  I perceived in my interaction with 
music video, I sought to understand the phenomenon, and turned to what literature
I could find on the topic. It seemed, however, that my interest in music video was 
not shared by the many writers that purported to address it: there was no shortage 
of discussion, at least in the 1980s, but nobody seemed to be particularly 
concerned with the music video text in itself. Most commentators were more taken 
with the channel MTV than the videos per se,5 and music videos were an example 
of this, or a proof of that, but always constituted. Rarely, if ever, was it addressed 
on its own terms, and never in terms of the one thing that marked it apart from 
other television forms, namely, the music. Many people seemed to be talking 
about music video, but few of these seemed to be addressing what they actually 
saw, instead of the ideas it represented, and fewer still were bothering to listen to 
them. And then, after the initial scholarly intoxication with music video, people 
stopped even talking about it. Katherine Dieckmann wrote recently:
Not so very long ago, back in the eighties, or ‘‘The Big 80s" as one short-lived video­
revival show liked to call them, MTV provided fruitful ground for the pop-minded 
scholar. The music video was, in fact, often considered the ideal mass cultural artifact.
...My interest in MTV is less theoretical and more pragmatic ... partly because a highly 
intellectualized approach to the medium feels just about as dated now as Madonna’s 
conical bustier.6
5 One of the very few book length studies, oft cited in music video research, is E. 
Ann Kaplan’s Rocking Around the Clock, and yet in her introduction she explicitly 
states: Let me remind readers that this book addresses itself not to rock videos in 
general but to their incorporation in the institution that is MTV.’ Kaplan, E.A., 
Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, and Consumer 
Culture, (Routledge, London and New York, 1987), p. 11.
6 Dieckmann, K., ‘MTV killed the music video star,’ in Kelly, K. and McDonnell, E. 
(eds), Stars don’t Stand Still in the Sky, (Routledge, London, 1999), p. 89.
4In the course of this essay, Dieckmann mentions the work of Andrew Goodwin as 
an example of a ‘pop-minded scholar,’ but she neglects to mention that Goodwin 
was arguing precisely against the raft of theory produced in the 1980s that treated 
music video as an exemplar of postmodernism for exactly as long as it failed to 
address the music. Many of the postmodern traits music video and MTV were said 
to embody were entirely typical presentations of the experience of live concert 
performance (for instance, direct address); they only became ‘postmodern’ when 
erroneously viewed from the standpoint of mainstream cinema. Music video was 
not only the ‘ideal mass cultural artefact,’ but an entirely idealized artefact, a 
convenient peg upon which to hang theory. At the time of writing it is ten years 
since Goodwin published Dancing in the Distraction Factory,7 a call for a 
‘musicology of the image,’ outlining the need to re-engage with music video as a 
musical entity rather than as a branch of film theory, and in the intervening period 
there has been an almost deafening silence. The most notable effort of the 
handful that have addressed Goodwin is that of Nicholas Cook, as part of a wider 
discussion of musical multimedia.8 Cook brings a welcome musicological 
perspective to music video, but I would suggest that in one key respect he has 
replicated the problem identified by Goodwin, and indeed Goodwin himself is also 
guilty of this, for instead of understanding music video in terms of music, both 
these media are understood in terms of what they mean, a difficult, and very often 
not a useful concept when applied to music. Again the material qualities of the 
music video are effaced in deference to an ideal category, and as I hope to 
demonstrate, this is exactly what a ‘musicology of the image’ should struggle 
against. I would contend that the model in which an artefact is regarded as a 
representation of something else, be that another object or an abstract concept, is 
a profoundly unmusical one, and based upon a visual paradigm. Indeed, the 
process of abstraction involved in the very notion of the ‘idea,’ so often unsuited to 
a discussion of sound, is derived from the visual realm. As Jonathan Ree notes:
7 Goodwin, A., Dancing in the Distraction Factory: Music Television and Popular 
Culture, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992).
8 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998).
5'Plato’s use of the word “ Idea" is itself based on its root meaning of “visible form.’”9 
A genuinely musicological response to music video must hence develop a means 
of addressing both image and music, and their combination without constant 
recourse to the transcendent realm of the ideal: the point is to stop considering 
entities as representations, and to start addressing their presence.
It is for this reason that my concern is for an aesthetics of music video: I 
wish to understand the affect of a music video, and derive social critique from this, 
rather than analysing the social meaning it offers up, which will of necessity simply 
be a reflecting back of one’s own prejudice. It should be stressed that this is not 
aesthetics understood as a contemplation of the beautiful in music video, but a 
return to the original formulation of Baumgarten in his Aesthetics of 1750. 
Aesthetics as ‘the business of affections and aversions, of how the world strikes 
the body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze and the guts 
and all that arises from our most banal, biological insertion in the world.’10 The 
original purpose of this, however, was not to provide a challenge to the realm of 
reason: as Terry Eagleton points out (and this is discussed in chapter III), it was 
precisely in order to separate out and harness the sensuous to Enlightenment 
reason that the field of aesthetics was born. One sees here the potential risk of 
ideological capitulation involved in music aesthetics, and the reason why Adorno 
and modern musicology has been so keen to avoid the purely musical’ and reveal 
musical meaning, an ideological product. The aesthetic realm, however, is not so 
easily ordered as it might seem. As Eagleton writes:
To lend fresh significance to bodily pleasures and drives, if only for the purpose of 
colonizing them more efficiently, is always to risk foregrounding and intensifying them 
beyond one’s control. The aesthetic as custom, sentiment, spontaneous impulse may 
consort well enough with political domination; but these phenomena border 
embarrassingly on passion, imagination, sensuality, which are not always so easily
9 Ree, J., Philosophical Tales: An Essay on Philosophy and Literature, (Methuen, 
London and New York, 1987), p. 65.
10 Eagleton, T., The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p. 13.
6incorporable. ... If the aesthetic is a dangerous, ambiguous affair, it is because ... there 
is something in the body which can revolt against the power which inscribes it.11
As I hope to demonstrate in my re-reading of Eduard Hanslick in chapter II, what 
might be regarded as a move to the ‘purely musical’ is in fact an attempt to bring 
out this radical potential of aesthetics, and to uncover the ‘signifiance’ (to borrow 
Julia Kristeva’s term) at work within signification and the inscription of meaning. A 
renunciation of the quest for meaning in favour of concentrating upon musical 
material is not a retreat into the ‘purely musical,’ because the notion of the ‘purely 
musical’ is based upon a fallacy. Both Mikhail Bakhtin, and in a less overt manner, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, have shown that any form of enunciation is always already 
intersected by a range of competing claims and that the word is of necessity a 
dialogical entity:
Any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed already as 
it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already 
enveloped in an obscuring mist. ... The word, directed towards its object, enters a 
dialogically-agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgements 
and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, 
recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape 
discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers.12
And I believe this is no less true of music than it is of language: every sound, 
harmony, musical style, is intersected by all its previous instances of usage in 
precisely the same way as language. An aesthetic approach to musical material 
need not be a way of ignoring entirely the social dimension of music (although it 
very often is, in certain analytic practices), but rather a way of approaching 
meaning from a new direction, sidestepping what I termed above a visual 
paradigm, predicated upon ideal concepts and a translation of the material into
11 Ibid., p. 28.
12 Bakhtin, M., ‘Discourse in the Novel,’ in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 
trans. Emerson, C. and Holmquist, M., (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981), 
p. 276.
7representation. (One sees here a possible reason for the difficulty of discussing 
musical timbre in traditional analytic terms: as that element of music that is most 
wedded to the material it resists translation into a representation of something 
else, and is hence ignored as being non-meaning, insignificant. The value of 
sonorous activity in music cannot be gauged so easily as its meaning. ) The key 
to endowing aesthetics with a social dimension is to consider it as a means of 
generating analysis through a connection to sensate phenomena, rather than as a 
set of ideals (unity, symmetry, etc.) to which one might aspire, and for which 
analysis provides a form of ‘proof.’ As Ken Hirschkop puts it: The points of 
pleasure and tension in our musical experience should lead to questions, linked to 
our social experience in general, rather than to aesthetic satisfactions which lead 
nowhere.’13 Consequently, this thesis will not take the form of a ‘how to ’ of music 
video analysis -  analytic strategies must be developed in response to the nature of 
the artefact and the context of its reception -  but I do wish to set out some 
fundaments of methodology, to suggest the ways in which one might interact with 
music video, and the forms that an understanding of this process might take.
II
What is required is a new conception of aesthetics, and this in turn demands a new 
way of apprehending the object. Barthes writes: ‘Aesthetics is absorbed into an art 
of living ... hence, it is less a matter of making pictures than furniture, clothes, 
tablecloths, which will have distilled all the juice of the “fine” arts; the socialist 
future of art will therefore not be the work (except as a productive game) but the 
object of use, the site of an ambiguous flowering (half functional, half ludic) of the
13 Hirschkop, K., The Classical and the Popular: Musical Form and Social 
Context,’ in Music and the Politics o f Culture, ed. Norris, C., (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1989), p. 303.
8signifier.’14 Aesthetics ceases to be a straightforward identification of the quality of 
an object, and becomes an understanding of the process of interaction between 
the subject and the object, the point of symbiosis between them. There is a shift 
from an aesthetics of being to an aesthetics of becoming, an aesthetics not of the 
work but of the text, and this is something that can only take place within a dialogic 
framework, such that the materiality of the object bears the imprint of the social, of 
better, the social-material symbiosis is an ongoing event with a particular affective 
charge. There is a close analogy with the conception of the wave-particle in 
quantum physics: the basis of matter is not exactly a particle, nor exactly an 
energy wave, but exhibits qualities of both at once, entity and enaction in one. It is 
important to keep this in mind when reintroducing the figure of the body into 
aesthetic discourse: the body is not to be regarded as a site of anchorage, a stable 
ground that can function as a benchmark against which everything else might be 
referenced. The body is itself an activity, a mediation or interaction, unfixed, and it 
is a working through of the ramifications of this ‘technological body’ that forms the 
basis of chapter III below.
What I also hope to show is that the form of this aesthetic response is 
something demanded by the peculiar nature of the music video artefact, and that 
this is a way of entering into what might be termed an aural paradigm, that 
operates in a different plane to the visual paradigm described above. Although he 
does not explicitly say so, Goodwin implicitly requests a dialogical response to 
music video, in stating:
It is important to establish from the outset that pop music is, and always has been, a 
multidiscursive cultural form, in which no one media site is privileged. The implication 
of this for music video analysis is that it becomes impossible to understand the 
meaning of any individual clip without considering its relation to the wider world of pop 
culture.15
14 Barthes, R., ‘Brecht and Discourse: A Contribution to the Study of Discursivity,’ 
in The Rustle o f Language, trans. Howard, R., (University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), pp. 221-2.
15 Goodwin, A., op. cit., p. 25.
9It may not be the case that any one medium is pushed to the fore, but what does 
take place, as Goodwin notes several times, is that music video makes television 
musical,’16 The nature of the object demands, in contradistinction to the normal 
hierarchy, that one understands the image according to the criteria of music rather 
than vice versa, or to put it in the terms defined above, one apprehends the image 
track in terms of an aural paradigm rather than applying a visual paradigm to the 
sound track. In a dialogical aesthetic, the qualities of the image that are important 
are not questions of what is represented or what it ‘means,’ so much as what are 
its material, affective qualities, how  does it impact upon the body; the image is 
made sensuous, it is musicalized.
This model may be particularly apparent in pop music, and music videos 
especially, but as Cook has pointed out dialogism can be observed in all instances 
of music:
The aesthetic interaction between image and sound is possible only because music 
possesses an intrinsic openness to semantic completion through the intervention of the 
image. To the extent that people assimilate what they see and what they hear into a 
composite experience, the every day reception of music gives the lie to the ideology of 
musical autonomy, according to which the touchstone of good music is hat it is 
aesthetically self sufficient.17
Both Goodwin and Cook demonstrate how both popular and classical musics are 
already saturated with image, and bound up more generally with the cultures, or 
‘forms of life’ to use Wittgenstein’s terminology, of which they are a part, but what I 
believe to be new here is the suggestion that the criteria according to which one 
perceives these images is potentially altered by their musical association. Which 
is by no means to suggest that this always, or even frequently happens: the 
representative, meaning-as-product model predominates in appreciation of both 
the visual and the musical, but music videos enable a point of entry to the
16 Ibid., p. xvi.
17 Cook, N., The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk, or Record Sleeves and Reception,’ 
in Composition -  Performance -  Reception: Studies in the Creative Process in 
Music, ed. Thomas, W., (Ashgate, Aldershot etc., 1998), p. 115.
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alternative -  a holding of the image or the sound en proces, resisting the 
temptation to close down the plurality of meaning to an exchange-value. It is not 
that meaning is renounced, but in the process of making meaning, the activity of 
understanding, the emphasis is shifted from the meaning to the making.
The model of the object is no longer that of the location, the fixed point, nor 
any point at all, but rather that of the probability sphere. The possible range of 
associations, amalgamations, and affective properties are in orbit around' the 
object, but there is no centre to these orbits, nothing to which one might point as 
‘the object itself.’ The object, so far as such a thing might still be usefully said to 
exist, is the space traced out by the combined loci of these orbits, which can only 
ever be partially apprehended and are in a constant state of flux. In the same way 
that one cannot pinpoint the path of an electron particle-wave around a nucleus, or 
a Baudrillardian event,18 so one’s understanding of one’s interaction with the object 
is uncertain, probabilistic; the process of comprehension is a stochastic process.
The way in which one might apprehend this process of comprehension, 
give it an understandable form, is the key to how one begins to relate the very 
different material affects presented by the different media that make up the music 
video composite. Chapter II discusses at length the concept of ‘gesture’ that I 
have taken from Wittgenstein, and from Paul Johnson’s discussion of the 
‘musicality of language’ in Wittgenstein’s later thought.'9 Putting it in somewhat 
reductive terms, gesture is the expression of the trace left by the interaction of the 
social and the object, a combination of the materiality of the object and the shaping 
of the realization of this material by the social forces acting on its production. The 
notion of gesture allows one to reconcile the specificity of each of the media that 
make up music video with the fact of their mutual influence upon one another, in 
the moulding of space and time that defines the identity of the object.
What this model does not allow for, however, is explanation. A dialogically 
conceived object cannot be explained, nor even exactly situated, but only related -  
a clarification of its place relative to one’s form of life. This is not necessarily a bad
18 See Baudrillard, J., Simulacra and Simulations, ‘ in Selected Writings, ed. 
Poster, M., pp. 174-7.
19 Johnson, P., Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner, (Routledge, London and New 
York, 1993), especially chapter 4, entitled The Musicality of Language.’
11
thing: Wittgenstein was highly critical of both the anthropologist George Frazer and 
Sigmund Freud for their attempts to explain rather than clarify the nature of certain 
phenomena,20 and Adorno was not concerned with explanation, and the 
implication of origin and non-contingent ‘essence’ that underpinned it. As Jay 
Bernstein puts it: ‘Adorno is seeking after historical truth, not the ahistorical, 
rational essence of phenomena. Historical truth is “shown” in fragmentary writing, 
which does not then explicitly aim to demonstrate of to explain. Explaining and 
demonstrating neutralize the phenomena in question; to explain is to explain 
away.'21 This echoes well with W ittgenstein’s belief that essence is expressed in 
the ‘grammar’ of a form of life,22 and that this is not something that can be ‘said,’ 
but merely ‘shown.’23
Ill
Music video has scarcely begun to be adequately theorized. In part this is due to 
problems in musical analysis more generally, and in the analysis of popular music 
in particular. The fault lines that run through musicology, and the difficulties of 
straddling sociological and musical analysis may be narrowing, but have not yet 
closed, and with a genuinely interdisciplinary object such as music video these 
problems are multiplied. The eclectic nature of the theories I have brought to bear 
on music video in the following study has been in part necessitated by the paucity 
of existing literature (with a few well-thumbed cited exceptions), and in part 
inspired by the formal and disciplinary eclecticism of music video itself. I have
20 See Cioffi, F., Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998) for details of his criticisms.
21 Bernstein, J.M., Introduction to The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass 
Culture, (Routledge, London and New York, 1991), p. 7.
22 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G.E.M., 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), §§371 and 373.
23 Gier, N., Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, (State University of New York Press, 
New York, 1981), p. 110.
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already mentioned many of the theoretical works that betray their presence in my 
own writing -  Barthes, Bakhtin, Wittgenstein. Academic discourse perhaps more 
than any other takes the form of a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation.’24 It is in 
this spirit, and I freely admit to following Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in this 
respect, that I begin each of the three chapters with ‘the prompting of an ancestral 
voice.’25 Each of these quotations is the expression of a particular historical 
juncture, a moment of intensity, an activity that effects what Deleuze and Guattari 
term an ‘incorporeal transformation,’ a point in which the set of relations that 
marked a specific mode of being is changed in such a way as to change the object 
itself without altering its corporeal form. It is the intersection of the social and the 
material, the moment in which the subject-object symbiosis is broken and reset 
from within.
Music video is a varied medium, encompassing many different styles and 
codes of music, word, and image, each of which, as suggested above, should be 
treated according to its specific requirements. I cannot claim to have deliberately 
set out to discuss as wide a range of these as possible; I have instead focussed 
upon those few that caught my eye and my ear, and which time and again 
prompted me to rethink what it was that so appealed to me. My interest in music 
video is not that of the catalogue compiler, but of the aesthete, perhaps even the 
dilettante. One might query whether this is a responsible attitude to have taken, 
given both the political nature of my conclusions, and the typically uncritical and 
ideologically questionable nature of the vast majority of music videos, at least in 
terms of their overt content, but it is my belief that all music videos, with very few (if 
any) exceptions, embody a form of relationship between sound and image that 
contains an incipient critique of the sign-system itself. One can scarcely overstate 
the extent to which this critique is held in abeyance, but there is nevertheless a 
potency here that may occasionally be perceived, however momentary or 
personalized that occasion might be. Whatever the weight of theoretical 
knowledge I have brought to the artefact, however, all the conclusions I have
24 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Massumi, B., (Athlone Press, London, 1988). p. 80.
25 Ibid., p. 80.
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drawn have been drawn directly from the encounter with the artefact and the way 
in which they have impacted upon me.
Much of the following takes the form of a discussion of music aesthetics 
rather than explicitly addressing music video, but as I have tried to show in this 
introduction, there are sound reasons (no pun intended) for this; what is true of 
music is very often true of music video also. The concept of the aural paradigm:' 
dialogistic, material, affective, and its distinction from the ‘visual paradigm:’ 
monologistic, representative, idealized, should not be read as meaning that each is 
in any way bound to its corresponding medium. The point is precisely that music 
video is a demonstration that these modes of apprehension can be extended 
across differing media, and co-exist in the same artefact in different planes. 
Whether they are of more general use to musicology as a whole I must leave for 
others to decide, but it is my belief that the attempt to combine the sociological and 
the ‘purely musical’ within a single theoretical framework, as begun by Adorno, and 
proposed in both the concept of ‘gesture’ and the figure of the ‘technological body’ 
here, would be of both theoretical and practical use. Music video as an art may 
not have entirely ceased to be metaphysical, but it does, to my mind, enable 
access to music, and the Text.
Fragments
I 
27th February 1854, Dusseldorf
Robert got up, but he was more profoundly melancholy than words can say. If I so 
much as touched him, he said: “Ah! Clara, I am not worthy of your love.” He said this, 
he whom I always look up to with the greatest, the most profound reverence ... ah! and 
all that I could say was of no use. He made a fair copy of the variations, and as he was 
at the last he suddenly left the room and went sighing into his bedroom -  I had left the 
room only for a few minutes, in order to say something to Dr. Hasenclever in the next 
room, and had left Mariechen sitting with him (for ten days I had never left him alone 
for a minute). Marie thought he would come back in a minute, but he did not come, but 
ran out into the most dreadful rain, in nothing but his coat, with no boots and no 
waistcoat. Bertha suddenly burst in and told me that he had gone -  no words can 
describe my feelings, only I knew that I felt as if my heart had ceased to beat.1
Robert’s body, on the other hand, as Barthes will point out, continued to beat 
strongly, and in a variety of remarkable patterns, on its journey through the streets 
of Dusseldorf. If only Clara had the benefit of Barthes’ hindsight, she might have 
known: ‘the Schumannian body does not stay in place (a major rhetorical 
transgression). It is not a meditative body. It sometimes makes a meditative 
gesture, but does not assume meditation’s bearing. ... This is a pulsional body, 
one which pushes itself back and forth, turns to something else -  thinks of
1 Extract from Clara Schumann’s diary, quoted in Chisell, J., Robert Schumann, 
from Master Musician's series, ed. Westrup, J., (Dent, London, 1948), pp. 75-6.
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something else.’2 This unsettled (and unsettling) movement, ceaseless flitting, 
butterfly-like (Papillon?), is the aesthetic of the fragment -  not the much-loved 
model of a Romantic composer’s descent into madness, the mental edifice of 
genius disintegrating into a thousand pieces, like the shards of a mirror, nor any 
kind of construction at all. Rather it is a coherence, a collectivity, an 
amalgamation, a ceaselessly productive corps morcele forever in flux, 
reconstituting itself as new parts are thrown into the mix. Certainly it is the mind of 
Freud, divided against itself, the fragmented decentred subject of modernism, but it 
is a great deal more besides, loosely woven into a totality-yet-to-come, a dynamic 
matrix of identity, both distinct from, and utterly embedded in the world.
Consider for a moment the American suburban party scene of the video to 
R.E.M.’s ‘Imitation of Life.’ It takes the form of a conspicuously everyday (if 
somewhat wealthy) ‘slice o’ life,' in the setting of a poolside gathering, and it is also 
very much a momentary slice, consisting as it does of a mere twenty seconds of 
footage repeated backwards and forwards some eleven times in the course of the 
video, with the addition of a short conclusion (backwards footage of a small girl 
blowing out cake candles). The scene is quite literally composed, in the 
etymological sense of placing things together as a composite, being made up of a 
series of distinct groupings that cover the social demographic one might expect. 
All human life -  that is, all American suburban human life -  is here: an elderly 
couple, a group of young adults dancing, men gathered around a barbeque, 
parents with younger children, to name but a few, as well as several solitary 
figures, including the three members of R.E.M., all of whom remain as distinct and 
identifiable entities throughout. A partial overview of the entire party scene is 
available only for brief instances, as the camera zooms in and out of the picture to 
pick up enigmatic events and poses. I am reminded of a scene in the film 
Bladerunner (and it would not surprise me if this was also true of the director of the 
video, Garth Jennings), where Harrison Ford’s Dekker uses a machine to closely 
examine a photograph, zooming in and examining minute details of the photograph 
that he seemed able to sense but not accurately comprehend without clarification, 
(and with a corresponding problem of picture quality that gives this video an
2 Barthes, R., ‘Rasch,’ in The Responsibility o f Forms, trans. Howard, R., 
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985), p. 300.
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unusual grainy character). This is the phenomenon that Barthes mentions in a 
brief aside in The Rhetoric of the Image,’ when he describes ‘Continuing to 
explore the image (which is not to say that it is not entirely clear at the first 
glance.)’3 Although one may physically apprehend everything the music video has 
to offer, both its aural and visual affect, instantaneously, this is more than can be 
consciously understood in that instant -  one knows more than one can say. Thus 
the task of the analyst is not to explain, but to clarify the experience, for as 
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain.’4 One must extrapolate the instant affect into the dimension of time, such 
that the analytical process becomes a fundamentally nostalgic activity.
There is an important difference, however, for where Dekker starts with an 
entire photograph, the world beyond the frames unconsidered (insofar as this is 
ever true), in this video the holistic picture may never be glimpsed -  one 
understands it through the dynamism and interaction of the distinct elements from 
which it is comprised. Through a clarification of the fragmentary components of an 
image, a thorough understanding of the detail available -  and there is no end to 
the depths of this detail -  one is encouraged to look beyond the confines of the 
frame, since there is more detail within the frame than it can comfortably contain. 
A dialogic relationship between music video and wider world is established. There 
is a simultaneous appeal to the particular and the holistic, and an establishment of 
a dynamic synergy between them both; looking, Janus-like, both inwards and 
outwards, is the aesthetic of the fragment. Indeed, many of these concepts are 
bound up with the field of aesthetics in general. As Eagleton notes:
This fusion of general and particular, in which one shares in the whole at no risk to 
one’s unique specificity, resembles the very form of the aesthetic artefact. ... For the 
mystery of the aesthetic object is that each of its sensuous parts, while appearing 
wholly autonomous, incarnate the “law” of the totality. Each aesthetic particular, in the
3 Barthes, R., ‘Rhetoric of the Image,’ in Image Music Text, trans. Heath, S., 
(Fontana, London, 1977), p. 34.
4 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G.E.M., 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), §126.
17
very act of determining itself, regulates and is regulated by all other self-determining 
particulars.5
Which is to say, it is not the 'parts’ that constitute this model, so much as the set of 
relations between them, and as such, the foremost problem of the ‘aesthetic 
artefact’ is also its greatest strength: the object becomes impossible to fix, its 
boundaries forever fluid, since it is collapsing in on itself at the same time that it is 
exploding outwards into the world.
Perhaps more so than any other format, the music video simultaneously 
proclaims its autonomy and fails to fulfil that promise. As the supplementation of 
the ‘pop’ single with an image track, it might be regarded as the ultimate fetishized 
commodity, replete in itself as object, but this is far from being the case. The 
presentation of spectacle in the music video is almost entirely unique, comparable 
only to the television channel ‘ident’ (that is, the short segments between 
programmes designed to establish the character of the channel) in the way the 
image is presented. (Music videos are also unusual in that, as a collective 
enterprise, subject reception is already embodied in the poietic process.) Their 
commodity status, as promotional tools, is uncertain like that of advertisements; 
unlike most advertisements, however, music videos reject most of the strategies of 
mainstream film: in the near permanent use of direct address to camera, a 
conspicuous absence of narrative, and a privileging of the striking image (what 
Barthes terms a ‘pregnant moment’6) over any commitment to continuity that might 
denote a sense of self-containment. Music video is above all a parasitic medium, 
constantly looking outside itself for contextualization and any sense of meaning; a 
music video rarely, if ever, offers meaning -  one must always make meaning from 
it, or not, as will be discussed later. What I hope to demonstrate is that, as Andrew 
Goodwin suggests, music video performs a musicalization of the image, an
5 Eagleton, T., The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p. 25.
6 Barthes, R., 'Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ in The Responsibility o f Forms, op. cit., 
pp. 93ff.
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extension of an aural paradigm into the visual realm (in a reversal of the usual 
hierarchy), as is frequently suggested in Barthes’ discussion of ‘the text.’7
This process, however, will not take place without first examining historical 
precedent; as Barthes notes: T o  criticize ... is to put into crisis, something which is 
not possible without evaluating the conditions of the crisis (its limits), without 
considering its historical moment.’8 In order to explicate the fragmentary qualities 
of the music video, it is necessary to first explore the aesthetic of the fragment as it 
first appeared in the late eighteenth century. The historical proximity of the 
development of the field of aesthetics, and that of the literary form of the ‘fragment’ 
in the late eighteenth century was not mere serendipity. The potency and flexibility 
of thought this mode of Weltverstandnis enables generated a range of analytical 
possibilities, adopted into artistic formats by the Jena circle around the likes of 
Friedrich Schlegel and Jean Paul, beloved by Schumann. When Schlegel 
famously wrote that: ‘A fragment should be like a little work of art, complete in itself 
and separated from the rest of the universe like a hedgehog,’9 he clearly meant 
this to say as much about the nature of the work of art as about the fragment. This 
should not be taken as an argument in favour of the separation of art and world, at 
least not in the sense of a straightforward autonomy -  a hedgehog is no more 
separate from the universe than the sun or the moon; rather it is constitutive of that 
universe, in however small a way, and the same is true of the artwork, with a 
similarly ill-defined boundary point. A frequently cited musical example of this is 
Schumann’s ‘lm wunderschonen Monat Mai,’ the opening song from the 
Dichterliebe cycle, which in terms of functional harmony begins with the sequence: 
ii74'3, V7 in F# minor, before resolving into A major on the entry of the voice, and
7 One might offer as examples, passages of S/Z, the statement that ‘listening 
bears within it that metaphor best suited to the ‘textual,’ (footnote in 'The Third 
Meaning,’ in Image Music Text, op. cit., p. 53), or the close of ‘Diderot. Brecht, 
Eisenstein,’ op. cit., ‘How long till music, the Text?’ (p. 97).
8 Barthes, R., ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers,’ in Image Music Text, op. cit., p. 
208.
9 Quoted in Rosen, C., The Romantic Generation, (HarperCollins, London, 1996), 
p. 48. The following reading and discussion owes much to Rosen's chapter 
‘Fragments’ in this book.
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concludes with the same sequence, finishing on the dominant seventh chord. The 
effect in performance is one of profound ambiguity, and serves to project the song 
both forwards and backwards in time by implying both an unheard prologue and a 
continuation of the song. Although this is a particularly impressive and beautiful 
example, the same effect is produced less artfully in innumerable pop songs that 
employ the familiar fade-out of a repeated chord sequence. A better example is 
that of the video to Basement Jaxx’s ‘Jus’ 1 Kiss,’ which opens as if ‘cutting in’ on 
a held synthesizer chord, and a black screen with a disembodied head moving 
slowly around the very edge of it, moves to a muffled introduction with ‘home 
video’ footage of Basement Jaxx before the song proper. (N.B. There is a 
disjunction between sound and image here, the image track ‘proper’ starting 
several seconds before the sound track ‘proper.’) Then to close there is more 
‘home video' footage of Felix Jaxx starting up the beginning of the song again on a 
portable stereo. As with ‘lm wunderschonen Monat Mai’ the music video is 
projected both backward into its own pre-existence, and forwards, continuing in 
another realm after its cessation in this world. This example also illustrates well a 
further technique common to the Romantic fragment, that of its disjunction from 
reality, or at least the problematizing of this relation. Time and again in Romantic 
literature one sees either points of self-referentiality and overt situating of the 
author/narrator, or else the text is consciously other-worldly, as in that most 
famous of literary fragments, Coleridge’s Kubla Khan, subtitled as a fragment’ and 
preceded by the story of the caller from Porlock.10 The poem is ruptured both 
internally, by its constant shifting of metre, and physically by the break at line 37 
(‘A damsel with a dulcimer ... ’) that marks a shift in tone from story-telling to 
personal (dream) recollection, and externally, ‘from the rest of the universe,’ by its 
fantastical content and its conscious labelling as ‘a fragment.’ The artefact is 
fragmented both at the level of its context and at the level of the work, and no 
doubt a close reading would reveal further disjunctions amongst the words 
themselves.
This multiple layering of fragmentation could be achieved musically in a 
single gesture via a technique employed repeatedly by Schumann, that of musical
10 The introduction was prefixed in its 1816 publication. See Coleridge: Poetry and 
Prose, ed. Garrod, H.W., (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1925), pp. 180-1 for details.
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quotation. Of course musical quotation did not originate with Schumann -  the 
cantus firmi of medieval polyphony were frequently based on popular melodies; 
there are dozens based upon ‘L’Homme Arme’ alone.11 However, whereas earlier 
quotation was integrated into the structure of the new piece -  disguised, in effect -  
Schumann’s use of it goes to some lengths to mark it out, both by shifts of rhythm 
and of texture, as in the insertion of a section of one of his own earlier works, 
Papillon, into the ‘Florestan’ section of Carnaval. As Rosen states: What is 
revolutionary here is not the introduction of a quotation from another work but the 
way it is made to sound like a quotation. If Schumann’s directions are faithfully 
carried out, the phrase will appear to be an intruder from somewhere else, even to 
those who have never heard another work by Schumann.'12 Both the form of the 
piece 'Florestan,' and its musical status as an autonomous work are thrown into 
doubt, but the way in which Schumann introduces the quotation, first as a 
momentary, hesitant, one bar fragment, then as a more completely recalled 
melody, and finally absorbed into the texture of the piece, throws the relationship 
between sound and world, music and listener, into an even more complex relief. 
The use of this quotation, and even its labelling with a question mark in the score, 
is clearly a model of musical recollection, and the way in which that memory is 
then incorporated into the context of its recollection. The scraps of memory that 
float into consciousness are clarified and then recontextualized in relation to 
current circumstance -  the dialogical relationship between past and present that is 
essential to all musical appreciation is here made flesh, or rather, tone. As Rosen 
demonstrates this technique is used again on a larger scale and with greater 
facility in Schumann’s Phantasie, which works and reworks a melodic fragment 
from Beethoven's An die Feme Geliebte into a complex hierarchy of memories, 
and concludes: The phrase of Beethoven is made to seem like an involuntary 
memory, not consciously recalled, but inevitably produced by the music we have 
just heard. A memory becomes a fragment when it is felt as both alien and
11 See, for example, Lockwood, L., Aspects of the ‘L’Homme Arme’ Tradition,’ 
Proceedings o f the Royal Musical Association, 100, (1974), pp. 97-122.
12 Rosen, C., op cit., p. 99.
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intimate, when we are aware that it is as much a sign of the present as of the 
past.’13
Carolyn Abbate has stated that ‘Music has no past tense,’14 in that it 
flattens everything out onto the level of discourse, but I would suggest that music is 
nothing but past tense. Music involves a temporal displacement, like the 
Bedingnis of Heidegger: The sounding, ringing, vibrating of language that goes on 
in excess of explanation,’15 the reverberation of history from which one constructs 
understanding. All experience of music is an experience of pastness, and takes 
the form of recollection, in that one apprehends music as the impact of sound 
waves upon the body, as vibration and resonance, as the affective trace of an 
event that has already taken place. As Bjork puts it, ‘I miss you, but I haven't met 
you yet, I remember, but it hasn’t happened yet.’16 Hence, listening to music is an 
exercise in nostalgia, trying to hold still what has already passed, a continual 
construction of what has been, that puts the subject into temporal flux, and undoes 
the notion of presence. This is perhaps somewhat ironic, since it was suggested in 
the Introduction that the application of an ‘aural paradigm’ was supposed to focus 
attention precisely on the issue of presence, rather than representation. 
‘Musicalization’ simultaneously poses the question of presence and effaces it -  it 
focusses attention there only to disappoint. But in so doing, it refines the notion of 
affect, which with music is inherently a communal phenomenon, transgressive of 
spatial boundaries, and also inextricably bound up with the formation of memory. 
Thus the memorization of the musical fragment takes on a Proustian quality, that 
of the memoire involontaire, as an infolding of the sensory impact of air molecules 
in motion, that is shared by all who have had the same experience. One might 
compare this to a passage of Asafiev, in which he discusses the memorization of 
melodic fragments by a community as a whole, such that they:
13 Ibid., p. 112.
14 Quoted in Nattiez, J.-J., ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?’ Journal o f the 
Royal Musical Association, vol. 115:2, (1990), p. 244.
15 Bruns, G.L., The Otherness of Words: Joyce, Bakhtin, Heidegger,’ in 
Postmodernism -  Philosophy and the Arts, ed. Silverman, H.J., (Routledge, New 
York and London, 1990), p. 136.
16 Gudmundsdottir, B., ‘I miss you,’ on the Post album.
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Enter into oral tradition as living intonations. ... Beyond the compositions themselves 
lies the world of music as the activity of the mass public consciousness, from little more 
than sound interjections, at times simply rhythmic intonations, and from characteristic 
universally loved melodic figures, to more developed melodic shoots and harmonic 
turns.17
The idea that there is a corpus of musical fragments that constitute some form of 
cultural memory, one that must inevitably interact with the experience of both old 
and new music, is a powerful one, and is something to which I will return in chapter 
III. For now, however, it is sufficient to state that the dialectic between the 
experience of music and musical experience, consciously exploited and rendered 
overt by Schumann, is already bound up in the phenomenology of music, and that 
the format of this phenomenology is necessarily a fragmentary one.
An attempt to combine world and music, although to rather different ends, 
is not unfamiliar to musicologists. The field of musical biography feeds upon the 
presumption that connections can be drawn between the two, and in its most 
disreputable form will demonstrate the precise parallels between the situation and 
disposition of the composer, and the musical works that flow ineluctably from this 
state of being. The intention is to provide both a narrative framework and unifying 
creed to an often disparate corpus of work, as well as to explain the organic 
genesis of each individual piece, and given the nature and type of Schumann’s 
output it is unsurprising that he has been particularly prone to such treatment. And 
Schumann himself did little to dissuade anyone from trying their hand at a little 
amateur psychology; the works are peppered with biographical details, to such an 
extent that the simplistic, one-to-one mapping, unidirectional (which is to say a 
passage from life to work) model becomes difficult to sustain. If we return to 
Carnaval for a moment, which in the words of Lawrence Kramer approaches an 
ideal subject precisely through a kind of fragmentation,’ there is a superabundance 
of biographical material provided freely by Schumann, insofar as all of ‘the 
miniatures that make up this collection are either character sketches or dances,
17 Asafiev, B., quoted in Monelle, R., Linguistics and Semiotics in Music, (Harwood 
Academic Publishers, Chur etc., 1992), p. 277.
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that is, personal or social images.’18 Not only do we have the divided self-image of 
the composer expressed in the ‘Florestan’ and ‘Eusebius’ sections of the piece, but 
the former of these, as mentioned above, quotes from one of his own earlier 
works. Sections continually run into one another, complete one another 
harmonically, making a mockery of the idea of a stable and chronologically ordered 
identity. The usual musicological solution to this thorny problem is to seek refuge 
in the cryptic ‘Sphinxes,’ a set of three pitch motifs derived from the lettering of his 
own name, and from two alternate musical ‘spellings’ of his then fiancee’s home 
town, which are used to convey unity upon the Carnaval set. This conveniently 
overlooks, however, both the parts of the set unrelated to the Sphinxes, and more 
obviously the fact that there are three Sphinxes, which although related in pitch 
content are clearly distinct. To portray this as being a unity of sorts is to wilfully 
ignore a much simpler explanation; it is what Julia Kristeva terms a ‘plural 
totality,’19 a multiplicity of interacting fragments, coherent but not coterminous.
It is a paradox that probably would have delighted the Jena circle, that the 
idea of the fragment as an important mode of expression coincided with the 
emergence of the aesthetic principles of organicism and unity. This in part 
explains the unique position of Schumann in music history, at once admired and 
derided, who as primary inheritor of the ideas of the Jena circle in the field of music 
produced work of undeniable quality, while failing utterly to conform to the criteria 
that would later become the yardstick of compositional ability, that is, the 
Schenkerian ideal of large-scale compositional direction and unity. Schumann not 
only appears to fail according to this standard, but at times seems almost hostile to 
the idea, and yet his music has a formal brilliance all of its own, a status that 
stands outside the box of the autonomous art work. Rosen writes:
The Romantic fragment is a closed structure, but its closure is a formality: it may be 
separated from the rest of the universe, but it implies the existence of what is outside 
itself not by reference but by its instability. The form is not fixed but is torn apart or
18 Kramer, L., Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900, (University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), p. 210.
19 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Waller, M., (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1984), p. 101.
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exploded by paradox, by ambiguity, just as the opening song of Dichterliebe is a 
closed, circular form in which beginning and end are unstable -  implying a past before 
the song begins and a future after its final chord.20
This ability to generate a formal alternative, a means of resistance, if you will, to 
the dominant musical aesthetic of the time has not won Schumann a great many 
friends, but his contribution to theory has not gone unnoticed: it is surely more than 
coincidence that leads Barthes to note that Gilles Deleuze and himself are among 
‘the only Schumannians I know.’21
And yet there is a danger in the model of the fragment put forward by 
Rosen, or rather there is a temptation. The ambiguity between art and world so 
carefully created and nurtured is under constant threat -  Rosen at one point 
describes the fragment as ‘incomplete’ in content, the suggestion being that the 
world might enter in to complete it, that the fragment only projects outside itself so 
that the world might endow it with meaning, permit it a raison d ’etre. In Deleuzean 
terms, the fragment no sooner performs a deterritorialization than it invites a 
reterritorialization upon a new content. I do not regard this model of analysis as 
either useful or desirable. My aim is not to ‘establish the truth of the text, but its 
plurality (however parsimonious); the units of meaning (the connotations) ... will 
not then be regrouped, provided with a meta-meaning which would be the ultimate 
construction to be given them.’22 In the words of Friedrich Schlegel’s namesake 
Margaret, ‘Only connect.’23 The fragmentary text is above all a generative text, a 
cue to recollection and reflection, and the key qualities of the Romantic fragment 
are its ambiguity and playfulness, as described by Novalis in his manifesto for a 
new kind of literature:
Narratives, without connectedness, but with associations, like dreams. Poems -  just 
sounding well and full of beautiful words -  but also without any sense or 
connectedness -  at most a single strophe that is understandable -  like so many
20 Rosen, C., op. cit., p. 51.
21 Barthes, R., ‘Loving Schumann,’ in The Responsibility o f Forms, op. cit., p. 298.
22 Barthes, R., S/Z, trans. Miller, R., (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p. 14.
23 Forster, E.M., Howards End, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1941).
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fragments of the most different kinds of things. True poetry can, at most, have an 
overall allegorical sense, and make an indirect effect, like music.24
Erzahlung, ohne Zusammenhang, jedoch mit Association, wie Traume. Gedichte -  
bloss wohlklingend und voll schoner Worte -  aber auch ohne alien Sinn und 
Zusammenhang -  hochtens einzelne Strofen verstandlich -  sie mussen, wie lauter 
Brauchstucke aus den verschiedenartigen Dingen seyn. Hochstens kann wahren 
Poesie einen allegorischen Sinn im Grossen haben und eine indirecte Wirkung wie 
Musik etc.25
(It should be noted that the German Zusammenhang implies a considerably more 
tightly bound relationship than the English ‘connectedness;’ Rosen translates it as 
‘logic.’) And it is this model of the fragment, formulated by Novalis in response to 
the dreamlike qualities of fragmentation and association he perceived in music, 
that is taken up by and realized in the format of music video.
II
The recruiting of music as an art form to varying aesthetic banners has a long and 
ignoble history that spans the nineteenth century, and which must act as a 
framework of understanding for Novalis’s manifesto. There is little to choose 
between Hegel’s assertion that music could not express concepts and was 
therefore essentially worthless, and the stance of Hoffman et al which formed a 
rather too easy connection between music’s indecipherability and ‘the ineffable,’ 
thus granting music the status of the art to which others might aspire, and all this 
before one even begins to address the concept of the 'purely musical.’ Amongst 
the fog and smoke of philosophical war, in which the aim of all parties seemed to
24 Translation taken from Treitler, L , ‘Mozart and the Idea of Absolute Music,’ in 
Music and the Historical Imagination, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1989), p. 184.
25 Original German taken from Rosen, C., op. cit., p. 76.
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be the claiming of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony to each’s own standard, there are 
any number of contradictory positions, the complexities of which would form a 
lengthy book in its own right (for an overview of these issues, see Carl Dahlhaus’s 
The Idea o f Absolute Music26), but a few key points do emerge. Prime among 
these are the questions of meaning and music, and narrative and music.
The issue of locating meaning in music is sufficiently troublesome to have 
been almost entirely avoided by traditional musicological analysis; one can’t help 
but suspect that Schenkerian analysis is as much about studiously ignoring the 
social complexity of music as with constructing something genuinely immanent to 
its material qualities. Even the Baroque period’s interest with ‘the affections' or the 
Enlightenment's ‘passions,’ while interesting in themselves, are clearly means of 
substitution for the category of meaning, deliberate or not. One possible 
conclusion which might be drawn from this is that the concept of meaning is simply 
not a particularly useful or relevant one in relation to music, and there is a sense in 
which this view has some merit, but the problem that needs to be explicated here 
lies in the use of the blanket term ‘meaning.’ The concept of ‘musical meaning’ 
covers a sufficiently broad range of competing arguments as to require a 
distinction between different sorts of ‘meaning:’ is the reference to denoted or 
connoted meaning, semiotic or semantic meaning, ‘extra-musical’ meaning, or 
even a Barthesian ‘third meaning’ (the obtuse, as opposed to the obvious27). The 
concept of music as directly denoting meaning, as language does, is impossible to 
sustain, and as such analysis of the ‘purely musical,’ be it Schenkerian, 
paradigmatic analysis, or pitch-set theory (although as Robert Snarrenberg has 
suggested, in Schenker’s case this is due to a deliberate stripping down of 
Schenker’s thought to its positivistic aspects alone28), has fought shy of even 
addressing the question of meaning. But this is not to say that it lacks any sense
26 Dahlhaus, C., The Idea o f Absolute Music, trans. Lustig, R., (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1989).
27 These terms are discussed and defined in Barthes’ essay The Third Meaning: 
Research notes on some Eisenstein stills,’ Image Music Text, op. cit., pp. 52-68.
28 Snarrenberg, R., ‘Competing myths: the American abandonment of Schenker’s 
organicism,’ in Theory, analysis and meaning in music, ed. Pople, A., (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 29-56.
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of meaning -  as Raymond Monelle suggests, ‘Music never seems meaningless’29 
-  simply that they have given up trying to say what it is. Whether ‘seeming’ to 
have meaning is the same as being meaningful is not something that Monelle 
elaborates on, however.
The notion of connotative meaning in music, which is to say an implied 
meaning, is much more readily accepted, and forms the basis of most musical 
criticism. This places musical meaning in orbit around the object, rather than at its 
heart, such that meaning is not something immanent to the object, but ‘extra­
musical.’ It might be suggested, however, that this is due to a flawed model of the 
musical object and the concept of immanence, rather than the implied 
impoverishment and second handness’ of extra-musical meaning. There is a 
strain of music theory that attempts to combine musical analysis with the so-called 
extra-musical,’ by treating music as a semantic system. As with connoted 
meaning, music is understood in relation to its social background, such that 
‘meaning ... arises as a function of context,’30 but rather than simply reflecting the 
social qualities of its reception in some way, it also becomes a direct expression of 
the set of social relations that are involved in its forming. Many writers in this field 
have arrived at similar conclusions having started out from differing stances: Boris 
Asafiev’s outlook was so radically social as to almost cross over into 
phenomenology, in that he believed musical comprehension was fundamentally 
rooted in cultural experience, so that ‘Each listener ... begins an auditory 
acquaintance new to him [s/'c.j through recognition and comparison as to whether 
there are elements in it of intonations familiar to his consciousness,’ or as Monelle 
puts it: The comprehension of music can only begin with the familiar. . . . No work 
can be wholly new, or it would be wholly incomprehensible.’31 David Osmond- 
Smith and Robert Hatten converge on the same point from opposite sides, the 
former beginning with an iconic understanding of musical representation, and 
acknowledging the cultural and historical basis of this, and the other showing how 
musically expressive devices may become ossified into cultural units, respectively,
29 Monelle, R., op. cit., p. 17.
30 Tomlinson, G., The Web of Culture: A Context for Musicology,’ Nineteenth 
Century Music, 7, (1984), p. 355.
31 Monelle, R., op. cit., p. 278.
28
to the extent that ‘there seems no difference in identifying established cultural 
content in a musical gesture, from recognizing the “meaning" of a linguistic 
morpheme.’32 In terms of musical analysis, the net effect of this is to change the 
question ‘what does this mean?’ into ‘how does this mean?,’ as is suggested by 
Kofi Agawu. However, this shift brings into play a range of other forces that 
Agawu’s analytic system seems to have difficulty coping with.
One of the most obvious consequences of a semantic approach to 
analysing musical meaning is the proliferation of a multiplicity of meanings; 
meaning is so utterly underdetermined in the musical text that any attempt to 
restrain the resulting semantic promiscuity is doomed to failure. Agawu notes this 
tendency, stating: ‘It seems more useful, in the face of the multiplicity of potential 
meanings of any single work, to frame the analytical question in terms of the 
dimensions that make meaning possible.’33 Rather than celebrate this multiplicity, 
however, Agawu seeks to curtail it, continuing: ‘Only then can we hope to reduce 
away the fanciful meanings that are likely to crop up in an unbridled discussion of 
the phenomenon, and to approach the preferred meanings dictated by both 
historical and theoretical limitations.’34 This ‘reduced’ meaning is derived from an 
observation of a dialectic between the inner workings’ (p. 72) of the piece (the 
‘purely’ musical, which is no less so for Agawu’s use of scare quotes (p. 51)), and 
hermeneutically constructed ‘topics’ of the classical period, which are broadly 
speaking, ‘extra-musical.’ There are several dubious assumptions here -  there is 
a whiff of ‘telling it as it really was’ hanging over the set of topics he arranges, but 
more important is his failure to ask by whom were these meanings preferred, and 
why, and the lack of a dialectical relationship of the piece to the socialization of 
reception. One might compare Agawu’s shift from the what’ to the how’ of 
musical meaning with Nicholas Cook’s statement that: ‘Instead of talking about 
meaning as something that the music has, we should be talking about it as 
something the music does (and has done to it).’35 The notion of music as process
32 Ibid., p. 270.
33 Agawu, K., Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation o f Classic Music, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1991), p. 5.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 9.
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implicit in Agawu’s ‘how does it mean’ is invoked only to tie down music all the 
more securely, and without reflection on what this meaning means. Understanding 
meaning in music was clearly untenable and unanswerable in the form of a ‘what’ 
question, but having moved to a ‘how’ question Agawu shies away from its 
ramifications.
Music ceases to be a thing, ein Ding, in Heidegger’s terms, and becomes 
an event, Bedingnis, and the consequences of this for meaning are potentially dire, 
or liberating, depending upon one’s standpoint. Both Cook and Chris Small effect 
the change from musical object to musical event, or ‘musicking,’ as Chris Small 
terms it,36 and both choose to reinstate meaning as a function of the interactions 
that are set in place, rather than attempt ‘to escape the tyranny of meaning.'37 The 
tendency of meaning is always to become product rather than process, an 
idealizing and fixing of something that is in flux. To make a sound event mean 
something is to stop it being a sound and make it into something else, an ideal 
category, stripped of its materiality and ontologized. As Adorno states in Aesthetic 
Theory: The movement toward the negation of meaning was exactly what 
meaning deserved,’38 (and I shall return to Adorno and the status of meaning in 
chapter III). And in a system where musical meaning can be convincingly 
compared with the exercise of social power, as Jacques Attali has shown,39 the 
resistance to fixing meaning, and of remaining en proces, is one of political 
engagement through a form of refusal to play the game that has been set out in 
advance: ‘It is a political task ... to undertake to reduce communication 
theoretically to the mercantile level of human relations and to integrate it, as a 
simple fluctuating level, to significance, to the text, an apparatus outside of
36 Small, C., Musicking: The Meanings o f Performing and Listening, (Wesleyan 
University Press/University Press of New England, Hanover, NH, 1998).
37 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ in Image Music Text, p. 185.
38 Quoted in Bruns, G.L., The Otherness of Words: Joyce, Bakhtin, Heidegger,’ 
op. cit., p. 120.
39 Attali, J., Noise: The Political Economy o f Music, trans. Massumi, B., (University 
of Manchester Press, Manchester, 1985).
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meaning.’40 An understanding of music as event, as Text, is thus not based upon 
a model of representation, which involves making music into something other than 
sound, idealized, but a stochastic process: one apprehends in parts, fragments, 
which when taken together will trace out the space (and time) the event inhabits, 
resonates in, and which is in a constant state of flux. Meaning is not destroyed, 
but cut adrift of its moorings, pluralized, such that there exists a 'theatrical state of 
meaning ... organized in associative fields, paradigmatic articulations.’41
Indeed, it is perhaps this very quality of fecundity, allied to the reticence to 
address meaning in music, which might explain the dearth of many practical 
examples of the use of this mode of analysis in music. This atomization of the idea 
of the musical work, a double move, inward to the scraps of sound that constitute 
the work, and outward into the web of association woven around each of these, 
creates a considerable problem when it comes to the compiling of practical 
analyses. Perhaps the best attempt, certainly the most complete, at getting to 
grips with this is seen in Phillip Tagg’s analysis of the ‘Kojak’ television theme tune, 
in which he devoted an entire doctorate to the workings of a fifty second-long piece 
of music. His technique of ‘interobjective comparison’ (IOC) was undoubtedly 
labour intensive, requiring the collating of evidence from across the musical 
spectrum to back up his assertion of what were basically cultural ‘truths’ (e.g., the 
connection between rising horn calls and heroic status), but it nevertheless 
demonstrates the awesome scope of potential in even the shortest extract of 
sound material. Consequently, I would suggest that any working out of practical 
examples of musical meaning will be more likely to take the simple form of Simon 
Frith’s ‘Accordions played in a certain way ‘mean’ France, bamboo flutes, China’42 
[quotation marks on ‘mean’ added] following the model that Cook suggests in 
stating that a musical object ‘attracts referents in the same sense that a magnet
40 Barthes, R., ‘Kristeva’s Semeiotike,’ in The Rustle o f Language, University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), p. 170.
41 Barthes, R., The Rhetoric of the Image,’ op. cit., p. 48.
42 Frith, S., Towards an aesthetic of popular music’ in Music and Society: the 
politics o f composition, performance and reception, ed. Leppert, R., and McClary, 
S., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987), p. 148.
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attracts iron filings,’43 than to Tagg’s tortuously complex methodological 
paradigm.44
The question of narrative in music follows on from that of meaning, and is 
similarly complicated by the variety of different claims that have been made in its 
name. The division between traditional and ‘new’ musicology that took place in the 
late 1980s confused the issue still further, since ‘narrativists’ tended to fall into the 
‘new’ camp and were hence grouped together, regardless of the ways in which 
their ideas contradicted one another. Relating music to narrative can take the form 
of a wide range of different practices, some of which are more enlightening than 
others, but all of which I believe to involve treating music in a profoundly unmusical 
way. Which is not to say, however, that I regard all uses of the term narrative in 
music as being necessarily incorrect, and even a very tight proscription of what 
constitutes narrative can prove illuminating when applied to music in particular 
ways. The use of ‘narrative’ in discussions of music became a means by which 
musicologists might set themselves apart from the 'purely musical’ style of 
analysis, and much of this work provided a welcome alternative that gave fresh 
insight to analysis. Lawrence Kramer’s comparison between the multiplicity of 
voices in Beethoven and Schumann (and Freud) and narrative effects in literature 
of the same period, cited above, is a case in point,45 and the nineteenth century 
approach to music criticism often means that there are sound hermeneutic reasons 
to include a consideration of narrative in any analysis. One must be careful, 
however, to make the distinction between something that narrates, and something 
that narrativizes, after Hayden White46 - much of the work in this area is involved 
not in analysing music as narrative, but music as like narrative; it shows the ways 
in which narratives and music are formally analogous, but ignores their material
43 Cook, N., ‘The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk, or Record Sleeves and Reception,’ 
in Composition Performance Reception: Studies in the Creative Process in Music, 
ed. Thomas, W., (Ashgate, Aldershot etc., 1998), p. 115.
44 Given in Tagg, P., 'Analysing Popular Music,’ Popular Music, 2, (1983), p. 46.
45 Kramer, L., op. cit., pp. 176ff.
46 White, H., The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,’ in On 
Narrative, ed. Mitchell, W.J.T., (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1981), pp. 1-23.
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incompatibility. Indeed, discussing music in terms of narrative (and even Barthes’ 
remarkable attempt to discuss narrative in terms of music47), never goes beyond 
analogy, and leaves us none the wiser as to the narrative capabilities of musical 
material.
To state that a given piece of music is a narrative is to imply several things, 
and not simply that there is some form of story attached. Firstly, there is the 
suggestion that we have some form of teleology here, that there is a directed goal, 
a product, at the end of a chain of linked events. Clearly in a model that has 
fragmented the musical object into a series of associative webs that may be 
tenuously, if at all connected, this is a difficult idea to sustain. If one privileges the 
paradigmatic over the syntagmatic, the fragment over the totality (although the 
equivalence paradigm/fragment -  syntagm/totality is only a provisional one; one 
cannot separate the individual fragment from the totality to the same extent that a 
paradigm might be viewed apart from the syntagm in which it is immersed), one 
immediately makes the idea of any kind of coherent narrative problematic. 
Secondly, one implies the existence of a distinction between what is variously 
termed ‘fabula’ or story, and its expression, ‘syuzhet’ or discours. Since the 
denotative qualities of music are so vague as to be non-existent it is difficult to 
maintain a separate musical story and an order of narration, music’s ‘story’ is its 
means of expression, its content-plane and expression-plane are indivisible 
(although not indistinguishable). Furthermore, most theories of narrative rely on 
the receiver being able to reference some kind of verisimilitude, in order to gauge 
the relation between ‘story’ and ‘discourse,’ but however well bound into the world 
music might be by reference, the occasions on which it represents that world, 
cuckoo calls, onomatopoeic sounds, are vanishingly rare, making the concept of 
verisimilitude in music nonsensical. If music is to be regarded as narration, and go 
beyond being analogous, it must fulfil the rules outlined above, namely, that it 
engenders an interaction between a represented actuality and a discursive 
practice. Leo Treitler is somewhat cagey on the fine distinction between narration 
and narrativity, but acknowledges the bipartite model and agrees that it is 
interaction between the two aspects that creates narrative, writing: ‘Central to the 
functioning of narrativity is the interplay between two intersecting patterns: the
47 Barthes, R., S/Z, pp. 28-30.
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chronological sequence of the events’ occurrence, and the order of their unfolding 
in the telling.’48 However, I believe that in distilling the complexities involved in 
representing reality down to the simple matter of chronological time, Treitler has 
misrepresented the full scope of narrative. Thus when he states
The apprehension of a musical work depends, in quite similar ways, on two intertwined 
processes: on the one hand the underlying patterns of conventional genres and implicit 
constraints arising from the grammar of style (harmony, voice-leading, and so on), and 
on the other the progressive interpretation of these determinants through the unfolding 
of the work in time. The first dimension is not exactly like the chronological sequence 
of the events of a story, but it is the counterpart in being the dimension of the 
determinants that are more or less fixed prior to the unfolding.49
one might be forgiven for not taking this as proof of music’s narrativity. Indeed, as 
stated above, music’s affect confuses and complicates the linearity of the 
temporal. The problem, if it might be termed so, for music is its inability to 
reformulate the real, to represent, in any recognizable form, a reality outside of 
itself.
Both Carolyn Abbate and Jean-Jacques Nattiez take a different tack, 
focussing on the ability of music to ‘narrativize’ rather than to narrate,' and at times 
explicitly distance themselves from other approaches: ‘When music is explained as 
the direct enactment of what might be called “promusical objects,” then it is denied 
discursive latitude, for it is read as being events, and not reformulating or 
recounting them.’50 And Abbate explicitly states: The fact that music thus lends 
itself to description as such a “narrative” does not actually constitute immanent 
narrativity.'5' As with Cook and Small with regard to musical meaning, Nattiez and 
Abbate recognize that the musical object is in fact not only object but act: ‘I
48 Treitler, L., Music and the Historical Imagination, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, and London, 1989), p. 186.
49 Ibid., p. 190.
50 Abbate, C., Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1991), p. 27.
51 Ibid., p. 28.
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propose that we understand musical narration not as an omnipresent 
phenomenon, not as a sonorous encoding of human events or psychological 
states, but rather as a rare and peculiar act.’52 This act, however, is not permitted 
by Abbate and Nattiez to remain as sonorous acting for any length of time, and is 
instead returned to the system of communication as musical ‘discourse.’ Nattiez 
states: The narrative, strictly speaking, is not in the music, but in the plot imagined 
and constructed by the listeners from functional objects. ... For the listener, any 
“narrative” instrumental work is not in itself a narrative, but the structural analyses 
in music o f an absent narrative.’53 Once again, music is reconceived as activity 
simply to become a different product, a translation of ‘the idea.’ To understand 
music as narrative, whether that be as ‘narration’ or as ‘narrativizing,’ is to tie it in 
place, so that it becomes just another way of inscribing a pre-existing social order, 
a place where the subject might enter in to complete production, but never say 
anything new.
Music does not lie, because of necessity the task of linking these phantoms of 
characters to suggestions of action will fall to me, the listener: it is not within the 
semiological possibilities of music to link a subject to a predicate. ... If, in listening to 
music, I am tempted by the “narrative impulse,” it is indeed because, on the level of the 
strictly musical discourse, I recognize returns, expectations and resolutions, but of what 
I do not know. Thus I have a wish to complete through words what the music does not 
say because it is not in its semiological nature to say it to me.54
Thus, through narrative, the word is invited in to fulfil what sound alone could, or 
perhaps would, not -  the formation of a product, the completion of communication, 
the constitution of the subject. The predicate is always the bulwark with which the 
subject’s imaginary protects itself from the loss which threatens it.’55 Nattiez 
recognizes the misapplication of predication to music, the refusal of sound to 
transfer directly the subjectivity of the composer in the poietic process, but then
52 Ibid., p. 19.
53 Nattiez, J.-J., ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?,’ op. cit., p. 249.
54 Ibid., pp. 244-5.
55 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ op. cit., p. 179.
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reinstates this in the aesthesic realm, rejecting the aural paradigm, signifiance, in 
favour of the visual.
If music is so readily co-opted to a ‘visual’ model, by which I mean one 
based upon secure representation, so as to enable clear meaning-product to be 
communicated, it might be thought that the medium of music video would 
accomplish this all the more readily. What I wish to argue, though, is that this is 
precisely what does not happen; certainly they are an invitation to narrativize, 
perhaps more so than music alone, and some are more susceptible to this than 
others, but in the main it is remarkable how resistant music videos are to narrative 
and any sort of secured meaning. Images, like sounds, are held en proces, 
instead of being communicative of product. Music videos enable one to resist the 
temptation of the ‘narrative impulse.’ (It would be a mistake, however, to conclude 
that pop music’s resistance to narrativization is in an explicitly anti-narrative 
stance, as certain post-modernists would have it: the work of Kaplan,56 amongst 
others, misrepresents music just as much as those that would ‘read’ a musical text 
like a newspaper.) Perhaps this is less surprising if one acknowledges the type of 
music that music videos are typically formed around, which is to say, the three 
minute pop song; this immediately prevents the development of any kind of 
extended story. As Richard Middleton notes: ‘If pop songs are “little plays,” as has 
been suggested, they are mostly sketches of situations rather than lengthy 
dramatic narratives.’57
The raising of the status of music to dominant partner in the music video 
composite is prompted not only by aesthetics, but also by practicalities of music 
video production, where the soundtrack precedes the image track in all but a 
minute number of cases. As such, sound provides the template to which the 
image must be accommodated. Furthermore, this process binds the act of music 
reception into the poietic process itself, so that the making of the image takes the 
form of a response to the music, and the music video is collectivized at the level of 
its incipience. One might compare this to Theodor Adorno's criticism of the
56 See Kaplan, E.A., Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, 
and Consumer Culture, (Routledge, London and New York, 1987).
57 Middleton, R., Studying Popular Music, (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 
1990), p. 224.
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Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk on the grounds that ‘the Gesamtkunstwerk is 
founded on the bourgeois “individual” with his soul,’58 which he contrasted with a 
model not wedded to the concept of individual ‘genius.’ ‘A valid Gesamtkunstwerk, 
purged of its false identity, would have required a collective of specialist planners 
... in which each person would take up the work at the point where another has to 
give it up.’59 Although I would be wary of applying the term Gesamtkunstwerk, with 
its considerable theoretical ‘baggage,’ to the music video format (a point discussed 
in detail in chapter II), it certainly approaches the model that Adorno puts forward 
here. All of which serves to demonstrate that if one wishes to understand music 
video, or start to analyse it, one would do well to begin by adopting an aural, rather 
than a visual paradigm: issues of representation and narrative should be rejected 
in favour of affect and spatio-temporal relation. Above all, the prompting of 
material selection and analytic strategy should come first from the video artefact 
itself, rather than the importing of analytical techniques from elsewhere.
In contrast to the connections that were frequently drawn in discussions in 
the 1980s, music videos are not little films,60 and as Andrew Goodwin and many 
others have noted, the imposition of film theory upon music video analysis has 
tended to conclude that music videos are failed narratives.61 For example, even 
Kobena Mercer’s analysis of Michael Jackson’s ‘Thriller,’ a video’ almost unique in 
the lengths it goes to in order to appear ‘film ic,’ (running to fifteen minutes,
58 Adorno, T.W., In Search o f Wagner, trans. Livingstone, R., (Verso, London and 
New York, 1991), p. 110.
59 Ibid., p. 111.
60 There are any number of examples, but a good one is Lawrence Grossberg’s 
comparison of the stylistics of 1980s ‘brat-pack’ films to music video, in The Media 
Economy of Rock Culture: Cinema, Post-modernism and Authenticity,’ in Sound 
and Vision: The Music Video Reader, ed. Frith, S., Goodwin, A., and Grossberg, 
L., (Routledge, London and New York, 1993), pp. 185-209.
61 Goodwin, A., Dancing in the Distraction Factory: Music Television and Popular 
Culture, (University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1992). Goodwin is 
particularly critical of Kaplan and Fiske for misinterpreting video events under the 
rubric of postmodernism when they can be explained straightforwardly by attention 
to musical practice.
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complete with opening and closing credits, and made by an established film 
director), eventually ‘acknowledges that there is no “plot” as such: the narrative 
code that structures the story has no story to tell. Rather it creates a simulacrum 
of a story, a parody of a story, in its stylistic send-up of genre conventions.’62 
Notably, in his attempt to identify the narrative of this video, Mercer, in common 
with Kaplan et al, almost entirely avoids any mention of the actual music, referring 
only to its lyric (word) content. Conversely, if one approaches the music video as a 
‘making musical of the television image,’63 any consideration of narrative becomes 
largely incidental. In Carol Vernallis’s words: The  use of the musical section as 
the fundamental unit places an emphasis upon varied repetition of materials over 
linear development.’64 It is not that the idea of narrative is entirely absent from the 
world of pop; just that it is not located at the level of the music video artefact. 
Quoting Goodwin once more: ‘characterization, fiction, and perhaps even narrative 
itself exist in popular music at the point of narration, outside the diegesis of 
individual songs, live performances, or video clips, through the persona of the pop 
star.’65 This phenomenon is not limited to music video -  Barry King has written on 
the existence of the same process at work in cinema,66 and the refocussing of 
identity upon the ‘personality’ of the star constitutes what Benjamin terms false 
aura.’67 However, in music video, unlike in film, it provides a mechanism by which 
a visual paradigm might be reasserted, and confers a unity that is not present at 
the level of music video text.
In order to understand music video analytically, then, first one must 
generate and identify, both materially and relationally, a set of fragments that can
62 Mercer, K., ‘Monster Metaphors: Notes on Michael Jackson’s Thriller,' in Sound 
and Vision: the Music Video Reader, ed. Frith, S., Goodwin, A., and Grossberg, L., 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1993).
63 Goodwin, A., Dancing in the Distraction Factory, p. 70.
64 Vernallis, C., The Aesthetics of Music Video: An analysis of Madonna’s 
‘Cherish,” Popular Music, 17, (1998), p. 169.
65 Goodwin, A., op. cit., p. 103.
66 King, B., Articulating Stardom,’ in Stardom: Industry o f Desire, ed. Gledhill, C., 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1991), pp. 167-182.
67 This point is made by Middleton, R., op. cit., p. 66.
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be observed paradigmatically and, where relevant, syntagmatically, to produce a 
clarification of ‘metonymic residues:’68 not simply to cut up and compare. One 
should also bear in mind the ideologically charged nature of music video reception: 
it is important that the fragments are genuinely generative of something new, and 
not merely a reproduction of the ‘star-text’ from which they were derived.
Quite apart from the issue of a ‘musicalization’ of the television image, 
which is at least potentially contentious, there is a further reason to suppose that 
the discussion of meaning and narrative in music above is directly transferable to a 
theorization of music video analysis. The rejection of the autonomous musical 
object as outlined above, and its replacement with the concept of music-in-the- 
world, is contingent upon the idea that music is always-already bound up with a set 
of ‘non-musical’ entities, to the extent that the distinction musical/extra-musical 
becomes impossible to draw clearly. In short, the range of extra-musical ideas and 
objects brought into play by the conjunction of music and image in a music video is 
more properly an amplification of a process already at work than a qualitative shift 
in the way that music is perceived, particularly so in the field of pop music. As 
Goodwin notes: ‘[It] is not a case of video imagery transforming pop meanings so 
much as an example of a video clip building on the visual codes already in play. It 
is an important point for the argument about “fixing” meaning, because such a 
phenomenon would be significant only if it could be shown that video routinely 
offers a closing off of the potential readings of songs.’69 It is frequently stated that 
‘a picture is worth a thousand words,' but the truth of this statement is just as often 
missed, for it is equally true to say that a word might be worth a thousand pictures, 
and a sound worth more again. The process of translation between specific art 
forms is always inexact and accompanied by polysemy, so that a composite art 
form such as music video has the potential for almost unlimited interpretation. In 
practice many of these possibilities are closed off, others are amplified and brought 
to the fore, but like Terry Eagleton’s description of the Hegelian dialectical system, 
the music video 'never leaves anything entirely behind.’70 Of course pop music 
has always cultivated this process -  the musical careers of Elvis Presley and the
68 Monelle, R., op. cit., p. 315.
69 Ibid., p. 11.
70 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 144.
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Beatles are indivisible from their films, press photographs, and record covers in the 
popular imagination, let alone more recent manufactured’ pop acts, but this is a 
feature of all music in Western culture, of the very idea of musical culture. Cook 
writes:
Musical cultures are not simply cultures of sounds, nor simply cultures of 
representations of sounds, but cultures of the relationship between sound and 
representation. The cohabitation and confrontation of different media are inscribed 
within the practice of Western classical music (and perhaps of all music), in the 
relationship between sound and verbal discourse. It is in this sense that music, even 
“music alone," should properly be seen as a form of multimedia in which all the 
components but one have been forced to run underground, sublimated or otherwise 
marginalized.'1
This is the theoretical framework that one must enter into in order to develop a 
practical methodology of music video analysis.
What, then, is it that I perceive in the presence of music video? What are 
the qualities that persist in the memory after I have turned away from the screen? 
The answer, at once banal and profound, is that I perceive many things in a 
simultaneity, or rather, a series of simultaneities. Not the vertical disjunction of 
sound, word, and image, but a syntagmatic disjunction of sound/word/image 
complexes, each satiated and replete with incipient meaning, and yet 
simultaneously dependent upon its connection with a broader (social) context, for 
none of these complexes is received in isolation -  I perceive a syntagmatic 
disjunction, but as a precondition of this I perceive also the presence of syntagm, a 
relationship Vernallis describes as ‘the here and now of the video, its moment-to- 
moment flow.’72 To rephrase this in terms of my earlier model, as a set of 
fragments that cohere to form something other (I hesitate to say more, though that 
is undoubtedly what I mean) than the sum of their collective parts. The fragmented 
address of the music video necessarily draws one’s attention to the social totality
71 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, p. 270.
72 Vernallis, C., op. cit., p. 175.
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of which it is a part: ‘Direct discourse is a detached fragment of a mass and is born 
of the dismemberment of the collective assemblage; but the collective assemblage 
is always like the murmur from which I take my proper name, the constellation of 
voices, concordant or not, from which I draw my voice.’73 Fragments are not joined 
in a linear relationship, according to the logic of the syntagm, but by an associative 
process according to the relationships it enables, association without end or 
beginning, a point discussed in detail in chapter II. Perhaps because of its 
unusualness, Befremdung, this trend is most apparent at the level of the image. I 
am struck repeatedly by a certain quality of the music video image, a constant 
desire to exceed itself, a striving for iconic status as if every moment sought to 
become as exemplar of itself, a poster image summation of the music video and 
that which it enacts in one.
One of the most extreme examples of this trait, and it is more pronounced 
in some music videos than in others, is seen in The Strokes’ ‘Hard to Explain.’ The 
image-track is constituted almost entirely from stock footage, intercut with a few 
seconds of ‘home-movie’ rehearsal footage, and ‘unnaturally’ staged performance 
footage of the band afloat on a studio lake. These images of the band are then 
placed in contiguity with footage of B52 carpet bombers, 1980s television shows, a 
boardroom presentation, cartoon dinosaurs, a close up of the wiring on a silicon 
chip, an ice-skating chimpanzee in black and white, and a long list of other equally 
memorable and ‘resonant’ images, none of which appear for more than a few 
seconds. Almost all of these are then repeated, speeded-up, in a different order, 
in the showing of thirty-five different pieces of footage in the last twenty-three 
seconds of the video. Any one of these images might have been spun out into a 
longer story, such is their import, but no linking material is provided, no way of 
connecting these images is offered, but must instead be generated in the act of 
reception, if at all. Even in those examples of videos where a single image is held 
throughout, as in the close-up on Sinead O ’Connor’s head in Nothing Compares 2 
U,’ or the Spike Jonze-directed video of a burning man running down a street in 
slow motion, held in shot for over three minutes in playing time (only for him to 
climb onto a bus at the end of the street), the emphasis is firmly placed upon the
73 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Massumi, B., (Athlone Press, London, 1988), p. 84.
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visual material presented, the ‘sensuous image' in Benjamin’s terms, rather than 
any sort of storyline.
One might theorize this as being a visual corollary to the musical concept of 
the ‘hook,’ the aural signature of a pop single designed to ‘catch’ the listener, but it 
is not, I think, a phenomenon entirely unique to the music video format, even if its 
specific context and mode of construction are. Compare Barthes' response to the 
films of Eisenstein: ‘no single image is boring, we are not forced to wait for the next 
one in order to understand and be delighted: no dialectic (that interval of patience 
necessary for certain pleasures), but a continuous jubilation, consisting of a 
summation of perfect moments.’74 Indeed, Eisenstein’s own conception of the 
audio-visual montage approaches the techniques common to music video: ‘the 
centre of gravity is no longer the element “between shots” -  the shock -  but the 
element “inside the shot” -  the accentuation within the fragment,’75 and it seems 
there is a connection between this perceived quality of music videos, and that 
quality of film that troubled Barthes, which he labelled the ‘obtuse meaning.’ 
Barthes eventually drew this quality from the film still, although it should be noted 
that ‘the still’ is rather different to the photograph that the term conjures in the 
mind’s eye: it is defined as ‘the fragment of a second text whose existence never 
exceeds the fragment, film and still find themselves in a palimpsest relationship 
without it being possible to say that one is on top of the other or that one is 
extracted from the other.’76 Given this complex reciprocal relationship, it is fair to 
say that there is a sense in which the music video more closely resembles a set of 
stills than it does film: it resembles a set of fragments excised from a film that does 
not exist. There is, however, an important difference, for whereas the primary aim 
of Eisenstein’s was a representation of ari idea, ‘the historical meaning of the 
represented gesture,’77 through the image, from which a third, obtuse, meaning 
escaped, there is no such aim in music video. The music video fragment is an
74 Barthes, R., ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ op. cit., p. 92.
75 Quoted by Barthes, R., in The Third Meaning: Research notes on some 
Eisenstein stills,’ op. cit., p. 67.
76 Ibid., p. 67.
77 Barthes, R., ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ op. cit., p. 93.
42
‘anaphoric gesture without significant content ... razed of meaning.’78 Where 
Eisenstein’s image disrupts the ‘Organon of Representation’ almost in spite of 
itself, in music video there is only disruption, instituted by music against 
representation.79
This quality of music video, utterly pervasive but difficult to bring into focus 
and pin down, may ultimately be the reason why Mercer concludes that the 
‘Thriller’ video is not a true narrative, despite considerable efforts to convince the 
reader (and perhaps himself) otherwise, and is rather a ‘simulacrum of a story.’ 
Indeed, it explains why so many attempts to read videos as film leads inevitably to 
the conclusion that they are failed narratives. And yet as Mercer also notes, these 
videos are not without story, devoid of any trace of narrative: in fact very often the 
reverse is true, the videos brim over with the suggestion of storylines, both internal 
and external to the artefact, back-stories that remain untold, relationships alluded 
to but never made clear. In short, an enigmatic and ambiguous character that 
defiantly underdetermines almost every aspect present. Music videos may lack 
true narrative, but they are not entirely without narrative, nor are they in any way 
anti-narrative: rather in place of narrative we have the gesture of narrative, a kind 
of pseudo-narrativity. Vernallis notes: ‘Because no parameter comes to the fore to 
the annihilation of another (although features become submerged or move into the 
background), multiple storylines can seem to exist simultaneously in the video. 
The viewer must consider all the visual gestures and all the musical codes in order 
to understand the connections among these moments.’80 This radical polyvalency, 
which music video shares with the musical object, seems to be one of the defining 
qualities of the music video. There is a barely restrained proliferation and 
interaction of semes, an absence of any hierarchy that might enable one seme to 
counteract another, so that the music video does not make sense, it makes 
senses, always multiple, always pluralized.
At this point, the music video artefact resembles nothing so much as an 
anarchic mess, and in many respects this is entirely correct. An understanding of
78 Barthes, R., in The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills,’ in 
Image Music Text, op. cit., p. 62.
79 See Barthes, R., ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ p. 89.
80 Vernallis, C., op. cit., p. 176.
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the structure(s) of the artefact does not necessarily produce an analytic order, and 
to do so arbitrarily would be an injustice to the material of investigation. To reduce 
the play of disorder that characterizes the music video to an explicable linear order 
would be a pointless exercise, and say little or nothing about the supposed object 
of investigation: better to enter into that spirit of play, to map out, rather than iron 
out, the complex weave of meaning and non-meaning. The Romantics, too, 
struggled with the relationship between chaos and order in the artistic fragment. 
Schlegel explicitly opposed the chaotic and the fragmentary, while still trying to 
incorporate the idea of the chaotic, as a metaphor for the disorder of everyday 
experience, into the symmetrical order of the artistic form, writing: Rhyme must be 
chaotic, and yet as chaotic with symmetry as possible. From this can be inferred 
the system of Romantic metre.’81 What the Romantics were unaware of was that 
the chaotic is not necessarily without order, and it is on this point that my 
conception of the fragment is markedly different from the Romantic fragment. 
Modern mathematics has uncovered the way in which simple ordered units can 
generate apparently chaotic systems, with unpredictable results, or at least results 
that can be gauged only as probabilities rather than certainties. (This same 
mathematics has generated the model of the fractal image, of which more 
elsewhere.) The music video, then, is truly chaotic, in that although its actuality 
cannot and should not be distorted into order, its mode of construction, the means 
by which this actuality was arrived at, can be understood and modelled.
The model which most accurately describes the workings of the production 
of meaning (and non-meaning) is that outlined by Greimas in his Structural 
Semantics,82 which although directed specifically at the structure of language can 
be adapted to shed light on a range of other possibilities. His method divides 
language into the basic linguistic component of the lexeme, which might be 
approximated very broadly to a word or group of words, and which can be further 
broken down into its constituent elements of meaning, semes. Each lexeme is a 
complex of semes, a ‘stylistic constellation,’ some of which are permanent and 
invariant’ forming a ‘semic nucleus,’ and others are only contextually related and
81 Rosen, C., op. cit., p. 95.
82 Greimas, A.J., Structural Semantics: an attempt at a method, trans. McDowell, 
D., Schleifer, R. and Velie, A., (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1983).
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thus are ‘contextual semes.’ In any group of lexemes there must be set of semes 
in common in order for them to be meaningful, but similarly there will be semes 
that point in other directions outside of the intended meaning, a kind of semic 
residue that appears to resemble what I have elsewhere termed an associative
Figure 183
complex. In the normal course of affairs certain isolated contextual semes will 
recur and create what is termed ‘redundancy,’ while other contextual semes fall 
away, remaining only as an invisible trace of language, as a necessary condition of 
intelligibility. ‘Redundancy sets in at the moment when a discourse begins to 
become intelligible; without redundancy language is meaningless nonsense, while 
too much redundancy creates meaningless repetition.’84 It is my contention, 
however, that this process, while fundamentally the same, is somewhat altered in a 
multimedia instance (using Cook’s terminology). In a music video the anchoring 
semic nucleus’ is not ‘permanent and invariant’ to anything like the same degree, 
whilst the ‘contextual semes’ are infinitely more numerous, invoking not only the 
ambiguity of poetic language in the lyrics, but also the polysemy of the rhetorical 
image and of music. As a result the process of redundancy is much less clear -  it 
is possible that there will be enough recurring semes to enable the multiplicity of 
'senses’ that one sees emerge -  and subsequently the ‘invisible trace’ of 
metonymic residue is never repressed to the same extent that it is in everyday
83 Diagram taken from Monelle, R., op. cit., p. 234.
84 Ibid., p. 235.
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language. This vast array of contradictory information is not eliminated, but held in 
play as a ‘meaningless’ backdrop to the plurality of meanings available. Hence the 
categories of ‘meaning’ and ‘non-meaning’ are hopelessly intertwined, dependent 
upon one another, creating the chaotic structure of the music video outlined above: 
order, such as there is, must be sought at the level of the music video equivalent of 
the lexeme, the fragment, the ‘stylistic constellation,’ while understanding will be 
found in the warp and the weft of their enmeshment.
Ill
What, in the meantime, has happened to Robert Schumann? Where has his flight 
into the rain-soaked streets of Dusseldorf, his head filled with sound (tortured by 
the music of both angels and demons), taken him? Clara’s diary cannot help -  she 
knows only part of the story -  but perhaps Barthes can shed some light on his 
situation.
Plural, lost, panicked, the Schumannian body knows (at least here) only bifurcations; it 
does not construct itself, it keeps diverging according to an accumulation of interludes; 
it has only that vague idea (the vague can be a phenomenon of structure) of meaning 
which we call signifiance. ... Music, in short, at this level, is an image, not a language, 
in that every image is radiant, from the rhythmic incisions of pre-history to the frames of 
comic strips. The musical text does not follow (by contrasts or amplification), it 
explodes: it is a continuous big bang.85
It is at this point that Robert Schumann's body has become musicalized, 
fragmented, event. Physically and mentally he is effecting an incorporeal 
transformation86 of himself into the act of fragmentation. Clara’s diary and Barthes’
85 Barthes, R., ‘Rasch,’ op. cit., pp. 301-2.
86 On the notion of incorporeal transformation and its attribution to bodies, see 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., op. cit., pp. 80-7, and further discussion in the 
conclusion below.
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‘Rasch' have become the speech acts through which Robert Schumann is made 
music, a set of movements (variations?) in which is expressed divergence, 
accumulation, radiation, explosion: all of those qualities that are attributed to the 
musical event and the music video. Schumann’s precise line of flight through 
Dusseldorf, resonating with the involuntary pre-memories of sounds unheard, 
remains unspoken, however, until the point at which he arrives at the Rhine 
Bridge, and it is only much later that Clara will learn, in a fragmentary and 
piecemeal fashion, that the men who returned him to his home were the same 
fishermen that had dragged him from the water; and it is as this radiant image of a 
man falling into the water and re-emerging plays through my mind, that it dissolves 
into a video picture, and I remember (involuntarily) my object of investigation, 
R.E.M.’s ‘Imitation of Life.’ Thus forms the ‘constellation of voices ... from which I 
draw my voice,’87 and in the ‘jump-cut’ I make from Schumann falling into the 
Rhine, to a scene from ‘Imitation of Life,’ I at once strip the image of its obvious 
meaning, making it sensuous rather than ideal, and reset meaning as activity, an 
intermingling of bodies’88 en proces.
If the music video is a demonstration of fragmentary form, then 'Imitation of 
Life,' incomplete, plural, vague, and radiant, is Exhibit A. The divergent quality of 
the music video image track is emphasized here, as described earlier, by a spatial 
separation of distinct ‘types;’ the lyrics are deliberately obtuse, peppered with non- 
sequiturs, and are dispersed amongst the characters in such a way as to 
problematize and pluralize the notion of ‘author;’ the music track consists of 
melodic scraps which cross and recross the traditional structural divide (verse, 
chorus) of the pop-song form, while superficially maintaining that structure. In 
short, identity, representation, autonomy, all are called into question during these 
twenty seconds of video, a fragment that is itself fragmented, reversed and 
repeated some eleven times during the course of the music video composite. 
Indeed, the unfolding of the video is such that alongside every moment of 
congruence between sound, lyric, and image there are also several disjunctures, 
which will in turn become conjunct in later repetitions, so that as Bjork suggests, 
one remembers, though it hasn’t happened yet.
87 Ibid., p. 84.
88 Ibid., p. 86.
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I have discussed the construction of the image track in very general terms 
earlier in the chapter, but the effect of this is mainly to enable a focussing of 
attention upon the wealth of detail present, far more than one could hope to 
comprehensively address. Furthermore, there are a series of possible frameworks 
for understanding these images: the ‘party scene’ totality of the video text, the 
macro-text of R.E.M. as a successful band known for their ‘folk-rock’ style of 
music, as well as the lyric and soundtracks, and all or some of these frameworks 
are being intuitively employed simultaneously in the activity of reception. Several 
images immediately catch the eye: the burning man diving into the pool (before re- 
emerging as the video reverses), that first drew me from my Schumannian reverie. 
This image resembles a film image, wrenched from context, and functions 
specifically as a metonym of the Hollywood action movie, belonging to the 
category of ‘the stunt-man spectacle.’ It is at once somewhat at odds with the 
suburban setting of the video, and with the ‘folksy’ aspect of the R.E.M. public 
image (present here in the tone of the mandolin), and yet also chimes with the 
repeated phrase of ‘that’s Hollywood’ that forms part of the chorus (although it is 
not precisely coincident with this utterance), and the more general seme 
surrounding pop and rock music of ‘American entertainment.’89 Thus there is an 
immediate setting up of conflicting conceptual realms at play here, which are taken 
up by another image spatially contiguous with the burning man, that of bass player 
Mike Mills filling a champagne fountain. This is more a cultural indicator of high 
living, a sign of plenitude and excess associated with (over-indulgent) rock stars 
and sport stars (and I am thinking particularly of the oft shown footage of George 
Best in a similar pose), but is again at odds with the axis suburban/folksy. The 
image gains further poignancy from the association of R.E.M. with alcoholic excess 
a relatively short time after a widely reported incident of Peter Buck’s being drunk 
and disorderly on an aeroplane, a ‘classic’ rock-star moment (and no doubt the 
reason for its being widely reported, despite his subsequent acquittal). A third 
striking image is that of guitarist Peter Buck, the only diegetic sound source in the
89 It is probable that this combination (or conflict) of ‘suburban’ values and 
Hollywood ‘glamour,’ as well as the video’s setting, is drawn from the Douglas Sirk 
film Imitation o f Life, one of his so-called ‘women’s pictures’ of the 1950s, which 
were distinguished by a distinctively Hollywood take on suburban life.
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video save for very brief moments of Stipe singing, playing his trademark 
mandolin. He is focussed on only in passing, although frequently in shot, perhaps 
echoing the status of his instrument, that provides near constant background 
arpeggiation, but never comes to the fore of the soundtrack. What is remarkable is 
his use of dark glasses and slightly stilted and detached deportment, the 
implication seeming to be that of blindness, which when combined with the witch’s 
familiar he has with him (an ape) conjures the figure of the seer. Once again this 
is a highly unusual personage to be present at a suburban party, and is suggestive 
of a position outside the video, an ability to see a ‘truth’ that is beyond the scene 
portrayed, perhaps loosely connected with the idea of recognizing the distinction 
between ‘imitation’ and ‘life’ that the title sets in play. All of the images here are 
resonant, rather than merely representative -  they overtly point outside of 
themselves, functioning as ‘texts’ rather than simple objects. It is in conjunction 
with the lyric and sound tracks, however, that the sensuous qualities of these 
images are put into play.
Like the image track, the lyrics consist of a series of ‘radiant’ phrases that 
are without any overarching ‘sense’ -  they exist as a coherence rather than as a 
unity (see Appendix for complete lyric sheet). The opening stanza immediately 
puts into play a set of disparate concepts, and even the opening line, ‘Charades 
pop skill,’ free from any obvious meaning, sets a whole series of ideas in process. 
The word ‘charades,’ referring to a similarity of gestural form, invites one both to 
reconsider the ungainly backwards dancing with which the video begins, and also 
to consider the question of representation put into play by the title and following 
line, ‘imitation of life,’ as well as suggesting the party game of the same name that 
involves guessing gestural equivalents. There are points that clearly resonate with 
the image track -  several water references (‘water hyacinths,’ koi in a frozen 
pond’), and a ‘folksiness’ to the concise phrasing and grammar of ‘that sugar cane, 
that tasted good,’ and the figure of ‘this lemonade,’ the lemonade stall being the 
quintessence of suburban Americana, but there is only one brief moment of direct 
connection, where the ‘teenager, cruising in the corner’ is directly represented. 
Equally there are many phrases entirely at odds with the scene: a ‘Friday fashion 
show,’ and the set of phrases grouped under the seme ‘natural disaster’ -  
hurricane, tidal wave, avalanche, etc. -  which are palpably playing against the 
image track, and pointing elsewhere, i.e. outside the video scene. However, the
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sections of the lyrics that are most clearly articulated, and of greatest interest, are 
those voiced by characters in the video. Some of these are diegetic, the shouting 
of ‘c’mon, c ’mon;’ some take the form of, admittedly strange, conversations 
between characters within the video, as with the Italianate woman at the table in 
the foreground (who to my mind seems to embody the seme ‘insufferable’ with her 
overt diction and habit of literally looking down her nose at people); whilst others 
directly address the viewer in a ‘performance’ mode, expected of the ‘star’ Michael 
Stipe, but more unusual when seen from some of the ‘bit’ players. This division of 
lyric text makes the idea of locating a stable and unitary authorial ‘voice’ ridiculous, 
especially given that there are two Michael Stipes present -  as a character and as 
a disembodied head on a television screen within the video frame (a further 
problematization of representation?) -  and that the compressed time frame of the 
image track means people are often talking across one another, the soundtrack 
selecting each in turn. The question of whose words these are is left completely 
ambiguous; disconnected phrases are divided amongst the party guests, although 
all of them speak with Stipe’s voice.
Anyone hoping or expecting to find unity and stability at the level of the 
music, however, (and this is not an uncommon move in musicology), will be 
somewhat disappointed. It is precisely a musicalization of the image that has 
prompted this multiplicity of analytic outcomes. Although the song superficially 
resembles the typical strophic verse/chorus/middle eight format of the pop song, a 
closer look will show an adaptation of this, and further analysis shows that there is 
a confusion of both the identity and the structural function of the verse/chorus 
relationship. The basic structure is:
V C V C Int. C C 1 C1 C C
(where V = Verse, C = Chorus, and Int. = Middle Eight, at bars 9, 264, 37, 544, 64, 
764, 864, 944, 1024, 1104 respectively -  see transcription in the appendix). The 
interlude is a middle twelve, rather than a middle eight (in fact it is properly a 
middle sixteen, but the chorus re-enters four bars before its completion). It can be 
clearly seen that in the second half of the song the structural function of the verse 
is replaced by that of a melodically and lyrically altered chorus. While verse and 
chorus are given distinct tonalities, E minor and its relative major, G, respectively, 
both of these are very weakly stated: there is no strong cadence in E minor, and
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the only IV V I movement, in G major at the close of the chorus, is immediately 
followed by a return to the tonic key, E minor. There is no sense of forward 
harmonic drive from verse to chorus and back, and no strong tonal differentiation 
between the two. Tonality is used as a structurally enabling force instead of 
functionally, as a structurally determining force, insofar as it enables an admittedly 
weak and confused distinction between verse and chorus.
This partially explains why the initial impression is that of a straightforward 
strophic structure, but if one analyses at the motivic level there is still further 
confusion. Each verse can be subdivided into the form A B A A 1 B A 1 (melisma), 
where A 1 inverts the opening of A. The motif of a falling third over a G major chord
Figure 2a
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on the word cry’/ ’try.’ It is this close motivic interconnection, and rhythmic and 
rhetorical similarity, allied to an unconventional structure that causes the confusion 
between verse and chorus in this piece. The entire song is constructed from a 
series of melodic fragments that are permutated in such a way as to generate both 
the verse and the chorus: these repeated figures, like the Schumannian body, do 
not stay in place.’ Some might see this motivic reworking as a means of 
circumventing the structural ambiguity of the song so as to create a greater 
consistency and unity, but, very much like the ‘Sphinxes’ of Schumann’s Carnaval, 
this rather wilfully ignores the fact that there are several motives present here, 
which although undermining the distinction between verse and chorus are 
nevertheless perfectly distinct with respect to one another (to say nothing of the 
middle eight). There is not a unity here, but again a multiplicity, a plurality of 
fragments, and the totality they produce, such as it is, is fractured but distinct in its 
identity. This mode of immanent analysis demonstrates not only the literal, 
repetition of motivic fragments, performed in such a way as to highlight their 
material qualities, as is often seen in so-called ‘minimalist’ works, but also 
highlights the motility of this repetition en proces, its unfixed and evasive 
relationship to the strictures of typical song format.
As can be seen, a brief examination of a few of the more obvious 
disjunctions between and within music, word, and image, has generated a 
considerable weight of analysis, and left a vast swathe of material untouched: 
poetic metre, instrumental timbre, the large number of ‘background’ characters. It 
is, of course, in the interaction of all these various parts that the substance of 
music video is to be found, and so to conclude this analysis I will perform a brief 
comparison between two similar moments with quite different affects. The two 
points I refer to are both moments of ‘false’ diegesis, that is, other characters 
voicing Stipe’s lyrics: the woman on the rock at the front of the pool, and the 
adulterous woman’ at the back left of the scene respectively. Both sing one of the 
two adapted choruses and thus have very similar texts to sing and identical 
melodies. However, whereas the former seems to have a poignancy and quality of 
regret, the latter seems far more upbeat. Since both moments have so many 
similarities one might think that the stem of this difference might be easy to locate, 
but it is not. Does the former’s wistfulness come from her solitariness, from 
something in her face, from the fact that the film is running backwards at this point,
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or from the qualities I draw out of the specific word ‘lemonade’ in this context? And 
does the latter’s relatively upbeat quality derive from her yellow dress, her joining 
with her lover, the fact that the film is now running forwards again, or more 
probably from the reintroduction of the full instrumental backing, absent from the 
sparse instrumentation of the first statement of the adapted chorus. The answer is 
that the distinction resides in all of these facts, and a great many others besides: 
for instance, ‘avalanche’ might be linked to the band The Avalanches,’ makers of 
upbeat dance music, while ‘hurricane’ begets Hurricane no. 1,’ a rather dour rock 
band, restricting reference to popular music alone. Some facts are naturally more 
relevant than others, and I suspect that the music’s timbre is of key importance in 
this instance, but none of them are irrelevant, and all contribute, in however small 
a way, to the overall sense impression that the music video experience generates.
I emphasize again that this is an interactive, and not an additive process: these 
senses are not a mere accumulation of associated properties but an 
interconnected web. To remove one element, however small, would be to remove 
its interaction with all the other elements and fundamentally alter the 'wiring' of the 
object, and it is this point that will be taken up in chapter II. As fragments cohere 
to form a totality, so associations cohere to form these fragments. Like the chaotic 
fractal image, however deep’ one cares to travel into the structuration of the 
object, the same structure will appear time and again, and as Gerald Bruns writes, 
after Bakhtin, The point to remember is that your descent is not taking you deeper 
into the inner world of preconscious grammars or, below these, into the body 
where one hears the warm, undifferentiatied murmur of the mother tongue. On the 
contrary, you are heading into the outer world of the “social heteroglossia." The 
deeper you go, the more open things get.’90
IV
Before laying claim to the fragment as a systematic mode of analytic organization, 
it would be wise both to clarify the relationship between fragment and totality, and 
to historicize my adoption of the fragmentary aesthetic. Middleton writes:
90 Bruns, G.L., op. cit., pp. 131-2.
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There seems to be a certain potency in the post-modernist position, which takes the 
dominant system as given and proposes as method of critique the fragment: 
subversion takes the form of “guerilla activity" which exploits fissures and forgotten 
spaces within the hegemonic structure. An “either/or” (to the extent it existed) is 
replaced by an “and/and,” a confrontation between unitary subjectivity and its 
destruction by an acceptance of multiples and contradictions.91
Middleton formulates this ‘postmodern’ stance in explicit opposition to the 
‘modernist’ stance of Adorno, and yet Adorno’s later writings not only 
acknowledge, but are founded upon the embracing of a fragmentary aesthetic: 
'Aesthetic Theory ... is an attempt, from what would now be called a “classical 
modernist” position, to write an aesthetics of modernism which recognizes at the 
outset the impossibility of any systematic and unified theory of art today in view of 
the fragmentation and pluralism which have characterized the art of the twentieth 
century.’92 Fragmentary structure is both modernist and post-modernist. I shall 
not attempt to engage the discussion of the relation of modernism to post­
modernist thought here -  those arguments have been well rehearsed elsewhere93
-  nor to prove that one or the other of these stances is the correct’ one; (a 
fragmentary stance would be to declare both right, although not necessarily in the 
same way). What is of use, however, is to assess the fragment/totality relation in 
these modes of thought, and also in my own work.
For Adorno, an overarching unity remains the ideal towards which one 
might strive, but one must be careful not to confuse this with ‘the “false totality” of 
the status quo.'9* Adorno’s aesthetics adopts fragmentation only as an
91 Middleton, R., op. cit., p. 62.
92 Paddison, M., Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory 
and Music, (Kahn & Averill, London, 1996), p. 48. See also J.M. Bernstein’s 
introduction to Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry: Selected essays on Mass 
Culture, ed. Bernstein, J.M., (Routledge, London and New York, 1991), pp. 7ff.
93 The best known of these being Jameson, F., ‘Postmodernism, or the cultural 
logic of late capitalism,’ New Left Review, 146, (1984), pp. 53-92.
94 Paddison, M., op. cit., p. 52.
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intermediary step against ‘mass culture,’ so as to reconstitute the totality in another 
form: it is an attempt ‘to evolve structures which can admit chaos, fragmentation 
and meaninglessness and which at the same time, through “critical 
consciousness,” can transcend such content.’95 This fragment is a means to an 
end, whereas the postmodern fragment has become an end in itself, a rejoinder to 
the ‘grand narratives’ famously critiqued in Lyotard’s Report on Knowledge 96 Both 
theories are formulated as a refusal of the status quo, but where Adorno identifies 
the existing material relations of the current ‘totality’ as the problem, 
postmodernism regards ‘totality’ as such to be the problem. The weakness of this 
latter stance, at least in many of its subsequent formulations, is the lack of critical 
leverage it enables -  the fragment cast adrift is easily fetishized and rendered 
powerless. Individualized multiplicity bears no danger for late capitalism, and is 
more likely to become a new selling opportunity than a threat. What is required is 
a reconception of the totality as an emergent property of a set of fragments, an 
unfixed and contingent collective entity, that is the resultant of a set of practices, 
rather than the determinant of those practices. Such a theory is put forward by 
Deleuze and Guattari in the figure of the rhizome, where The line no longer forms 
a contour, and instead passes between things, between points. ... The multiplicity 
it constitutes is no longer subordinated to the One.’97 The rhizome is a coherence 
of fragments, which no longer need to be reified into ‘types’ for the purposes of 
critical discourse; it provides an alternative rather than a challenge to the status 
quo, since to challenge it directly would involve acceding to the rules of 
engagement already set out. In this way the music video can remain musical and 
not ideal, material and not transcendent, affect rather than representation.
This problem bears more than a passing similarity to that of locating a final 
‘signified,’ that might act as anchor to the system of language, and I do not think 
this is mere coincidence. It is essentially a question of ordering and understanding 
one’s world, or better Weltanschauung, and this is necessarily connected with the
95 Ibid., p. 52.
96 Lyotard, J.-F., The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. 
Bennington, D. and Massumi, B., (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1984).
9' Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., op. cit., p. 505.
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issue of language. The binding of world and artefact takes place in and through 
language, although this involves an expansion of the concept of 'language' beyond 
the narrow one employed by Saussure. Barthes writes: The image is penetrated 
through and through by the system of meaning, in exactly the same way as man is 
articulated to the very depths of his being in distinct languages. The language of 
the image is not necessarily the totality of utterances emitted ... it is also the 
totality of utterances received.’98 This is not to say, however, that the image (or 
music video) derives its identity from the totality of meanings centred upon it alone, 
but from the very system of meaning as well, from a ‘language’ enlarged by 
reception theory, the language of Heidegger, Benjamin, and Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein in particular maps out a relation between identity and language that is 
of great significance to the fragment/totality model. The idea of language as a 
‘totality of utterances,’ not as a single entity, but as a connected group of things 
(which he termed ‘language-games’), is of fundamental importance to the later 
W ittgenstein’s thought: ‘We see that what we call ‘sentence’ and ‘language’ has 
not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less 
related to one another.’99 The connection between these things is the same as 
that between different games; there is not one rule that applies to all, a unifying 
law, but a range of disparate entities that are similar in some respects, different in 
others, but which all overlap to a greater or lesser extent to produce the field (or 
family) of ‘games.’
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that 
these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word 
for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is 
because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language.” ...
We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.100
98 Barthes, R., ‘Rhetoric of the Image,’ op. cit., p. 47.
99 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, §108.
100 Ibid., §§65-6.
56
This familial relationship that characterizes language, and thus an entire culture or 
‘form of life’ for Wittgenstein, a model of multiple connections which exist as a 
coherence without there being any centralized unity, is precisely the kind of 
relationship that exists between fragments and totality, and determines the format 
and identity of any given artefact. Thus a clarification of identity and fragmentary 
structure is as much an interrogation of the sign system itself as of its specific 
instances.
A final coherence,’ then, is not an appeal to a singular and unified entity, 
but the above does not solve the problem of its location. Barthes notes: 
‘theoretically, we can never halt a sign at a final signified; the only halt we can give 
a sign in its reading is a halt which comes from practice, but not from the 
semiological system itself.’101 The solution to the problem lies not in a theorization 
of Weltanschauung, but in Weltanschauung itself, that is, a way of living. The 
‘final’ signified, ultimate coherence, lies not in theory, but in praxis. Quoting 
Wittgenstein once more: ‘Do not say: There isn’t a last’ definition.' That is just as 
if you choose to say There isn’t a last house in this road; one can always build an 
additional one.” 102 Thus the ultimate arbiter is one’s own culture and language, a 
form of life,’ and the ultimate coherence the community in which it is received; a 
coherence in which each individual is a fragment at once constitutive of and 
constituted by that community. It is worth bearing in mind, then, that the source of 
this understanding is itself contingent and in no way absolute. Thus the idea of 
‘symbolic dynamism,’ the continual dialectical process in which all parts of the 
system are caught up, such that yesterday’s innovation becomes today’s cliche, is 
not a strain upon a transcendental absolute, but constitutive of the system itself.
This close association of model and world is not entirely benign, however, 
particularly with regard to music. There is a danger that music video might 
become another means by which the model of the status quo might reassert itself. 
Music, as Deleuze and Guattari warn, is a powerful tool of connection/collection: 
‘Since its force of deterritorialization is the strongest, it also effects the most
101 Barthes, R., 'Semiology and Medicine,’ in The Semlotic Challenge, trans. 
Howard, R., (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), p. 
210 .
102 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, §29.
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massive of reterritorializations.’103 Music video may facilitate an alternative to the 
order of representation and enable a new ‘form of life,’ but it does not force one to 
follow that line of escape; it must be actively taken up. One might equally generate 
a 'rhetoric' of the music video (after Barthes’ ‘Rhetoric of the Image’), shot through 
with dominant ideology (in what circumstances are ideologies anything other than 
dominant?): ‘The variation in readings is not, however, anarchic; it depends on the 
different kinds of knowledge -  practical, national, cultural, aesthetic -  invested in 
the image and these can be classified.’104 Although in one sense Barthes is 
correct to identify that the fragment/totality model is utterly bound up with 
hegemonic practice, its divergent, multiple nature makes complete codification a 
near impossibility, and always allows a degree of unpoliced space. Fragmentary 
structure is not entirely without a capacity for resistance, and its insidious nature is 
a potential strength as well as a weakness.
Having established that the music video artefact is neither a straightforward 
articulation of late-capitalism, nor is it an obvious site of resistance, one would do 
well to acknowledge that this condition of flexibility is characteristic of capital itself. 
As Tetzlaff notes: ‘It [capital] does not present, nor has it ever presented, anything 
like a single, unified dominant ideology.’105 Thus the field of interaction between 
them is very much more complicated than is often made out. Tetzlaff continues:
The pop culture text is theorized as attempting to resolve contradictions in line with the 
prevailing ideology, but subcultural audiences create their own meanings, which are 
necessarily resistive since they contradict the dominant discourse. ... However, this is 
not necessarily a sign of progressive politics. ... The question is, does this indicate 
successful local resistances or only fragmentation of capital s address to its subjects, a 
series of carefully articulated “job descriptions’’?106
103 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., op. cit., p. 348.
104 Barthes, R., The Rhetoric of the Image,’ op. cit., p. 47.
105 Tetzlaff, D., ‘Popular Culture and Social Control in late capitalism,’ in Culture 
and Power, ed. Scannell, P., Schlesinger, P., and Sparks, C., (Sage, London,
1992), p. 62.
106 Ibid., p. 59.
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I am not sure, however, that I agree with Tetzlaffs rather downbeat conclusion, 
that in the face of late capital, as with the Daleks, resistance is futile. A resistance 
to the totalizing impulse, the desire to generate fragments that cohere without 
having an essential unity, like the language-games of Wittgenstein, is more than 
just good post-structural practice; it is a co-optation of the techniques of capital 
itself. To set up a totalized and logical system is to invite its destruction -  
removing any one aspect means the collapse of the entirety -  better to spread 
oneself, like capital, in such a manner that there is not one target, but many, and 
so the destruction of one element need not destroy the resistive power of the 
artefact as a whole. And the music video artefact, as a gateway to fragmentary 
aesthetics, is capable of sustaining other forms of resistance. The semic 
proliferation generated by music video as described above, is in a reciprocal 
relationship with the fragment, which is to say that it is both constitutive of and 
amplified by, the fragment model, and can enable a form of resistance of its own, 
identified by Baudrillard. The present argument of the system is to maximize 
speech, to maximize the production of meaning, of participation. And so the 
strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and the refusal of speech.’107 
In a system dedicated to use, to the effective transfer of information, and above all 
to efficiency, the prolific generation of that without use, an excess without logic, a 
kind of ‘semic noise,’ is a reminder of an alternative, of another way, not so very 
different from the Bakhtinian carnival. Furthermore, this intense polysemy may 
have the potential to rupture the sign system itself, to be the ‘specific object' of 
‘semanalysis’ described by Kristeva in her essay The  Semiotic Activity.’108 
Eagleton writes: The representational devices of bourgeois society are those of 
exchange-value; but it is precisely this signifying frame that the productive forces 
must break beyond, releasing a heterogeneity of use-values whose unique
10' Baudrillard, J., The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media,’ in Jean 
Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. Poster, M., (Polity, Cambridge, 1988), p. 219.
108 Kristeva, J., The Semiotic Activity,’ Screen, vol. 14, (1973), p. 38. Kristeva 
suggests that the ‘poetic text’ will fulfil this role, but I believe the music video to be 
an even better example of ‘a bearer of a surplus of signification that the system of 
the sign is unable to contain.’ [ibid.]
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particularity would seem to refuse all standardized representation.’109 It is this 
combination of properties, the stretching to breaking point of the signifying frame, 
the uniqueness of each and every video coherence, of which every instance is a 
kind of very particular cultural map, and its problematizing of the standard idea of 
representation, that make the music video artefact a potent source of analytic 
activity.
Apart from its political potential, the fragment model, particularly as it is 
realized in music video, has methodological ramifications that extend beyond the 
direct realm of the artefact into one's engagement with the world. The idea that if 
one attempts to probe the ‘depth’ of the artefact one encounters only more 
fragments, combined with the absence of a fixed unity, renders the concept of 
'essence,' a key object for analysis, largely redundant. As Eagleton notes of 
Nietzsche's thought: ‘Art instructs in the profound truth of how to live superficially, 
to halt at the sensuousness of the surface rather than hunt the illusory essence 
beneath it. Perhaps superficiality is the true essence of life, and depth a mere veil 
thrown over the authentic banality of things.’110 The privileged term ‘depth,’ as a 
corollary to essence,’ ‘explanation,’ and more often than not, ‘origin,’ is turned on 
its head. ‘Essence,’ such as it is, is present not in the vertical but in the horizontal 
axis of the object, in a Deleuzian plane. The same form is generated by the 
specific nature of a particular coherence at all levels; there is no one thing to trace 
it back to; one simply moves further and further out into Bakhtinian 'social 
heteroglossia.’ Instead, ‘since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain.’111 Rather, as shown previously, the purpose of analysis is to clarify, and 
not to explain,112 This also implies a far greater role for the materiality of the 
artefact, its specific qualities and affective impact, to which I now turn.
109 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 214.
110 Ibid., p. 258.
111 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, §126.
112 A detailed discussion of this distinction can be found in Cioffi, F., Wittgenstein 




My good mood made it easier for me on that evening to treat Hanslick for some time as 
a casual acquaintance up to the point when he took me aside for an intimate talk and 
assured me, with tears and sobs, that he could no longer bear it to see himself 
misunderstood by me; the blame for anything untoward in his judgements about me, 
he averred, was certainly not rooted in a malevolent intention but solely in a limitation 
of the individual, and he would like nothing better than to have the boundaries of his 
knowledge extended by my instruction. These declarations were made with such an 
explosion of emotion that I could feel no wish other than to soothe his pain and 
promised my undivided sympathy in his further pursuits.1
This moment of rapprochement between the two primary figures of nineteenth- 
century musical aesthetics, made on Wagner’s part with the expressly political aim 
of garnering a favourable climate for production of his operas in Vienna, was to be 
remarkably short-lived. Only three months later Wagner invited Hanslick to a 
reading of the text of Die Meistersingers von Nurnberg with the sole aim of 
humiliating him through the unveiling of the character Beckmesser, an idiotic and 
unmusical pedant, and an obvious caricature of Hanslick (to the extent that 
Wagner had actually named the character Hans Lick in an earlier draft). To his 
eternal credit Hanslick left the gathering without a word, but from this point on
1 W agner, R., My Life, trans. Gray, A., ed. W hittall, M., (Cam bridge University Press, 1983), 
pp. 694-5.
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hostilities between the two were resumed in earnest, and would remain 
unresolved. Through a hardening of their respective positions into mutually 
incompatible views of music and opera, a state that was considerably enhanced by 
the willingness of their followers to either misrepresent or misunderstand both of 
their positions for polemical value, a remarkable opportunity to reformulate the 
aesthetics of music based upon the common ground of their theories seems to 
have been missed.
That Wagner’s aesthetics might be misunderstood is perhaps 
understandable; his theoretical promiscuity and capacity for adopting entirely 
contradictory stances under the rubric of a self-mythology of consistency has been 
well documented2 and formed the basis of a vicious attack by his former acolyte, 
Nietzsche3 (and in part explains the disparate groups that labelled themselves as 
‘W agnerian’ in the years following his death). Whilst Wagner’s capacity for being 
all things to all men has done little to alter his impact or popularity (at least outside 
of Israel, where he remains taboo), the misappropriation of Hanslick as a ‘formalist’ 
has resulted in a persistent misreading of his theories; a situation not helped by 
Gustav Cohen’s translation into English of Vom Musikalisch-Schonen that, in the 
words of its recent re-translator Geoffrey Payzant ‘rarely makes contact with 
Hanslick’s argument.'4 John Shepherd dismisses Hanslick as an ‘absolutist,’5 
Jean-Jacques Nattiez as 'adopting a normatively formalist conception of music ... 
deny[ing] that purely sonorous configurations, independent of any textual
2 See, for instance, Wagnerism in European Culture and Politics, ed Large, D., and 
Weber, W , (Cornell University Press, New York, 1984), and Dahlhaus, C., The Twofold 
Truth in Wagner’s Aesthetics,’ in Between Romanticism and Modernism, trans. Whittall, M., 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980).
3 See both ‘Nietzsche contra Wagner,’ Collected Works, vol. Ill, trans. Common, T., (T. 
Fisher Unwin, London, 1899), and The Case of Wagner,’ in The Birth of Tragedy and The 
Case of Wagner, trans. Kaufmann, W., (Random House, Toronto, 1967).
4 The details of this are discussed in Payzant’s ‘Essay: Towards a Revised reading of 
Hanslick,’ in Hanslick, E., On the Musically Beautiful, trans. Payzant, G., (Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1986).
5 Shepherd, J., 'Music Consumption and cultural self-identities: some theoretical and 
methodological reflections,’ Media, Culture and Society, vol. 8, (1986), p. 310.
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suggestion, do indeed have a power of evocation.’6 Even in 1998 Christopher 
Small could repeat the mantra that ‘formalism’ has ‘no content whatever beyond 
the contemplation of the beauty of the tonal patterns and forms,’ and that ‘this view 
even denies any value whatsoever to the sensuous enjoyment of musical sound. 
The nineteenth-century Viennese critic Eduard Hanslick was a leading exponent of 
such a view.’7 What I hope to demonstrate here is not only that Hanslick's 
conception of aesthetics is more subtle than he is typically given credit for, but also 
that, alongside Wagner, it allows for a connection to the much more radical 
theories of Roland Barthes or Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and can facilitate 
a better understanding of the processes of music video.
The key point upon which Hanslick and Wagner are said to differ, and the 
most relevant to music video, is in their conception of how the arts might be related 
to one another, most notably in that celebrated Wagnerian concept, the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, a putative synthesis of all the arts rather than a straightforward 
composite art form. Amongst his many legitimate criticisms of Wagner, Hanslick 
rather unfairly suggests that Wagner’s attempt to perform this synthesis rests upon 
his adherence to ‘feeling-theory,’ that is, that the function of art is either to arouse 
or else directly embody ‘feelings’ or emotions.8 Since Vom Musikalisch-Schdnen 
was formulated specifically as a response to the idea that music represents 
feelings, it is to be expected that his dislike of Wagner’s music and aesthetics 
would lead him to suggest that Wagner subscribed to this viewpoint (and to be fair, 
Wagner’s sometimes confused writings do little to dissuade one from this), and 
thus presumably that the Gesamtkunstwerk operated by evoking the same ‘feeling’ 
in all art forms simultaneously.9 Wagner’s theory was actually more subtle than 
this (although would still be equally mistaken in Hanslick’s view) and derives from 
a strain of thought that runs throughout Romanticism, expressed in Robert
6 Nattiez, J.-J., ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music,’ Journal of the Royal Musical 
Association, vol. 115:2, (1990), p. 243.
7 Small, C , Musicking: The meanings of performing and listening, (Wesleyan University 
Press, New Hampshire, 1998), p. 135.
8 For a discussion of the complexities of ‘feeling-theory,’ see Dahlhaus, C., Esthetics of 
Music, trans. Austin, W., (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 16-24
9 Hanslick selectively quotes from Wagner’s The Artwork of the Future in the section of On 
the Musically Beautiful entitled ‘Some Feeling-Theorists,’ p. 91.
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Schumann’s aphorism that The aesthetics of one art is that of the others; only the 
material is different.’10 In this view, taken (like so much of Schumann’s theory) 
from the aesthetics of Jean Paul (who in turn looked back to Goethe11) the defining 
quality of art was not the concrete ‘feeling,’ but instead the abstract idea of ‘poetry,’ 
falling in line with the German Idealism of the time. In the hands of Wagner the 
difficult ‘poetry’ became the even more problematical ‘drama,’ and it is at this point 
that the question of how to combine differing art forms becomes embroiled in the 
long running dispute over the primacy of music and word; a dispute that has 
existed as long as one has been set to the other. Perhaps surprisingly, neither 
Wagner nor Hanslick strike a definite pose on one side of this issue: the question 
is almost entirely incidental to the core of Hanslick's arguments (although he of 
course engages with them), and is uncomfortably straddled by Wagner, as 
Nietzsche pointedly exposed in his fragment ‘On Music and W ords,’12 but it is 
worth a brief diversion to understand both the intellectual climate in which both 
writers worked, and the (mis)use to which their ideas were put subsequently.
From ancient times and throughout the history of early sacred music the 
primacy of the word (or, indeed, the biblical ‘W ord’) was, so to speak, taken as 
read. With the growing complexity of Western polyphony during the Renaissance, 
however, the idea that one must be sacrificed for the glorification of the other 
became more contentious, not least because of the clash between the 
Reformation’s avowed desire to strip away ornament from religion, and the 
Catholic church’s awareness of the allure of musical performance to its
10 Quoted in Dahlhaus, C., Esthetics of Music, p. 3.
11 In fact, Goethe’s theories seem to be incompatible with the idea of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, but are nevertheless an apparent inspiration of it.
Colour and sound do not admit of being compared in any way, but both are referable to 
a higher formula: both are derivable, though each for itself, from a higher law. They 
are like two rivers that have their source in one and the same mountain, but 
subsequently pursue their way, under totally different conditions, in two totally different 
regions, so that throughout the course of both no two points can be compared.
From Zu Fahbenlehre, quoted in Cook, N , Analysing Musical Multimedia, p. 46.
12 Nietzsche, F., 'On Music and Words’, trans. Kaufmann, W., in Dahlhaus, C., Between 
Romanticism and Modernism, pp. 103ff.
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congregation. The Council of Trent decrees in the mid-sixteenth century 
attempted to resolve this split by upholding the so-called ‘Roman style’ of 
Palestrina as a model of good practice, but could do nothing to change the 
underlying tension between the desire either to foreground the text or to give the 
music free rein. Thereafter the question of their ‘correct’ relation would recur 
sporadically, following what Carl Dahlhaus terms one of the oldest 
historiographical schemes, that of the origin, decline, and restoration of an idea.’13 
The first notable eruption of controversy surrounded the debate between 
Monteverdi and his critic Artusi regarding the seconda prattica: typical of the 
debate was the fact that Monteverdi restricted himself to composing, and had little 
to do with the theoretical nuts and bolts of the affair, leaving it to his brother 
Giovanni and Vincenzo Galilei to defend this ‘new’ music. More typical still was 
the variety of forms this doctrine of adherence to the text took; the intensely 
chromatic and polyphonic word painting of Gesualdo was as distant from the prima 
prattica as it was the seconda prattica , but was it a more or less faithful rendition of 
a given poem than the even cadenced monody of Sigismondo d'lndia? The 
answer depended upon whether one understood musical accompaniment of a text 
to mean illustration of individual words, of the overall ‘poetic intention’ of an entire 
clause, or else simply heightening the declamation, allowing the words to ‘speak 
for themselves,’ after an almost entirely imagined ancient Greek model, since there 
was at the time no extant ancient Greek music available. The question re- 
emerged in the eighteenth century, first with the debate between Rameau and 
Rousseau concerning the relative importance of harmony and melody known as 
the ‘Querelle des Bouffons,' and shortly after was reignited by Gluck’s operatic 
‘reforms, which again cited a ‘decline’ into ornamentation and the need to revive 
the model of ‘the ancients.’ (It was Franz Grillparzer’s response to this program of 
reform that seems to have inspired Hanslick’s attack on both Gluck and Wagner, 
given the extensive quotation of Grillparzer present in Vom Musikalisch- 
Schonen u ) By the nineteenth century this idea was beginning to be turned on its 
head, for although the idea that music and text should accurately reflect one 
another was retained, based on Rousseau’s (amongst others’) suggestion that
13 Dahlhaus, C., Esthetics of Music, p. 65.
14 Hanslick, E., op. cit., pp. 23-4 in particular.
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music and speech had a common origin, music was now believed to be the site of 
a transcendent meaning, in comparison with which words were an inferior and 
incapable means of communication. This viewpoint, which has come to be 
associated with the term ‘absolute music’ (first coined by Wagner as a negative 
term) forms what Dahlhaus describes as ‘the latent unity of musical aesthetics in 
the nineteenth century,’15 but it continued to exist uneasily alongside an 
acknowledgement of the importance of words to music. Music continued to be 
thought of as a fundamentally vocal art, and as Nicholas Cook has noted, it is 
precisely at the historical juncture where ‘absolute music’ emerged that there was 
an explosion of words in the form of programme notes and musical analysis, as 
though they were suppressed in one place only to re-emerge elsewhere.16 It is 
exactly this uneasy balance that Wagner attempts to strike, caught between 
ancient tragedy and Schopenhauer, yet in a more profound way, and this is 
something that Dahlhaus appears to miss, both Wagner and Hanslick, in different 
ways, sidestep this bugbear of music aesthetics entirely.
Regardless of what their followers might claim, or indeed what they claim of 
each other, neither Hanslick nor Wagner appear to be interested in establishing 
the primacy of either music or word. Wagner cuts the Gordian knot by 
subordinating both music and word to the properly abstract ‘drama,’ whilst 
Hanslick’s argument is based precisely on the non-commensurability of differing 
art forms, at least in the terms put forward above in the Schumann quotation.17 As 
Cook has suggested, the long running word/music debate has served to conceal a 
far more fundamental consistency -  of a model of ‘unitary conformance’ which 
begins by identifying one medium as the origin of meaning, and uses this as the
15 Dahlhaus, C., Between Romanticism and Modernism, p. 39. See also the same author’s 
The Idea of Absolute Music, trans. Lustig, R., (University of Chicago Press, 1989).
16 Cook, N., The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk, or Record sleeves and Reception,' in 
Composition-Performance-Reception, pp. 105-117.
17 It must be acknowledged here that where poetry and music are joined, Hanslick states 
that musical specificity predominates (The union of poetry with music and opera is a 
morganatic marriage.’ On the Musically Beautiful, p. 26), insofar as he believes that bad 
music can spoil a good poem in a way that the reverse can not. This seems to be a 
personal prejudice, however, rather than a necessary outcome of his theoretical 
framework, and is partially retracted in his comparison of music and colour.
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measure of other media through a series of pair-wise judgements of similarity or 
dissim ilarity.’18 Against this analysis, W agner’s model displaces all media involved 
by measuring them not against each other, but against ‘drama,’ in effect 
designating all media equivalent (and thus allowing himself to appear to favour one 
medium or the other at any given time without disrupting his overall aesthetic). 
Hanslick deems questions regarding the relating of differing arts to be irrelevant to 
their aesthetic appreciation, although not, as we shall see, to be entirely 
impossible.
As mentioned above, the Schumannian concept of ‘poetry,’ the site of 
Schopenhauer's ‘aesthetic pleasure’ and driving force of nineteenth-century 
aesthetics (essentially derived from the Platonic Idea), is distorted by Wagner’s 
reading of Gluck into the concept of ‘drama’ in the abstract, and this distortion is 
not without consequences. Wagner does not encounter Schopenhauer until 
1854,19 and for all his attempts to reorder his earlier theories in the light of this, his 
commitment to Idealism remains short of being absolute, with the result that later 
self-styled ‘Wagnerians’ and the history of the Gesamtkunstwerk would take subtly 
divergent paths. What is certain is that ‘drama’ functions in a transcendent 
capacity: Nietzsche makes this much clear in stating ‘It was not with his music that 
Wagner conquered them, it was with the “idea.”’20 If one reads on, however, it 
seems that Nietzsche’s main criticism is that this transcendent idea is not ideal 
enough:
It is the enigmatic character of his art, its playing hide and seek behind a hundred 
symbols, its polychromy of the idea that leads and lures these youths to Wagner. ... In 
the midst of Wagner’s multiplicity, abundance and arbitrariness they feel as if justified 
in their own eyes -  “redeemed." Trembling they hear how great symbols approach 
from foggy distances to resound in his art with muted thunder.21
18 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, p. 115.
19 Dahlhaus, C., ‘The Twofold truth in Wagner’s Aesthetics,’ op. cit., p. 33.
20 Nietzsche, F., ‘The Case of Wagner,’ §10, op. cit., p. 178.
21 Ibid., p. 178.
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In Nietzsche's view, Wagner should have given primacy to the musical idea 
instead of tailoring the music to ‘theatrical’ symbols, and thus barring access to the 
essential sanctuary of music.’22 To attempt to comprehend music through its 
symbolic representation is to miss the aesthetic ‘truth’ contained therein.
Perhaps, then, the answer would be to strike the category of ‘drama’ and 
even ‘poetry’ from the equation, and look directly to the sensuous possibilities 
represented by the arts. Rather curiously Nietzsche is strangely quiet on the 
sensuous qualities of music, so caught up is he in the musical ‘idea,’ but 
paradoxically this is precisely what the symbolist movement sought to take from 
Wagner. Gerald Turbow writes: Baudelaire found a similarity between Wagner’s 
attempt to create a synthesis of the arts and his own idea, stated in his poem 
“Correspondances,” that our senses respond to forms in nature’s language that are 
symbols o f truths inherent in the world of the spirit.’23 Stripping the Wagnerian 
Gesamtkunstwerk of the unifying ideal of ‘drama’ enabled the symbolist poets to 
concentrate on the individual constituents and their sensuous possibilities, but this 
was fatally compromised by their continued commitment to the unity of the ideal, 
‘truths inherent in the world of the spirit,’ which resulted in these sensuous 
possibilities being received not in their material particularity, but as ‘forms in 
nature’s language.’ The irony of symbolism is that by responding directly to a 
material ideal rather than drama’ or ‘poetry,’ the symbolists lost the ability to 
consider each art independently of the other: Wagner’s synthesis of the arts 
became synaesthesia. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Mysterium  of Scriabin. 
Scriabin, the ultimate sensualist, considered Wagner ‘too theatrical’, and went to 
extraordinary lengths to abolish the stage/theatre distinction by combining his 
music with coloured lighting, dancing, sacred texts and even incense in pursuit of
22 Nietzsche, F., Those who carry away feelings as the effects of music possess in them, 
as it were, a symbolic intermediate realm that can give them a foretaste of music while at 
the same time it excludes them from its inmost sanctuaries,’ from 'On Music and Words,' 
op. cit., p 112. It is worth noting that Nietzsche is capable of just as much contrariness as 
Wagner with regard to aesthetics. Elsewhere he writes ‘there is an aesthetic of 
decadence, and there is a classical aesthetics -  the “beautiful in music” is a figment of the 
imagination, like all of idealism,’ in ‘The Case of Wagner,’ Epilogue, op, cit., p. 190.
23 Turbow, G., ‘Wagnerism in France,’ in Wagnerism in European Culture and Politics, op. 
cit., p. 162.
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an 'all-unity' experience. In practice, however, the ‘absolute’ character of musical 
‘form ’ (not the form of traditional music analysis) acted as a spur to generate 
identical ‘form s’ in other media, to produce an absolute idea that was absolutely 
meaningful, which for Scriabin equated to God. In the cult of Scriabin one might 
educe ‘the potential fascism of music’24 identified by Deleuze and Guattari. The 
synaesthetic model is incapable of treating sound simply as sound; it is always a 
representation, a cipher of something else.
A more practical problem with the ideal unity of a synaesthetic event is the 
fact that it is impossible to sustain in a composite art form; however much one may 
try to duplicate exactly the experience of one art in the experience of another, the 
project is doomed to failure. As Sergei Eisenstein pointed out in The Film Sense, 
synaesthetic associations and cultural associations are both difficult to dissociate 
and utterly pervasive: is the quality of sunshine immanent to the colour yellow, and 
if so will this be experienced similarly by the Inuit of the Arctic tundra and the 
Bedouin o f the Arabian desert? If two genuine synaesthetes cannot agree on any 
fixed connection between words and colours (the most common form of 
synaesthesia, although by no means the only one), what chance is there of 
persuading anyone that two distinct phenomena can provoke a singular, absolute 
response? In any art form composed of differing stimuli, a one to one mapping is 
impossible.
Cook notes of Schoenberg’s attempt at a Gesamtkunstwerk that ‘The music 
in Die gluckliche Fland does not exhaust the signification of the colours, any more 
than the colours exhaust the signification of the sound; no mechanical translation 
from one to the other is possible.’25 Schoenberg, unlike the symbolists, however, 
had foreseen this, and his aim was not to forge a union, but a harmony: The whole 
thing should have the effect (not of a dream) but of chords. Of music. It must 
never suggest symbols, or meaning, or thoughts, but simply the play of colour and 
form.’26 Like Wagner, Schoenberg had acknowledged that an artistic synthesis
24 Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 
348.
25 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, pp. 55-6.
26 Q uoted in Butler, C., Early Modernism: Literature, Music and Painting in Europe 1900- 
1916, (C larendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 87.
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need not be synaesthetic, but a desire for some kind of all encompassing discrete 
and unitary identity equivalent to Wagner’s ‘drama’ still hangs over his abstracted 
‘forms,’ and this quickly causes problems. He continues ‘Just as music never 
drags a meaning around with it, at least not in the form in which it [music] 
manifests itself, even though meaning is inherent in its nature, so too this should 
simply be like sounds for the eye, and so far as I am concerned everyone is free to 
think or feel something similar to what he thinks or feels while writing music.’2' 
This final effort to offload the issue onto the site of reception fails to conceal that 
Schoenberg is struggling to maintain the idea that ‘forms’ do not have meaning, so 
as to allow them to act in counterpoint to one another, but his concern for unity 
makes this impossible to sustain, as is clear from Cook’s reading: ‘both media, 
together and in conjunction with the other elements of Schoenberg’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk, converge upon a cumulative meaning which is emotional and, 
in the broadest sense, dramatic.’28 A concern for the unitary identity of the work’ 
forces Schoenberg to conceive of the play of forms entirely in the abstract; in 
suppressing the material qualities of the disparate media that make up Die 
gluckliche Hand Schoenberg effectively idealizes the concept of form in the same 
way as the symbolists, hence his difficulty in preventing a reterritorialization of this 
upon meaning and drama.
Herein lies the greatest challenge to a unified Gesamtkunstwerk. However 
much one attempts to idealize or abstract the content that makes up the work, so 
as to demonstrate either its essential similarity or compatibility, a stubborn 
materiality, an affective power remains, that evades any question of ‘drama’ or of 
‘meaning.’ Cook criticizes Eisenstein’s and Hanns Eisler’s theories regarding 
composite art for being wedded to the concept of identity, and hence replicating 
some of the symbolist’s arguments, when they are attempting to formulate a theory 
opposed to the model of synaesthesia.
Like Eisenstein -  like Kandinsky -  Eisler has only one fundamental model for the 
relationship between different media, and it is identity. ... Both Eisenstein and Eisler 
assert the principle of counterpoint, but fail to theorize it; they reject the principle of
27 Ibid., p. 87.
28 Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, p. 56.
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synaesthesia, but cannot escape its language. Both Eisenstein and Eisler, in short, 
end up going round in circles because they are trying to use a language predicated on
29similarity to articulate a principle predicated on difference.
Cook's jettisoning of the concept of identity, and hence of the role played by 
specific material qualities in themselves has some profound consequences, 
however. He has constantly to have recourse to explanation in terms of ‘meaning’ 
and ‘drama.’ A specific timbre, a vowel sound, a striking colour, all can only be 
comprehended by Cook insofar as they have meaning, that is, by discussing not 
what they are but what they stand for. This is remarkably similar to one of Theodor 
Adorno’s criticisms of Wagner’s musical technique:
What specifically characterizes Wagnerian expression is its intentionality: the motiv is a 
sign that transmits a particle of congealed meaning. For all its intensity and emphasis, 
Wagner's music is as script is to words and it is hard to avoid the suspicion that its 
intensity is needed only to conceal that fact. Its expression does not present itself, but 
is itself the object of presentation. Wagner’s leitmotivs stand revealed as allegories 
that come into being when something purely external, something that has fallen out of 
the framework of a spiritual totality, is appropriated by meanings and made to 
represent them.30
Thus one always elides the object, apprehends it by proxy; one must never 
engage with it, only understand it passively.
How, then, might one begin to reconcile the material identity of differing art 
forms in order to produce a composite such as a music video that coheres in any 
kind of perceptible way? One can almost instinctively (that is, one perceives it to 
be instinctive, although it is not necessarily a-cultural) discern that some 
combinations of sound and vision are more apt than others, sometimes as a 
correspondence, sometimes as a fruitful counterposition, but how does one make
29 Ibid.. p. 65.
30 Adorno, T., In Search of Wagner, trans. Livingstone, R., (Verso, London and New York, 
1991), p 45.
71
such a judgement? What is required is a method of identifying the individual arts 
in such a way as to acknowledge their specificity, whilst allowing of some kind of 
comparison to be made between them, a comprehensible mechanism of relation. 
And this is what Eduard Hanslick furnishes us with in his deceptively simple (and 
often mistranslated) statement that Der Inhalt der Musik sind tonend bewegte 
Form eri (The content of music is tonally moving forms’).31 Much of the power of 
this idea, that content is itself a kind of form, was neither a new idea nor restricted 
at this time to Hanslick. Many of the Wagnerian followers discussed above were 
suggesting similar things: Baudelaire’s ‘forms’ were ‘symbols of truths,’ and 
Schoenberg made ‘the play of form ’ the object of his Gesamtkunstwerk. 
Eisenstein’s ‘inner movement’ seems especially close to 'tonally moving forms,' but 
it seems closer still to Johann Gottfried von Herder’s ‘energy of movement'32 
described in his Kalligone of 1800, which was in its turn inspired by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's and Rousseau's ideas on speech, and so on back to Aristotle’s 
concept of ‘energia.’ The importance of Hanslick’s thought, however, is in his 
derivation of this form directly from the affective materiality of the art, bypassing 
completely the realm of the ideal.
If people do not acknowledge the abundance of beauty residing in the purely musical, 
one may blame the undervaluation of the sensuous, which we find in the older systems 
of aesthetics favouring morality and aesthetic sensitivity and in Hegel’s system 
favouring the “Idea." Every art originates from and is active within the sensuous. The 
feeling theory fails to recognize this; it ignores hearing entirely and goes directly to 
feeling. Music creates for the heart, they say; the ear is of no consequence. ... The 
auditory imagination, however, which is something entirely different from the sense of 
hearing regarded as a mere funnel open to the surface of appearances, enjoys in
31 Hanslick, E., On the Musically Beautiful, p. 29. For a discussion of this phrase and the 
history of its translation see Payzant’s ‘Essay’ in the same volume, op. cit., pp. 94ff. It 
should be noted that Payzant’s translation is itself not unproblematic, the translation of 
tOnend as 'tonally' imputing a specific musical sense that is not necessarily present in the 
German original.
32 See Monelle, R., Linguistics and Semiotics in Music, p. 212.
72
conscious sensuousness the sounding shapes, the self-constructing tones, and dwells 
in free and immediate conception of them.33
Thus ‘form ’ is at once an expression of musical content and also of the conditions 
of its own being, which is to say the nature of ‘tone;’ the actualization and potential 
of musical sound in one. Remarkably, if one looks closely one can find an 
acceptance of the possibility of this thesis (if not an actual endorsement) in 
Wagner’s own writings, even if it is described in derogatory terms, as in this 
passage from The Artwork o f the Future (1850): The human voice had at length 
completely taken refuge in a merely sensual and fluid tone device by means of 
which alone the art of music, wholly withdrawn from poetry, continued to present 
itself.’34 One sees here for a brief moment Wagner’s acceptance of the idea of 
music in and for itself, without recourse to the category of the ideal, be that drama’ 
or the fully transcendent ideal of ‘absolute music.’ Being Wagner, however, he 
regards this as being insufficient, and sets about ‘redeeming’ this state of affairs by 
uniting music with the other arts, stating that Through the art of tone, the arts of 
poetry and dancing understand each other.’35 The ideal site of unity that Wagner 
alights upon in this essay is a rather less ideal one than is seen in many of his 
other writings, though; namely the motion of the human body: Th is symphony 
[Beethoven's Seventh] is ... the most blissful act of bodily movement, ideally 
embodied, as it were, in tone.’36 Thus Wagner both acknowledges the possibility 
of a non-ideal autonomous music (even if he does not like it), and suggests the 
possibility of a synthesis based upon an equally non-ideal footing (which he then 
rejects in favour of the ‘universal drama’ of Beethoven’s Ninth). There is without 
doubt a considerable gap between Wagner’s and Hanslick’s conceptions of music, 
and how music relates to the other arts, but it is not an unbridgeable one. Both 
demonstrate that the model of ‘unitary conformance’ described by Cook (see
33 Hanslick, E., op. cit., pp. 29-30.
34 Wagner, R., The Artwork of the Future, extract in Strunk’s Source Readings in Music 
History, Revised Edition, vol. 6: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Solie, R., (W.W. Norton and 
Co., London and New York, 1998), p 63.
35 Ibid., p. 58.
36 Ibid., p. 64.
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above), giving primary and subordinate roles to differing media, can be subverted, 
and I hope to have shown that their ideas regarding the combining of the arts are 
not so implacably opposed as is usually thought. For although Hanslick is largely 
silent on the topic of joining art forms, his concentration upon the ‘specifically 
musical’ need not impede the possibility of an appreciation of a composite art 
work, only the idea that such a thing would have an overall ‘unity.’ In the little 
comment he does make, Hanslick himself implies that his theory of 'content 
consisting of materially moving form s’ (to paraphrase) could be extended to other 
media. Indeed, when he states that ‘the formal aspects of both music and colour 
rest on the same basis,’ he appears to positively encourage the same process to 
be undertaken in the other arts, that is, that the visual be judged on the way in 
which it works out and manipulates the qualities of images, poetry the qualities of 
language, and so on. The task of the analyst of the composite art work, then, is 
not simply to demonstrate unity, or even just to find multiple meanings (although 
that may be part of it); it is to compare and contrast these differing forms, to 
discover how they relate to and impact on one another, be that in the manner of 
conformance, contestation, or complementation.37 It is no longer a matter of 
similarities, but of identifying a what, how, and why of both similarity and 
difference.
II
The content of an object is itself a kind of form: but this immediately requires a 
great deal of clarification. Combining content and form as a single entity, when the 
two have long been understood in opposition to one another, at least in music, 
creates some knotty problems and is ripe for misunderstanding (hence the 
designation of Hanslick as a ‘formalist’ concerned only with musical form, thus 
bypassing his argument entirely). One must first define both content and form, and 
show how both of these relate to the identity of an object. According to literary 
theory (and since most of this theoretical territory has been mapped out there it
37 These categories are taken from Cook, N., Analysing Musical Multimedia, pp. 98-106.
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would be wise to retain its terminology), content is understood as forming the 
‘what’ of an object, and this is communicated by the ‘how’ of expression. To put it 
in Louis Hjelmslev’s terms, there is a plane of content and a plane of expression, 
and each of these has a ‘form.’38 The use of the term ‘form ’ by Hanslick, however, 
cuts across the content-expression dichotomy, and the use of these terms in all 
music theory is problematical, insofar as the distinction between what music 
expresses, its content, and its means of expressing it, is difficult to sustain. 
Indeed, this is precisely the point that the grammatically awkward phrase ‘tonend 
bewegte Formeri attempts to put across, and which I believe is a potential model 
outside of music as well, on which more later.
Even if we limit ourselves to the content-plane (so far as this is possible), 
‘form ’ describes a moulding or shaping of the material of content, a patterning that 
is necessarily determined by the nature, which is to say the affective properties, of 
the material in hand. Hanslick is not simply suggesting, then, that one takes note 
of the form of the content so as to perform a replacement, a substitution of content 
by the form that it takes, but that content in itself consists of a kind of pattern. The 
‘what’ of a given object is comprehended as a pattern that embodies its unique 
qualities. One must be careful, however, with the notion of pattern as the content 
of an object (and not a representation of that content); pattern must not be 
understood simply as a geometric entity, such that content has/is a shape,’ at 
least, not in the sense of an object with a simple (i.e. unitary) identity. The pattern 
has no single location; rather it is a modelling of a field of play, the relation of a set 
of locations, at once noun and transitive verb. Simultaneously act and abstraction.
The idea that in order to comprehend an object one must do so 
systemically, that is, understand its place within a set of objects rather than alone, 
exists in several different fields. System theory is a branch of science of its own, 
and informs thought on computer systems to ecology. In philosophy, Wittgenstein 
stated that: ‘When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a 
single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.’39 The most famous 
formulation of this idea, however, and certainly the most widely known, is that
38 H jelmslev, L., Prolegomena to a Theory o f Language, trans. W hitfie ld, F., (University of 
W isconsin  Press, Madison, 1969).
39 W ittgenstein, L., On Certainty, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1969), §141.
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proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure in one of the founding texts of semiology, his 
Course in General Linguistics,40 The lesson most often drawn from this book is his 
thesis that ‘in language there are only differences ... a difference generally implies 
positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are 
only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the 
signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic 
system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the 
system .41 What is less often noted is the continuation of this passage, in which 
Saussure notes: ‘the statement that everything in language is negative is true only 
if the signified and the signifier are considered separately; when we consider the 
sign in its totality, we have something that is positive in its own class. ... Although 
both the signified and the signifier are purely differential and negative when 
considered separately, their combination is a positive fact.’42 Although Saussure’s 
linguistic system is predicated entirely upon negative differentiation, the particular 
network of relations that is set up both within and between the realms of ‘the 
concept’ and phonic substance, a word’s ‘pattern’ of difference, is a means of 
positive identification. That is, each word's negotiation of the relation of materiality 
to a range of similar and conflicting concepts produces a distinctive quality by 
which it can be identified. The content, however, which in the language system is 
‘meaning,’ is not localized upon any one word; rather it is permeated throughout 
the system, determined not exclusively by its materiality, but by the productive 
capacity of the network of relations to content across the system, such that 
‘meaning’ is an emergent property of the language system. ‘Within the same 
language, all words used to express related ideas limit each other reciprocally; 
synonyms like French redouter “dread,” craindre “fear,” and avoir peur “be afraid” 
have value only through their opposition: if redouter did not exist, all its content 
would go to its competitors. Conversely, some words are enriched through contact 
with others: e.g. the new element introduced in decrepit results from the co­
existence of decrepi. The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its
40 de Saussure, F., Course in General Linguistics, ed. Bally, C., and Sechehaye, A., trans. 
Baskin, W., (Peter Owen, London, 1960).
41 Ibid., p. 120.
42 Ibid., p. 120.
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environment.’43 (Incidentally, the idea that language divides up a continuum of 
experience, rather than parcelling up discrete quanta of precise concepts, is still 
not universally recognized, as seen in recent texts by Christopher Small and Bryan 
Magee.44) There is a degree of tension here, in the generation of positive identity 
from the distinction between the pattern of content and the pattern of materiality, 
insofar as the material qualities of the word cut across the distinction 
content/expression by connecting outside the category of similar/differing concepts 
to a range of assonant words (as Saussure himself explains), which complicates 
the ‘environment’ and thus value of any term. This is not something that Saussure 
seems to resolve completely, which may cause him to fix finally upon the word as 
being not a purely relative entity, but as something with a concrete location. A  
particular word is like the centre of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of 
an indefinite number of co-ordinated terms.’45 This fixing upon a singular point, an 
exact location rather than the locus of an equation seems to me to be mistaken, 
and rather to undo the value of systemic, relational understanding that Saussure’s 
model allows. It does not diminish the validity or impact of the systemic analysis of 
an object in any way, however.
Understanding content, or anything else for that matter, as form or pattern 
enables one to model the full complexity of aesthetic appreciation. A combining of 
objects is no longer a straightforward addition of further properties, but a complex 
intermingling, algebraic rather than arithmetic. For example, if a very simple object 
is comprehended as a relational system of three points with three relations (and 
any real object would be almost immeasurably more complex), and then combined 
with a non-identical system also of three elements and relations, the result is not 
defined as a system with six points, but rather one with fifteen relations, as 
illustrated below.
43 Ibid., p. 116.
44 See Small, C., op. cit., pp 94ff., and Magee, B., Confessions of a Philosopher, 
(Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1997), especially pp 76-82.
45 De Saussure, F., op. cit., p. 126.
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In any given system of ‘n’ points, the number of potential relations in that 
system is given by the formula:
/ ( n) = 1/ 2n (n - 1 )
Therefore when two objects, ‘n’ and ‘x ’ are combined, it can be seen that the 
resultant is not simply the sum of the relations of n and x, but expressed as:
/(n+x) = 1/4(n+x)((n+x) -1).
The consequent increase in complexity is thus shown by:
/(n+x)—/(n ) = 1/2[(n+x)((n+x)-1) -  n(n-1)]
=1/4(2nx-x+x2)
or to put it more simply, one can state that:
/(n+x) > / ( n) +/(x).
In short, what a systemic understanding tells us is that in either the combining of 
two differing objects, or the supplementation of an existing object, the level of 
complexity produced is considerably greater, and thus also the need for accuracy, 
than the more reductive model of unitary identity would suggest. One can apply 
these ideas of complex identity to a range of concepts: the idea of style or genre 
can be understood as a set of elements in systematic relation, both internally, and 
in comparison with one another. Is a fugue written ‘in the style of Bach’ an 
accurate reproduction of his method? Even though it may sound correct to the 
modern ear in every respect, there may be one historical association that has been
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lost over time, such that it would sound quite unlike Bach to his contemporaries. 
To paraphrase Thomas Carlyle, ‘in every object there is inexhaustible meaning; 
the ear hears in it what the ear brings means of hearing.’46 Similarly, it explains 
why two apparently similar objects can seem very easy to distinguish. An imitation 
stone urn made from plastic will never appear quite like the genuine article, 
however closely the colours and texture match, since the alteration of just one 
element will produce not one difference, but a whole set of different relations, a 
completely new pattern.
One can see these principles at work in the music of Edgard Varese, based 
upon the idea of crystalline structure. The crystal has no predetermined external 
shape, but its internal structure, determined by the regular arrangement of one or 
several ions, is a tightly defined pattern, and the manner of its growth (the form of 
its expression, so to speak) is a result of the interaction of this pattern with the 
medium in which it grows. The content-pattern of the crystal is the relative 
positions of the ions that constitute it. One cannot point to any one of these ions 
(even metaphorically) and say ‘There it is, that is the pattern;’ the pattern is a result 
of combination and arrangement. To put it in mathematical terms (which is, after 
all, the language of the material) pattern is permutational and combinatorial. 
Varese writes:
The crystal is characterized by a definite external form and a definite internal structure. 
The internal structure is built on the unit of crystal, the smallest grouping having the 
order and composition of the substance. The extension of the unit into space forms 
the whole crystal. In spite of the limited variety of internal structures, the external 
forms of crystals are almost limitless. I believe this suggests, better than any 
explanation I can give, the way my works are formed. One has an idea, the basis of 
internal structure; it is expanded or split into different shapes or groups of sounds that
46 The actual quotation is ‘In every object there is inexhaustible meaning: the eye sees in it 
what the eye brings means of seeing.’ Quoted by Raymond Briggs in response to his 
critics in the paperback edition of Fungus the Bogeyman, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 
1979), back cover.
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constantly change in shape, direction and speed, attracted or repelled by various 
forces. The form is the consequence of this interaction.47
Thus Varese’s ‘musical idea' (which it should be stressed is an affair limited to 
sonic material alone, and is in no sense ideal) equates to the 'unit of crystal,’ or 
content-pattern of the musical work, which in turn might be equated with Hanslick’s 
‘tonally moving forms.’ And although Varese’s compositional technique is a 
deliberate attempt to effect a ‘corporealization of the intelligence that is in sound,’48 
his implication is that all music is constructed (more or less successfully) out of 
‘intelligent sounds.’
As many writers have noted, Varese’s crystalline approach to his music 
emphasizes the spatial qualities of his sound world; indeed Varese cites his 
encounter with the work of Wronski as being probably what first started me 
thinking of music as spatial.’49 But Varese is neither unique nor original in 
conceiving of his music this way (although he does foreground the issue to a 
degree unseen previously); discussions of the spatiality of music are a recurrent 
topic in musical aesthetics and analysis across the decades. Anthony Gilbert has 
pointed out that the very terminology of music is replete with definitions and 
directions that ‘require an apprehension of space or volume for their full 
understanding,’50 and the analogy between music and architecture, or even 
landscape, as an attempt to enact ‘the beautiful’ in form goes back centuries, and 
is present in the arguments of nearly all commentators on music, including, for 
instance, both Hanslick and Wagner. There are, however, two very distinct
47 Varese, E., quoted in Mellers, W., Music in a New Found Land, (Barrie and Rockliff, 
London. 1964), p. 158.
48 I am indebted to Malcolm McDonald for the source of this quotation, the background to 
which is discussed in the section ‘Wronski and ‘Intelligent Sounds” of his forthcoming 
monograph on Var6se, currently still in manuscript at the time of writing. Varese showed 
great fondness for this quotation, which he took from the nineteenth century Polish 
mathematician Joseph-Maria Hoene Wronski, using it on more than one occasion.
49 Varese, E., again quoted by McDonald, op. cit., from a lecture entitled ‘Spatial Music,’ 
given at Sarah Lawrence College in 1959.
50 Gilbert, A., Musical Space: A Composer's View,’ in Critical Inquiry, vol. 7, (1980-1), p 
605.
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schools of thought regarding how space is realized in music with differing 
conceptions of musical form,’ which might be characterized (in line with Saussure) 
as being on the one hand a synchronic or paradigmatic approach, and on the other 
hand a syntagmatic or diachronic one. Neither of these approaches need be 
mutually exclusive of the other, but they do stem from two competing aesthetic 
models of musical appreciation, the former privileging the moment by moment, 
sensory impact of sound, the latter requiring a contemplation of the musical work 
(and it does depend upon the notion of the work) as a whole, at one remove from 
its auditory presence. As it happens, these two approaches have become 
entangled with musicological politics, theorists of popular music being more likely 
to favour the former, while more conservative theorists tend to favour the latter, 
with its emphasis on both canonized works and notated scores,51 but there is no 
insurmountable impediment to the application of either approach to any music. 
Which is not to say that they are unifiable: Edmund Gurney was wrestling with 
reconciling the two views over a hundred years ago in his treatise The Power o f 
Sound,52 but his inability finally to do so reflects more upon the difficulty of the task 
he set himself than his own capabilities.53 Consideration of diachronic form in 
terms of spatial metaphor, largely based on the concept of repetition of a musical 
‘block,’ as in the balanced form of an A-B-A structure, has become familiar and 
well understood through long standing use (and is the source of architectural 
analogies), but to my mind is of limited use, certainly when attempting to relate 
sounds to images. One might imagine this ‘spatialization’ of music to be an 
effective means of comparison, but in practise the idea that ‘melodic contours 
relate closely to the affect we perceive in the music,’ such that ‘jagged lines 
produce music that seems anxious and intense’ or ‘lines with a narrow ambitus
51 On this point, see Brackett, D., Interpreting Popular Music, (Cambridge University Press, 
1995), although the same point is made in innumerable texts.
52 Gurney, E., The Power of Sound, (Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1880).
53 This point is discussed in detail by Bojan Bujic in his essay ‘Form and Forming: From 
Victorian Aesthetics to the Mid-twentieth-century Avant-garde,’ in Composition -  
Performance -  Reception, pp. 118-131.
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seem more meditative, not only seems somewhat crass, but is also limiting in 
implying once again that music and image must conform to a unitary model. Note 
Vernallis s assertion that ‘We respond to imagery and music that work together to 
reflect these spatial relationships.’55
The idea that an individual sound moment might be conceived of spatially 
is seen considerably less often, although it is implicit in much music of the 
twentieth century that took an increased interest in the importance of musical 
timbre. The origin of this viewpoint, or certainly the first time at which it was 
codified, was in the work of the physicist Hermann von Helmholtz in the mid­
nineteenth century. In his book On the Sensations o f Tone,56 the analysis of 
sounds in terms of the overtone series that constitute them provides a spatial 
model of any given sound that is both qualitative and quantitative, noting not only 
the arrangement of frequencies, but also their amplitudes, the relation between 
them determining the identity of a sound wave. Not only did this model produce a 
spatial metaphor for sound identity, but his work on acoustics also incorporated the 
actual spatiality within the uniqueness of a sound, since perceived sound is also 
determined by the space in which it resonates. These suggestions are what 
Gilbert refers to as ‘the truly essential nature of the [spatial] phenomenon,’5' and is 
probably what Varese had in mind when speaking of his music as spatial,’58 but 
this conception of music on its own is flawed fundamentally. Varese attempted to 
‘compose out’ the implicit spatiality of an initial sound or group of sounds, but even 
by attempting to do so he introduced syntagmatic spatiality, and even had he not, 
the very model of the spatial is ill-suited and insufficient for a sound event 
predicated upon oscillations that necessarily take place in time. The diachronic 
model is similarly lacking when examined closely: it is tenable only if one overlooks
54 Vernallis, C., op. cit., pp. 158-9. Vernallis also cites Leonard Meyer’s Style and Music, 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 128-9, but she could as easily 
have cited any number of authors.
55 Ibid., p. 159.
56 Helmholtz, H., On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of 
Music, trans., Ellis, A.J., (London, 1885).
57 Gilbert, A., op. cit., p. 606.
58 Varese was clearly familiar with the work of Helmholtz, and would frequently cite it as an 
influence upon his music.
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the temporal aspect of music, which might be argued to be its most important 
quality. The balance and symmetry of an A-B-A structure exists for just as long as 
one ignores that the second A section, unlike the first, is heard both as a repetition 
in relation to its first airing and in relation to the B section -  the experience is a 
dynamic one, unfolding not in three dimensions but in four. And here we run up 
against the limits of modelling either music or the moving image as being 
straightforwardly spatial, or representable by pattern alone. Any musical work is of 
necessity an integration of both of these forms of spatiality, a point made explicit 
by Pierre Boulez, of whom Varese may be regarded as a precursor. Boulez took 
Varese’s concept of the sound-object, but chose to superpose it with an overall 
system, rather than attempt to ‘grow’ the sound, like a crystal. As both Bojan Bujic 
and Alistair Williams have noted, Boulez’s notion of the relationship between static 
spatiality and temporal spatiality is a dialectical one, as expressed in his essay ‘Le 
systeme et I'idee. ’
Boulez’s notion of musical material ... is realised by the system manifesting itself in 
terms of the structural properties of the music, but relinquishing its grip sufficiently to 
allow local and contingent configurations thrown up by the material to have an intrinsic 
role in the musical discourse. The dialectic of system and idea is conceived in terms 
commensurate with the Adornian dialectic of concept and object. The musical idea is 
an object whose specificity eludes complete control by the system, yet which is in need 
of manipulation by the system. The system organises the musical object, yet 
recognises its concreteness and its ability to generate local configurations.59
In placing the two aspects of musical space in a dialectical relation Boulez has 
gone some way to reconcile these two strains of thought in music history, but not 
quite, I believe, far enough. The connection of ‘system’ and ‘idea’ or particle, is not 
merely a dialectical one of mutual influence, but one of fused identity, certainly in 
the instance of its reception, what Nattiez would call the ‘aesthesic’ realm. Any 
given system is a conglomeration of its parts, an emergent property, and attempts
59 Williams, A., "Repons’: phantasmagoria or the articulation of space?’ in Pople, A. (ed ), 
Theory, analysis and meaning in music, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 199-200.
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to control a system or distort it will be successful only insofar as one can add 
things to the set of relations in order to weight the system. One can try to conceal, 
or overwhelm a system, but one cannot efface any part of it; the system is an 
emergent property of the set of particles that constitute it, and each particle is 
understood in relation to those with which it is connected. It is no longer a 
question of space or time, or even space and time, but a fusion of the two; spaces 
in motion -  Einsteinian space-time. One can see an articulation of this fusion in 
the video of the Chemical Brothers’ ‘Star Guitar,’ which takes the form of a 
landscape as viewed from a moving train. Musical elements or ‘sound objects’ are 
made coincident with physical objects -  for example, the repeated kick drum on 
the first beat of each bar is accompanied by the passing of a concrete pillar, a 
passing train coincides with each repetition of a high synthesizer riff -  and different 
landscapes, be they urban or rural, accompany different sections of the music. 
Not only is the music’s ‘spatiality’ thus made visible, but the viewer positioning is 
such that one can see the musical space that one has passed through receding 
into the distance. Both the immediate space of the musical object and the 
‘architectural’ space of the music’s passing through time are made available.
Even this, however, can not be regarded as a representation of music, but 
only as an adjunct to it. Sound itself is not an object in space but an oscillation; 
even if one inscribes a locus rather than a location, that locus must itself then be 
extended in time -  it is impossible to plot sound in a three dimensional pattern. 
Note once more that Hanslick defined the content of music as being ‘tonend 
bewegte Formen.' Even the individual ions of Varese’s crystal model are not static 
but constantly vibrating; matter itself is a condensate of energy waves in motion. A 
set of relations is never a fixed pattern, but a pattern that is itself in oscillation. The 
principle of identity being an emergent property of a dynamic process has long 
been understood in chemistry. The standard test for the identity of a metal present 
in a compound is the flame test, in which the compound is held over a flame, and 
the colour of the resultant flame gives the identity of the metal. The physics behind 
this involves the promotion of electrons into higher energy states than they would 
normally occupy by the heat of the flame, and as they fall back into their usual rest 
state this energy is given up as light of a particular frequency. Thus it is the 
change in energy of this process, the relation of two different states of oscillation, 
that reveals the particular identity of the metal. In the words of Plato, ‘Whenever
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we see anything in a process of change, for example fire, we should speak of it not 
as being a thing but as having a quality.'60 Representational pattern can either 
map the location of an interaction, or the motion of a locale, but not both, which is 
to say, the motion of an interaction -  the diagram is no longer sufficient; to employ 
all necessary dimensions one must move to the equation. (I am put in mind here 
of the physicist’s attempt to model in two dimensions the warping of three- 
dimensional space by showing how heavy objects distort the regular grid pattern of 
a taut rubber sheet. This quite literally leaves a great deal to the imagination.) To 
attempt to represent the pattern of the object is to miss the object altogether, to 
encounter it only tangentially; representation of pattern-equation involves a 
mathematical differentiation of its actuality, be that with respect to time or space, 
with a consequent loss of information.
It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that Edmund Gurney in 1880 failed to 
make the leap to an Einsteinian relativistic frame of space-time, both conceived of 
as a single entity. And it is important to realize that this reconsideration of space 
involves more than just adding one more dimension: the move from space to 
space-time requires one to make one’s own status part of the equation, in that the 
movement of the observer is a factor of the observed, as well as the reverse. 
Relations that were a question of distance are now functions of their velocities; the 
pattern is always-already motile. Henri Lefebvre writes:
Modem science suggests that rather than think of space as a container or bodies as 
“things” in space, we grasp the organism as a centre for the production of space 
around itself -  space is not external to the body but generated by it. ... Such analysis 
needs to be completed by a rhythm analysis in which time is then grasped in its spatial 
form. ... Spatial practice is on this level most concretely articulated in the various 
historical and cultural systems of gestuality 61
60 Plato, Timaeus, 49d, trans., Lee, H.D.P , (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 67.
61 Lefebvre, H., cited as an unpublished manuscript dated 1983, quoted by Berland J., in 
‘Sound, Image and Social Space: Music Video and Media Reconstruction,' in Sound and 
Vision: The Music Video Reader, p. 35.
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The point is no longer just to identify where precisely something is in space, but to 
understand the way the entirety of space-time is engineered and modulated, its 
harmonies and discordances, and the way these oscillations resonate and interact. 
The simple algebra and diagrams above clearly no longer suffice, but there is a 
mathematics and a geometry in existence designed for this task, namely the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics and non-Euclidean geometry. The very 
difficult mathematics of quantum mechanics are way beyond the technical 
capabilities of the writer, but the concepts and phenomena they describe and 
predict enable considerable insight into notions of perception, and hence 
aesthetics. The idea that an object might simultaneously be a material entity and a 
set of oscillations, or rather, that these two things are one and the same, will be 
familiar to anyone who has studied elementary particle physics and the wave 
equations of Schrodinger that accompany it. The similarity between Barthes’ 
assertion that the idea of signifiance is theoretically locatable but not 
describable’62 and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which states that it is 
impossible to simultaneously know the position and momentum of a quantum 
particle-event, is all the more striking for the fact that they were almost certainly 
developed independently. The riddle of Schrodinger’s cat was formulated to show 
the absurdity of observing quantum phenomena at the level of the object, but it told 
us more about rethinking our ways of perceiving the world than it did about flaws in 
quantum theory.
The model of relationality demonstrated the complexity of perception and 
object comparison, but it did not go nearly far enough. Basic algebra could show 
the quantitative aspect of pattern relation in simple numerative terms, but could tell 
us nothing about the quality of those relations in space-time: their oscillation, 
intensity, duration, in short, everything about an object that individuates it rather 
than simply quantifying it. The object is not number, but matrix, and the composite 
object extends in further dimensions still. Heisenberg showed that in quantum 
theory the combination of 1+1 could be performed in such a way as to equal more 
than two, and the complex commutation of matrix mechanics, developed to model 
the behaviour of material systems, shows that this is true of the physical realm 
also.
62 Barthes, R., The Third Meaning,’ in Image -Music-Text, p. 65.
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So far, so abstract, one might think, but this rethinking of the object inspired by 
Hanslick’s formulation leads to a conception of identity (and thus composite 
identities) that has already been effected via a different route in the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari. They write:
III
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or 
substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an 
hour, a date have perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is 
different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they 
consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, 
capacities to affect and be affected.63
And they go on to show the presence of such individuations in the literature of 
Woolf and Proust, in haiku poetry, in an instance of rubato in Chopin. The problem 
is not that of finding and identifying haecceities, however, but of delimiting them. 
The haecceity occupies a range of registers of existence, fragmenting and 
exceeding what might be regarded as the classical conception of the ‘object.’ 
Having established a systemic model of relationality in the place of the object, the 
boundaries that demarcate ‘object’ have become fluid, if not invisible. This is not 
to say that the object is floating freely, unrestricted; if anything it is the reverse. 
Rather, the world itself, what might be termed Lebenswelt in the jargon of 
phenomenology, has been systematized, aestheticized. Barthes notes:
Just as Einsteinian science demands that the relativity of the frames of reference be 
included in the object studied, so the combined action of Marxism, Freudianism and 
structuralism demands, in literature, the relativization of the relations of writer, reader 
and observer (critic). Over against the traditional notion of the work, for long -  and still
63 Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F., op. cit., p. 261.
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-  conceived of in a, so to speak, Newtonian way, there is now the requirement of a 
new object, obtained by the sliding or overturning of former categories. That object is 
the Text64
The reassignation of the object as pattern ‘demands’ a shift from ‘work’ to ‘text,’ 
and consequently a new way of approaching the object, now a subset of ‘world.’ 
The full implications of Barthes’ category of object that was ‘locatable but not 
describable’ now become apparent. The question of ‘what’ an object is, at least in 
its classical formulation of meanings, origins, causes and reasons, is not one that 
can be realistically answered; to do so would be to step outside one’s own 
conceptual box, an attempt to ‘use language to get outside language,’65 to borrow 
W ittgenstein’s formulation of the problem. For Barthes to describe what he 
perceived in the film still would require him to describe the entire culture, or form 
of life’ in Wittgensteinian terms, the complete network of which that object, in all its 
complexity, was part. This is of course unfeasible, but is also in a way 
unnecessary, given there is likely to be considerable agreement in form of life 
between ‘writer’ and ‘reader.’ Thus one presents the space(s) occupied by the 
object in the network; one can say ‘where’ it is (or better, where it moves) rather 
than ‘what’ it is; the linguistic trace of this idea is made clear when we talk about’ 
something, instead of speaking it exactly. As Barthes himself put it: textual 
analysis ... is henceforth less a question of explaining or even describing, than of 
entering into the play of the signifiers; of enumerating them, perhaps (if the text 
allows), but not hierarchising them.’66 As with Wittgenstein’s criticism of Freud, 
what is required is not (causal) explanation, but clarification of a perception, an 
attempt to ‘confer blatancy on what was immanent to it.’67 Aesthetic experience 
does not prompt a search for the origin of the source of that experience, but a
64 Barthes, R., ‘From Work to Text,' in Image-Music-Text, p. 156.
65 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Remarks, trans. Hargreaves, R., and White, R., 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1975), p. 54.
56 Barthes, R., ‘Theory of the Text,’ in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. 
Young, R., (Routledge, London and New York, 1981), p. 43.
67 Cioffi, F., op. cit., p. 202.
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relation of that event to one's own previous experience and to the ‘web of 
culture. 8
A  further, and perhaps even more radical consequence of this conception 
of the world is the necessary binding of the subject to any consideration of the 
object. This idea has a long history (at least outside the Anglo-Saxon 
epistemological tradition69) that predates the work of Einstein by nearly a century. 
The Hegelian dialectic, predicated on the idea of locating an active subject position 
distinct from the secure subject of Cartesian epistemology, performs the same 
theoretical movement, such that Things exist in themselves, but their truth will 
emerge only through the steady incorporation of their determinations in the 
dialectical whole of Spirit. What makes the object truly itself is simultaneously 
what turns its face towards humanity, for the principle of its being is at one with the 
root of our own subjectivity.’70 This subject, however, is not the same subject as 
that of the text, but an Ideal subject, present to itself. Idealist philosophy’s 
avoidance of the sensuous materiality of art and language, and the production of 
the subject in this is outlined by Julia Kristeva, who sees in aesthetics a ‘second 
overturning of the Hegelian dialectic’ (the first being the political economy of Marx).
It is not just that the subject considers the object in its self knowing, but is 
produced in and by the art object: The subject is only the signifying process and 
he appears only as a signifying practice, that is, only when he is absent within the 
position  out of which social, historical, and signifying activity unfolds. The 
subject that is just a product of the system from which it emerges is a very different 
subject to that of either Kant or Hegel, and much closer to what Wittgenstein 
describes as a form of life.’ In the linguistic universe of the later Wittgenstein, the 
notions of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are stripped of their privileged connection to
68 The phrase is Gary Tomlinson’s, but is derived from his reading of the sociologist Clifford 
Geertz See The Web of Culture. A Context for Musicology,’ in Nineteenth Century Music, 
vol. 7, (1983-4), pp. 350-62.
69 See the essay of Montefiore, A., and Taylor, C., ‘From an analytical perspective,’ that 
introduces Kortian, G., Metacritique The philosophical argument of Jurgen Habermas, 
trans., Raffan, J., (Cambridge University Press, 1980), for a discussion of the relation the 
ideas of Hegel and Kant to the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition.
70 Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, pp. 122-3.
71 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 215.
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‘reality.’ They become different ‘language-games,’ different positions one might 
take up within the system of one’s own form of life. Since the idea of a ‘private 
language' is shown to be nonsensical by Wittgenstein, and language is the 
medium in which we apprehend the world, one’s experience of the world is 
necessarily intersubjective. ‘It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form 
of life 2 Moreover, a Wittgensteinian ‘language’ is far more than the set of words 
that are available, but a composite of all the possible ‘language-games,’ or modes 
of expression, that are in use by a form of life. A language is thus a set of 
practices, based upon the culture and the capabilities of the group that use it. And 
as Jean-Jacques Nattiez notes, these practices may be so well ingrained as to no 
longer constitute a distinct set of actions in themselves, but instead be an 
unquestionable mode of being, stating ‘among the Japanese, the succession 
“waiting followed by rapid and violent action” is less a literary structure than a 
typical schema of behaviour, a cultural scheme and a way of being.’73 Hence, 
when Wittgenstein states that If a lion could talk, we could not understand him,’74 
the point is that the activity of being a lion is so different from our own as to be 
incomprehensible. As to the similarity of different human forms of life, Wittgenstein 
equivocates: on the one hand he states The common behaviour of mankind is a 
system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language,’75 but 
on the other, ‘One human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn 
this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, 
what is more, even given a mastery of a country’s language. We do not 
understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to 
themselves.)’76 Thus the connection between different human ‘languages’ (in the 
broad sense) is like that between different language-games, insofar as there is 
overlap and familiarity, sufficient to comprehend what is going on. Unlike 
language-games, though, in order to understand, one must be familiar with the
72 Wittgenstein, L, Philosophical Investigations, §241.
73 Nattiez, J.-J., ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?, trans. Ellis, K., Journal of the 
Royal Musical Association, vol. 115:2, p. 250.
74 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, p. 223.
75 Ibid., §206.
76 Ibid., p. 223.
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system as a whole, to see not only the elements but also the way in which each is 
connected to the others. Understanding, and thus aesthetic appreciation, is a 
complex process of relation: one cannot properly understand either a part of the 
system alone, or the whole system from the outside. One must be part of that 
system. ‘Does the theme point to nothing beyond itself? Oh yes! But that means:
- The impression it makes on me is connected with things in its surroundings -  e.g. 
with the existence of the German language and of its intonation, but that means 
with the whole field of our language games.’77 A distinction between subject and 
object is no longer essential, for Wittgenstein, to aesthetic appreciation of an 
artistic practice. One does not explain the object, and one cannot explain the 
system, which constitutes one’s own frame of reference; instead one clarifies the 
spatio-temporal relations of an artistic practice to other kinds of practices, or 
language-games.
This mode of Weltanschauung (world-understanding) is broadly compatible 
with that of Deleuze and Guattari, who similarly see fit to dispense with the notion 
of subject altogether, redesignating the systemic object and subject alike as 
haecceities:
We must avoid an oversimplified connection, as though there were on the one hand 
formed subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal co­
ordinates of the haecceity type. For you will yield nothing to haecceities unless you 
realize that that is what you are, and that you are nothing but that. . . . It should not be 
thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop that situates objects, or 
of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage 
in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity.78
However, they do differ on how one regards the conditions of being for the system 
as a whole itself. For Deleuze and Guattari the formation of haecceities takes 
place in a defined space, the ‘plane of consistency,’ which is both 'a geometrical 
plane’ and ‘a plane o f ... univocality.’79 By contrast, the form of life is precisely not
77 Wittgenstein, L., Culture and Value, revised edition, ed., von Wright, G.H., (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1998), 59e.
78 Deleuze, G, and Guattari, F., op. cit., p. 262.
79 Ibid., p. 266.
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univocal: even though within the system one must understand the part holistically, 
the system as a whole lies outside the purview of any part of that system. Even 
though one understands the part holistically, the whole remains beyond 
understanding since it has no exterior point of reference. ‘What has to be 
accepted, the given, is -  so one could say -  forms o f life.’80 The whole is not a 
unitary entity, but an emergent product of a collective energy, a ‘plural totality’ in 
Kristeva’s terms. In this sense it is far closer to the Derridean reading of chora 
than it is to the ‘plane of consistency.’ ‘It does not have the characteristics of an 
existent, by which we mean an existent that would be receivable in the ontologic, 
that is, those of an intelligible or sensible existent. There is chora, but the chora 
does not exist.’81
Derrida, of course, was addressing the idea of ‘chora’ in the light of the 
work of Kristeva in Revolution in Poetic Language, and she in turn had ‘borrowed’ 
(her own word) it from a passage of Plato’s Timaeus.82 Kristeva describes chora 
initially as being ‘not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it 
is not yet a sign); nor is it yet a position that represents someone for another 
position (i.e., it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, generated in order to 
attain to this signifying position. Neither model nor copy, the chora precedes and 
underlies figuration and thus specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or 
kinetic rhythm,’ and as ‘a modality of signifiance in which the linguistic sign is not 
yet articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between real and 
symbolic.’83 One can, however, draw a distinction between this relatively abstract 
notion of chora and the specific instance of the ‘semiotic chora,’ in which ‘the 
social’ ‘imprints its constraint in a mediated form which organizes the chora not 
according to a law  but through an ordering,'84 (although it should be noted that
80 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, p. 226.
81 Derrida, J , ‘Khora’ (rewritten throughout as ‘chora’ for reasons of consistency), in The 
Derrida Reader: Writing Performances, ed. Wolfreys, J., (Edinburgh University Press, 
1998), p. 237.
82 Plato, ibid., 48d-53, pp. 67-72.
83 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26.
84 Ibid., p. 27. It is also worth noting that Deleuze and Guattari briefly touch on (and reject) 
the idea of a 'semiotic chora’ (ibid., p. 65), but do not mention chora again, despite its 
similarity to their notion of the ‘plane of consistency.’
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Kristeva herself does not make this distinction explicit). In this process chora is 
made geometric, in as much as this ordering ‘fixes the chora in place and reduces 
it.’85 The idea of form of life seems to fall somewhere between this transition from 
the Platonic idea of chora, to an instance of the chora, through its hab ita tion  into a 
Freudian system of drives, being neither so abstract as the former, nor as 
determined as the latter. As suggested above, the reading of chora that most 
readily approximates to the social and biological character of a form of life is that of 
Derrida, as when he writes:
Chora “means " place occupied by someone, country, habited place, marked place, 
rank, post, assigned position, territory, or region. And in fact, chora will always already 
be occupied, invested, even as a general place, and even when it is distinguished from 
everything that takes place in it Whence the difficulty . . . of treating it as an empty or 
geometric, or even, and this is what Heidegger will say of it, as that which prepares the 
Cartesian space.86
It is this fusion of the abstract and the concrete achieved in the familiar Derridean 
‘always already’ that makes this so similar to the ‘form of life.’ The positing of a 
capacity is coexistent with its realization, neither preceding the other. The social 
field does not expand into space; instead the expansion of the social generates a 
new space. There is a potential dynamism of the social in Derrida and 
Wittgenstein that Kristeva seems to close off, if not disavow entirely, in semiotizing 
chora through the body of the mother, and hence the Lacanian phallus.8' It would 
be unfair to compare Kristeva to a dishonest taxi driver, as Cioffi does Freud,88 that 
takes one on a gratuitously long journey to a destination that was round the corner, 
but there is a degree of this in Revolution in Poetic Language. Having suggested 
that the semiotic chora is no more than the plane where the subject is both 
generated and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of
85 Ibid., p. 240n 15.
8fi
Derrida, J., ‘Khora,’ op. cit, p. 246.
87 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26 and p. 241 n.22.
88 Although he is at this point writing in lieu of Wittgenstein. See Cioffi, F., op. cit., p. 225.
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charges and stases that produce him,’89 and then demonstrated how this subject is 
then undone in and through language in the very act of his production, we are left 
in the end with linguistic and artistic practice.90 The subject is offered only to be 
withdrawn, and what remains seems very much like the elements of a form of life, 
having been put through a psychoanalytic mill. However, although Kristeva has 
taken us a great distance only to arrive very close to where we started, she has 
furnished us with a range of analytic tools along the way. Wittgenstein (after 
Hegel) had already reconceived the object as a set of dynamic relations, as 
khoros, above all as practise: Kristeva performs this move all over again (in a more 
explicit way), but she also introduces the idea of the social in the form of the 
‘symbolic,’ which brings a critical potential to the form of life that is often thought to 
be missing. Montefiore and Taylor note that T o  the Wittgensteinian, critical 
theorists may appear as just another band of fools rushing about over the ground 
which has just been so carefully cleared by the assembled reminders about the 
ways in which our language works; conversely, to critical theorists the 
Wittgensteinian may come across as preaching an obscurantist acceptance of the 
status quo.'9' Kristeva shows that it is possible after all to understand chora or 
form of life critically through the theory of text (although this is only a partial 
understanding), without stepping outside one’s own conceptual box (even if the 
Oedipal model of the social she deploys would have been an anathema to 
Wittgenstein in its determinism). If we return to an earlier analogy for a moment, it 
might be said that in the same way that gravity is a warping of space-time, such 
that bodies are not directly aware of this except so far as their motion is weighted 
towards a massive body, so the form of life/system distorts, but does not 
predetermine, the limits of one's horizon. And it is through an interrogation of the 
social that one can become aware of this process of distortion.
89 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 28.
90 Ibid., pt. IV, sec. 5, The Second Overturning of the Dialectic: After Political Economy, 
Aesthetics,’ pp. 214-6.
91 Montefiore, A., and Taylor, C., op. cit., p. 21.
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Let us prepare to grapple with the ineffable, and see if we may not eff it after all.92
Given that the object has been superseded (at least theoretically) by a set of 
dynamic relations, it is worth asking how one begins to perceive anything from the 
mass of information the senses receive. How does one cut through the holism of 
the system so as to apprehend apparently discrete units, and what is the mode of 
that apprehension? Whether one turns to Hanslick or Wagner, Wittgenstein or 
Kristeva, there is a truly remarkable convergence of opinion on this topic; a 
reiteration of Hanslick’s wish to reinstate the role of the sensuous in perception, 
grounded in the capacities of the human body. As Terry Eagleton notes, Thought, 
to be sure, is more than just a biological reflex: it is a specialized function of our 
drives which can refine and spiritualize them over time. But it remains the case 
that everything we think, feel and do moves within a frame of interests rooted in 
our “species being,” and can have no reality independently of this.’93 As discussed 
earlier, we need to understand our relationships to the Lebenswelt not only 
quantitatively, identifying connection, but also qualitatively, in identifying the 
properties of those relations, and one’s means of doing this lie in the realm of the 
senses, of affect. This is a return to the original project of aesthetics as formulated 
by the eighteenth-century philosopher Alexander Baumgarten: an attempt to 
cognize the world of sensation that lay outside of Kantian reason. Although the 
discipline of aesthetics grew increasingly distant from its initial raison d ’etre over 
time, a strain of it remains in the thought of Schelling, of Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein, and has become a familiar trope of Cultural Studies over the past 
twenty years, to the extent that ‘few literary texts are likely to make it nowadays 
into the new historicist canon unless they contain at least one mutilated body.’94 A 
model based upon the idea that ‘the physical and sensuous experience of human
IV
92 Adams, D,, Dirk Gently 's Holistic Detective Agency, (Pan Books, London, 1988), p 150.
93 Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 235.
94 Ibid , p. 7.
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beings and our bodily experience of the world '15 is a prerequisite of understanding, 
will necessarily privilege the biological facts of the sense organs in our relation to 
the material. This is not to say, however, that different materials impacting on 
different sensory modes are irredeemably distinct to the extent that they are 
unrelatable: the semiotic chora is a ‘continuum,’90 and although each mode may 
have a specific type of pattern, it is pattern nonetheless. Acknowledging the 
material specificity, the ‘untranslatability’ of an object need not make a comparison 
of their affective qualities impossible, once they are grounded in ‘the bottom of all 
purely human art -  that of plastic bodily movement.'97 Wittgenstein wrestled with 
this process of comparison for many years, particularly as it related to music, and 
finally concluded that 'there just is no paradigm there other than the theme. And 
yet again there is a paradigm other than the theme: namely the rhythm of our 
language, of our thinking and feeling And furthermore the theme is a new  part of 
our language, it becomes incorporated in it; we learn a new gesture.'98 This 
adoption of the concept of gesture as a human equivalent (and not a 
representation) of a specific affective entity late in his career (the above was 
written just five years before his death), is an important step in his last writings, 
w ith wide-ranging ramifications.
It should be stressed that gesture as a term here encompasses a great 
deal more than gesticulation alone. Gesture is the resultant of the interaction of 
the material and the social, the negotiation of object and world; it is a spatio- 
temporal actualization or corporealization of what Idealists would term essence; it 
is the space-time of affect, where material becomes sensuous and intermingles 
with the social body in a specific pattern-event, two modes of oscillation combining 
to produce a movement, khoros. Here is the beating of the body in Barthes 
‘Rasch,’ the music affecting the body and the body inside the music.99 When
95 Small, C., op. cit., p. 104
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Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, pp. 28-9.
97 Wagner, R., The Artwork of the Future,’ op. cit., p. 63.
98 Wittgenstein, L., Culture and Value, p. 59e.
99 This phrase is Robert Samuels’, and is discussed in ‘Music as text: Mahler, Schumann 
and issues in analysis,’ in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. Pople, A., 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 152-163.
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Barthes asks ‘What does my body know?’100 the answer is gesture. Thus gesture 
is the subject and the object in combination; not a translation, not a representation, 
but thing and apprehension in one. As Paul Johnson puts it, in writing of music:
The phrase says something, but something which cannot be paraphrased -  it says 
itself It makes a unique gesture, but the significance of that gesture can be explored 
by relating it to the network of possibilities against which it has meaning. ... What is at 
stake is not the substitution of one general sign for another; rather it involves finding a 
link between two incommensurate realms, both of which get their importance from their 
connection to human life and feeling.101
Certainly this phenomenon, binding the material qualities of an object indissolubly 
to one’s understanding of it, is easiest to recognize in music, unencumbered as it 
is by the need to represent anything outside of itself, but it is common to all 
objects. For Saussure the words tree, Baum , and arbre were interchangeable, 
despite the fact that this contradicted his own theories regarding the ‘environment’ 
of a word (see above). But for Wittgenstein the phonic constitution of a word 
creates a ‘corona’ that is key to the precision of its use (and hence meaning), as in 
his discussion of the concept of the ‘if-feeling,’ which compares the word with a 
musical phrase,102 in such a way that ‘the word [if] ... becomes a gesture of if- 
ness.’IOJ One sees here, in this reclamation of the material, a restitution of the 
‘musicality’ of language, but it might as well be the ‘musicalization’ of any object or 
art form. The Romantic encounter with ‘the ineffable’ that E.T.A. Hoffmann found 
in music seems to me to have been inextricably related to an encounter with the 
sensuous, since that which is inexpressible might be found in language also, 
hence Kristeva's analysis of symbolist poets. This is, however, the sensuous as 
social actant, and the ‘inexpressible’ as something held in the interstices of
101 Barthes, R , Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Howard, R., (Vintage,
London, 2000), p. 9
101 Johnson, P., Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner, (Routledge, London and New York,
1993), p. 110.
1L‘ Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, pp. 181-3.
103 Johnson, P., op. cit., p. 116.
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language, rather than a transcendence of the social. Indeed, the very idea of an 
encounter with the ineffable is rather odd, since if one encounters it, it must have 
been expressed: in W ittgenstein’s words, 'if only you do not try to utter what is 
unutterable then nothing gets lost. On the contrary, the unutterable will be -  
unutterably -  contained in what has been uttered.’104 And this same point is 
repeated time and again in Barthes’ writing on the experience of signifiance, those 
moments where meaning is temporarily obliterated to reveal -  the grain of the 
voice, that part of the cinematic image ‘that does not represent anything, '05 the 
phonism of speech (in ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’)106 -  much as the 
obliteration of the sun in an eclipse reveals its own, normally invisible, corona. In 
any moment where one ceases to pursue what Hanslick termed ‘the chimera of 
meaning,’10, the fullness of gesture, which is to say the undoing of one’s own 
subjecthood in a dialectic of the social and the material, may be glimpsed.
Perhaps the most immediate aesthetic ramification of gesture, however, is 
its dynamism. The world of gesture is no longer a world of beings, but of doings, 
processes rather than products. Small writes: ‘Music is not a thing at all but an 
activity, something that people do. The apparent thing “music” is a figment, an 
abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all 
closely. '08 This reconceptualization of the abstract ‘music’ as the act of 
‘musicking’ is the touchstone of Christopher Small’s attempt to reinscribe the social 
character of music at the heart of the discipline, and indeed at the heart of all the 
arts, so as to render all artistic endeavour ‘performative.’ Furthermore, he states 
that the process of social inscription undertaken in musicking is such that The act 
of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of relationships, 
and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies.’109 Small’s 
emphasis upon locating meaning is perhaps the reason for his repetition of the 
now familiar pursuit of unity, this time in the concept of ritual, which he terms ‘the
104 Wittgenstein, L., in a letter to Paul Englemann, quoted in Johnson, P, ibid., p. 115.
105 Barthes, R , The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills,’ in Image- 
Music-Text, p. 61.
106 Ibid., p. 207.
10 Hanslick, E., op. cit., p. 44
10c Small, C., op. cit., p. 2.
109 Ibid.. p. 13.
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great unitary art in which all of what we today call the arts ... have their origin.’110 
He is correct, however, it seems to me, in demonstrating that the idea of gesture, 
as a set of dynamic relations, is a means of successfully comparing (although not 
necessarily uniting) differing art forms.
The experience of a particularly striking aesthetic impression will almost 
always elicit a desire for knowledge and discussion of that experience, and the 
form that this takes is often the search for an explanation of the phenomenon. ‘I 
should like to say: “These notes say something glorious, but I do not know what." 
These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put anything side by side with it 
that will serve as an explanation.'111 But as Wittgenstein suggests, to seek an 
explanation is to miss the point of the phenomenon. To ‘explain’ it, and find its 
‘meaning,’ is to translate it into something else, to step away from the phenomenon 
that inspired one in the first place. Instead, what is required is an elucidation of the 
event, a clarification of the relationships involved: ‘Understanding a sentence lies 
nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. 
... In order to ‘explain’ I could only compare it with something else which has the 
same rhythm (I mean the same pattern).’112 And as Cioffi notes, ‘What this 
amounts to is an attempt to provide an equivalent in a different modality for the 
experience we wish to characterize or elucidate.’113 The particular gesture that 
expresses an aesthetic experience is specific and untranslatable: one cannot 
explain it. One can, however, compare it to other gestures, relate it to previous 
experiences, both those with the same material component and without, in 
different modes. Velvet, double cream, the descending Ch arpeggio played on the 
lower middle register of an old Moog synthesizer that opens the Kid A album by 
Radiohead: clearly these are entirely distinct phenomena, and yet there are 
underlying similarities that most people would recognize -  their patterns of identity, 
gestures, overlap. As Barthes notes:
110 Ibid., p. 106.
11 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, §610.
112 Ibid., §527.
11' Cioffi, F., op. cit., p. 69.
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Rhetorics inevitably vary by their substance (here articulated sound, there image, 
gesture, or whatever) but not necessarily by their form. ... Thus the rhetoric of the 
image (that is to say, the classification of its connotators) is specific to the extent that it 
is subject to the physical constraints of vision (different, for example, from phonatory 
constraints) but general to the extent that the ‘figures’ are never more than formal 
relations of elements.1'''
There is no overarching identity to unify and explain these similarities, but there 
are resemblances nevertheless, like those of a family, or the overlapping concepts 
that constitute the word ‘game’ for Wittgenstein. It follows that any response to an 
aesthetic phenomenon conceived of as gesture is always already a composite 
experience, cutting across different modes in such a way as to bring out 
resemblances without ever compromising specificity or identity. 'It is through 
gesture  (i.e. rhythm of movement) that the spatial and temporal arts are linked. 
The two share a common temporal-spatial universe, albeit working within it to 
different ends.'115 The distinction between different musical objects is perceived as 
readily as that between objects of similar gesture presented in different modes of 
perception. An apparent attempt to explore this notion can be observed in Michel 
Gondry's video to Daft Punk's Around the World.’ The five musical instruments 
that make up the piece each have a commensurate group of four dancers, and 
their movement in musical space is echoed by the choreography of the dancers 
around a small circular set. Thus the rising and falling of the bass line coincides 
with the ascending and descending of a set of steps of the ‘bass’ dancers, and as 
each instrument comes to the fore the choreography determines that the 
commensurate group of dancers is either foregrounded or highlighted by the 
selection of camera shot, until all move in unison at the end. The mirroring is not 
absolutely precise, and the characterization of each instrument (the drums as 
bandaged mummies, the synthesizer as women in sequinned bathing suits and 
caps) is clearly an invention, increasing points of relation, rather than a replication,
1 ~ Barthes, R., 'The Rhetoric of the Image,' in Image-Music-Text, p. 49. N.B. Barthes’ use 
of gesture’ here is different to my own usage.
115 Kershaw, D , Music and Image on Film and Video: An Absolute Alternative,’ in The 
Companion to Contemporary Musical Thought, ed. Paynter, J., et al, (Routledge, London 
and New York, 199?), p 497.
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but the degree of similarity is sufficient to produce an overlap of gestural mode. 
The interaction of musical elements being recreated in the interaction of dancers 
allows one to appreciate similarity and difference of gesture across modes of 
perception as well as within them.
Indeed, in a Lebenswelt constituted by overlapping gestures, the very 
notion of what is ‘composite’ becomes rather suspect. As Wittgenstein outlines in 
Philosophical Investigations (§§47-8), the idea of what is composite is determined 
by the register at which one observes, the language-game that is in use at the 
time Composite’ is always a relative term, since any object is composite at some 
level, right down to and including elementary particles. Identifying what is 
composite eventually comes down to clarifying what sort of practice one is 
engaged in.
The description of music video as being a composite art now becomes a 
rather less important aspect of how one approaches it, since both image track and 
sound track might equally be regarded as being composite themselves, and the 
video as a whole is one part of the composite that is the culture in which it is 
experienced. As Stan Hawkins reminds us, perception does not stop at the edges 
of the screen: 'The viewer’s sense of imagination soon exceeds the boundaries of 
the visual image. In other words, the sense of perception becomes altered through 
visual images in a manner that shapes, enhances and even detracts from our 
experience of the music on its own.’116 Sound and image may be recognizable as 
distinct types of gesture, and normal analytic practice would be to make that 
distinction, but that does not of itself prevent effective and valid comparisons 
between the two being made, indeed, the complementation of their qualities upon 
one another might be said to demand this. The gestures of the one may or may 
not resonate with some, all or none of the other, and within themselves, for it 
should be stressed that the act of comparison need not be focussed solely upon 
resemblance: for two gestures to resonate, or ‘sound well' together as chords’ (to 
borrow Schoenberg s model for Die gluckliche Hand) they need not be the same, 
indeed, it is preferable if they are not. Better that they are in proportion, or play off 
one another. For example, the video to Robbie Williams’s ‘Let Love be Your 
Energy’ is characterized by an animated Williams running through a series of
116 Hawkins, S., ‘Perspectives in Popular Musicology,’ in Popular Music 15, (1996), p. 32.
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landscapes. At no point does the rhythm of his running equate to the underlying 
rhythm of the music, but for a short time (approximately twenty seconds) while he 
runs across a shining sea at a slightly higher rate, there is a relation between his 
running rate (around 233 beats per minute) and the beat of the music (exactly 89 
beats per minute) that has an almost magical effect. To ask whether this is due 
solely to their relative proportions (which is incidentally that of a doubled Golden 
Section proportion, insofar as both are Fibonacci numbers and have a Golden 
Section relation to the intermediate Fibonacci number 144),11/ or to its relation to 
what has gone before, or the way the celebratory brassy fanfares of the chorus 
echo the glinting of light on the water, is to ask the wrong question. It is of course 
due to all of these things in part, some more than others, and many more besides, 
but suffice to say it is not because they are ‘the same.’ Plato describes a similar 
process, noting ‘the various bodies part or come together in the course of mutual 
interchanges of position and what seems like magic is due to the complication of 
the ir effects on each other.’118
And where there are similarities, or isomorphisms, these need not mean an 
equivalence of identity. One might compare the phenomenon of sympathetic 
resonance in strings, where the upper partials of a sound will provoke a response 
on strings of a certain proportional relation, with a different pitch to the original, and 
given sufficient strength of input this would in turn produce its own upper partials, 
so that a system of great complexity can be generated from simple rules. This 
tendency of simple inputs to generate complex outcomes, such that similarities 
might be observed across the system in differing registers, without compromising 
the specificity of the part or the diversity of the system as a whole, is described by 
the mathematics of chaos theory, and based upon the idea of the fractal. Fractal 
mathematics can be observed in a range of apparently random phenomena: cloud 
formation, air turbulence, or crystal growth, to pick up Varese’s analogy. It can
117 For a detailed discussion of Golden Section proportions as they might be related to 
music, see Lendvai, E., B6la Bartdk: An Analysis of his Music, (Kahn & Averill, London, 
1971).
118 Plato, ibid., 80, pp 107-8.
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also be seen in music analysis,119 and in the technology used to compress and 
store digital images. In terms of analysis, this means that two very different 
gestures may have an underlying similarity that is difficult to discern, and also that 
combining even two very simple gestures can produce a chain that resembles 
neither. To say that the world is a complex place is not to say much, but it does 
demonstrate that any attempt to analyse a music video would barely touch the 
surface of what it might offer, and also that to concentrate on identifying the 
sim ilar’ would be likely to miss even that limited target.
V
It is not idle bickering to argue emphatically against the concept o f "representation,” 
since from this concept have arisen the most serious errors in the aesthetics of music.
To “represent" something always involves the notion of two separate, dissimilar things, 
of which one must be intentionally related to the other through a particular mental
act.120
Where meaning seeks to reduce the object, to translate it, represent it, and efface 
its materiality in favour of the ideal, gesture is its antithesis, pluralizing, opening the 
object out onto the world. Meaning fixes the khoros of gesture, geometricizes its 
oscillations: ‘here would be instituted against music (against the text), 
representation.’121 In an essay on Bertolt Brecht, Barthes writes, ‘One of the tasks 
of a critical age is precisely to pluralize the object, to separate pleasure from the 
sign; we must de-semanticize the object (which does not mean de-symbolize it),
119 See Madden, C., Fractals in Music: Introductory Mathematics for Musical Analysis, 
(High Art Press, Salt Lake City, 1999), and also a rather more poetic account in Adams, D.,
op. cit., pp. 144-7.
120
Hanslick, E., op. cit., p. xxii.
121 Barthes, R , ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ in The Responsibility of Forms, p. 89.
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give the sign a shock: let the sign fall, like a shed skin.’122 And it is Brecht that 
seeks to make a synthesis of these opposites, in the concept of the social gestus. 
‘a gesture, or set of gestures, in which can be read a whole social situation.’123 
Brecht resisted the totalized meaning -  his plays are not constructed with a final, 
single moral in mind, to be reified and taken home. His plays are active, the 
gesture is given to be taken up and used, but he remains committed to meanings, 
an engagement with the social order made on the terms of that society. The 
Brechtian gesture, gestus, is extracted from its aesthetic bodily origin, and 
‘promoted’ to the standing of reason by virtue of its capacity for meaning. The 
gesture, insofar as it is an entity of perception, is always already socialized, but it 
maintains a certain stubborn materiality, signifiance, at work on the social, undoing 
it. The gestus has already abandoned this process in favour of meaning, and no 
sooner has it done this than it has become re-presentation, divorced from its 
materiality. In Kristevan terms, it has privileged phenotext at the expense of 
genotext.
And this process will recur every time there is a search for meaning: Small 
notes that ‘the convention of the concert hall denies them [musicians] any 
expressive use of bodily gesture, confining them to gestures in sound that are 
made through their instruments. The art of representation has alienated itself 
completely from the human body and its gestures.’124 Small has partially 
recognized the problem; what he describes is in large part the phenotext of a 
performance, but he seems so intent on uncovering the meanings of the 
relationships a performance sets up, the non-meaning aspects of sound that have 
a more directly somatic appeal, the genotext, in short, (although this rather 
oversimplifies Kristeva’s categories), has been overlooked. He is by no means 
alone in this intent: Adorno is not only concerned with eliciting meaning, but is 
positively hostile to anything that might cloud this. ‘Many of the cultural products 
bearing the anti-commercial trademark “art for art’s sake” show traces of
122 Barthes, R., ‘Brecht and Discourse: A Contribution to the Study of Discursivity,’ in The 
Rustle of Language, trans. Howard, R., (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1989), p. 222.
12‘ Barthes, R., ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,’ op. cit., p. 93.
12* Small, C., op. cit., p. 155.
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commercialism in their appeal to the sensational or in the conspicuous display of 
material wealth and sensuous stimuli at the expense of the meaningfulness of the 
work.’125 Astute as Adorno may be on the circumstances surrounding the rise of 
the slogan ‘art for art’s sake,’ one might suspect that he has fallen prey to what 
Benjamin notes as The obligatory misunderstanding of I ’art pour I ’art. For art’s 
sake was scarcely ever to be taken literally; it was almost always a flag under 
which sailed a cargo that could not be declared because it still lacked a name.’126 
Adorno’s requirement of ‘meaningfulness' from the art object becomes paradoxical 
for a Marxist critic after Kristeva’s suggestion that ‘communication is 
merchandise,''127 an idea also implicit in W ittgenstein’s assertion that meaning is 
commensurate with use.
How, then, is one to ‘escape the tyranny of meaning,’128 where are the lines 
of flight? It is worth contrasting the notion of ‘the social’ with that of ‘the collective.’ 
If the social is the site of meaning, status quo, what Freud termed the ‘Superego,’ 
the collective is the social made aware of its non-meaning, material aspect: a 
Bakhtinian carnivalesque entity. Where the gestus of Brecht is socialized 
throughout, the collective ‘gesture’ retains some of its affective charge, remains 
unfixed, as khoros. The very idea of a stimulus acting directly upon the body 
demands a response that is by its very nature collective, which itself takes the form 
of movement, of gesture. It is in no sense coincidental that the notion of the 
chorus in Greek tragedy is etymologically bound to khoros, movement. The 
chorus is the human collectivity confronting the event and seeking to understand 
it.’129 It stood as a bulwark against the intrusion of ‘meaning’ into the form of the 
tragedy, giving a physical response to the physical challenges posed by the Fates. 
Barthes notes:
125 Adorno, T W , 'How to Look at Television,’ in The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on 
Mass Culture, ed. Bernstein, J.M., (Routledge, London, 1991), p. 137.
126 Benjamin, W., 'Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,' in 
Reflections, trans. Jephcott, E., (Schocken, New York, 1986), pp. 183-4.
127 Barthes, R., ‘Kristeva’s Semieotike,' in The Rustle of Language, trans. Howard, R., 
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), p. 170.
128 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ in Image-Music-Text, p. 185.
129 Barthes, R , The Greek Theatre,’ in The Responsibility of Forms, p. 82.
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As the interrogation shifts to increasingly intellectual forms, tragedy evolves toward 
what we today call drama, even bourgeois comedy, based on conflicts of characters, 
not on conflicts of fate. And what marks this change of function is specifically the 
gradual atrophying of the interrogative element, i.e., of the chorus.130
In the face of drama and of narrative, individuals placed in meaningful relation to 
one another, there is no longer a place for the chorus, for collectivity. To narrate is 
to situate the characters, to map out and fix the relations between dramatic 
protagonists. But where there is only pseudo-narrative, in profoundly non-dramatic 
scenarios, in short, in music video, there the role of collectivity might flourish. The 
emphasis music videos place upon the scene, the resonant image or ‘pregnant 
moment,’ demands a collective response. Music video’s refusal to posit a single 
meaning, to ‘fix ’ itself so as to become a representation, marks it as text rather 
than object. The only other form that the music video could be compared to is the 
channel ident,’ which has a similar striking-yet-enigmatic character that refuses to 
volunteer a meaning of its own. Both might be described as culturally parasitic, 
since they are dependent upon a process of association, based on gestural 
comparison, for releasing any kind of meaning, which is in any case always plural. 
Music video generates not a meaning but a process, a space that the perceiver 
might enter into to make meaning, or simply revel in material sensation.
In his critique of Wagner, Adorno recognized that the revolutionary claims 
of the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk were an impossibility, by trying to embody the 
collective whilst being founded upon the ‘genius’ of a bourgeois individual.131 
Music video is not a Gesamtkunstwerk in this sense of the term, but it may not be 
so far from Wagner’s stated ideals, as expressed when he wrote: ‘No-one can be 
better aware than myself, that the realization of this [music] drama depends on 
conditions which do not lie within the will, nay, not even the capability of the single 
individual -  were this capability infinitely greater than my own -  but only in 
community, and in a mutual cooperation made possible thereby.’132 In resisting the 
unity of meaning and representation, and remaining unfinished, processual, and
130 Ibid., pp. 68-9.
31 Adorno, T.W., In Search of Wagner, pp. 110ff.
32 Wagner, R., quoted in Adorno, T.W., ibid., p. 113.
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stubbornly material, the music video allows for the possibility of seeing beyond the 
social and enabling ‘the very transcendence of egotism.’133 The aim of an 
aesthetics of music video ‘is no longer the platitudinous one of Beauty: it is 
festivity.’134
133 Barthes, R., ‘One Always Fails in Speaking of What One loves,’ in The Rustle of 
Language, p. 305.
134 Ibid., p. 304.
The Technological Body
c. 375 B.C., Athens
This is the kind of lawlessness that easily insinuates itself unobserved [through music] 
... because it is supposed to be only a form of play and to work no harm. Nor does it 
work any, except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows upon the characters and 
pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business 
dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution 
with wanton license until it finally overthrows all things public and private. ... For the 
modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political 
and social conventions.1
The notion of aesthetics as a separate discipline, distinct from philosophy as a 
whole only took place in 1750 with the publication of Alexander Baumgarten’s 
Aesthetics, and one senses in Immanuel Kant’s ‘rigorous demarcation of aesthetic 
judgement from the cognitive, political and ethical realms’2 a few years later, the 
promotion of an ideological agenda as much as the genuine idea of an entirely 
new field of thought. Although aesthetics was supposed to circumvent questions 
of ethics and politics by focussing upon the point of sensation, prior to this the (as 
yet undefined) field of aesthetics, and music aesthetics in particular, were
1 Plato, The Republic, trans. Shores, P., Loeb Classical Library, (Putnam’s, New York, 
1930), quoted in Attali, J., Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Massumi, B , 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1985), pp. 33-4.
2 Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 9.
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inextricably bound to their socio-ethical import. In the time of Plato, aisthetikos 
could not be considered apart from ethikos. (The same is increasingly true today 
also; witness Simon Frith’s assertion that ‘aesthetic response is, by its nature, an 
ethical agreement.’3) The power that Plato ascribes to music in The Republic and 
elsewhere, as having the capacity to either mould the model citizen, or else, as 
with those who dance to the Phrygian mode, releasing what is lowest and wildest 
in their nature,’4 is one that is intimately connected with the social order. The 
process of social engineering through sound is to take place in conjunction with 
gymnastics, not because mousike is good for the soul, physical exercise for the 
body, as most people imagine, but because these two aspects of education are 
complementary and mutually corrective.’5 Thus for Plato the establishment or 
disestablishment of social order takes place through music (and physical training) 
in a way that is inextricable from its affective qualities, or as Adorno put it, ‘Music 
represents at once the immediate manifestation of impulse and the locus of its 
taming.'6
The idea that music is doubly inscribed, at once enacting (and producing) 
the social order from which it emanates and simultaneously prefiguring the 
idealized model of a ‘society yet to come,’ embodying a set of relationships other 
than those it partakes in, is a fruitful one. What for Plato was a relatively 
straightforward proscriptive distinction between ‘good’ modes and bad’ modes of 
music, however, is now understood as a much more complicated set of dialectical 
relations between music and society. Frith neatly articulates this tension, writing:
3 Frith, S., Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1996), p. 272.
4 Scruton, R , The Aesthetics of Music, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 390.
5 Abrahams, G., The Concise Oxford History of Music, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1979), p. 32, although Abrahams is closely paraphrasing a passage from Plato’s Republic, 
see Strunk, O. (ed), Source Readings in Music History: Antiquity and The Middle Ages, 
(W W. Norton & Company, New York and London, 1950), p. 12.
6 Adorno, T.W., ‘On the fetish character in music and the regression of listening,’ in The 
Culture Industry, ed. Bernstein, J.M., (Routledge, London, 1991), p 26.
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What music does (all music) is put into play a sense of identity that may or may not fit 
the way we are placed by other social forces. Music certainly puts us in our place, but 
it can also suggest that our social circumstances are not immutable. . .. It may be that, 
in the end, I want to value most highly that music, popular and serious, which has 
some sort of disruptive cultural effect, but my argument is that music only does this 
through its impact on individuals, and that this impact is obdurately social.7
The idea that music can both be formed by society and actively construct collective 
identity in the same instant is what makes its social status such a thorny problem, 
or a revolutionary potential, depending upon one’s approach. The complexity of 
the problem is doubled in relation to music video, not least because it involves a 
combination of music, seen as a collectivizing force, and television, which is 
typically regarded as a dividing, individuating medium. However, as with Frith's 
good’ music, the primary impulse upon seeing a particularly striking and enigmatic 
music video is a social one; as with Frith’s aesthetic response to hearing a 
favourite track on the radio in a hotel room, ‘I wish there were someone to play this 
to .’8 My desire to discuss the music video with others, to clarify its status, to make 
meaning, is perhaps evidence of Andrew Goodwin’s premise that music video is 
‘the making musical of the television image,’ such that Television is musiced.’9 
(Or one might say, after Chris Small, television is ‘musicked.’) In return, music 
video may lay bare certain aspects of popular music, either directly, or indirectly by 
deliberate omission of the expected, making explicit the social qualities implicit in 
music. One might cite the instance of The Wiseguys’ ‘Start the Commotion’ as a 
particularly clear example of this reciprocity. Like much modern dance music it is 
constructed through the principle of ‘sampling’ older records, and this track is 
made almost entirely from scraps of preexisting musical material that are cut up, 
looped and repeated. The video is similarly constructed from a set of fourteen 
fragments of performance footage (one for each auditory source plus footage of a 
DJ, one of The Wiseguys), all filmed separately on the same set and then intercut 
to match the music, or to preempt and cue a sample’s ‘entrance,’ but always paced
7 Frith, S., Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music, pp. 276-7.
8 Ibid., p. 278.
9 Goodwin, A., Dancing in the Distraction Factory: Music Television and Popular Music, p. 
70.
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in such a way as to reinforce the rhythm of the track. Although each of these 
fragmentary performances’ take place against the same sparse backdrop, all are 
costumed appropriately, with the dress, hairstyles, and gestural mannerisms that 
one might expect of the time period and genre of the musical samples. Thus the 
folk-style flute sample is ‘played’ by a long-haired, corduroy-clad ‘folkie,’ perched 
on a high stool, whilst the rock guitar and drum sound that underpins the track is 
performed’ by a Rolling Stones-style four piece band, complete with a strutting, 
pouting singer. The only two performers in contemporary apparel are the rapper 
that presents the bulk of what are presumably new (with the track) lyrics, although 
his performance is visually ‘sampled’ in the same way as the other musical 
elements, and the DJ, seen leafing through records before a single Dansette-type 
turntable. Although the DJ-creator of the track does not produce any of the sonic 
material himself, his role as composer (literally) of the track is being deliberately 
presented in the image track, despite the fact that there is no ‘performance’ as 
such to show. (This Hitchcock-like presence of non- performing' DJ composers is 
quite common in dance tracks; witness the peripheral presence of both the 
Chemical Brothers and Fat Boy Slim, on T-shirts, paintings, or as ‘extras' in many 
of their videos.)
The video to ‘Start the Commotion’ makes overt the latent (social) content 
of the music track, its historical points of reference and its means of production, but 
one performs this connection of music to its so-called ‘extra-musical’ meaning at a 
subconscious (if not unconscious) level every time one listens to any piece of 
music. An educated listener (and by educated I simply mean socially practised, a 
form of life, rather than trained) is capable of making these associations, Peircean 
indexical relationships, almost instantaneously. The principle is illustrated in an 
obvious way in this music video by doubling up the ‘social content’ of the music in 
the image to a large extent, (although not completely: there are subtle 
connotations to the setting, facial expressions, and a myriad of others not 
immediately present in the sound, and vice versa -  as Cook puts it, neither 
exhausts the signification of the other). But the same forces are at work, in either 
a complementary or dialectical relationship, in every music video. And the binding 
of image, a much more clearly socialized medium insofar as it is based upon the 
notion of representation, with the potentially socially disruptive music is to raise the 
stakes somewhat, perhaps even to demand a Kristevan semanalysis’ that would
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mean the interrogation of the fundamental matrix of our civilization grasped in its 
ideological, neuralgic locus.’10 Certainly when she writes ‘semanalysis needs to 
provide itself with a specific object which the traditional modes of analysis are 
incapable of grasping in all its specificity,’11 she might as easily be talking of music 
videos rather than the poetic texts to which she devotes her attention. Indeed, 
Kristeva identifies the importance of the ‘poetic musicality found in “symbolist’’ 
poetry and in Mallarme,’12 and also suggests that through ‘musicality’ ‘Logical 
syntheses and all ideologies are ... displaced toward something that is no longer 
within the realm of the idea, sign, syntax, and thus Logos, but is instead simply 
semiotic functioning.’13 Kristeva does not follow up these suggestive statements 
with specific reference to music, but I believe it would be fair to state that music 
video does involve a calling into question of the Stoic sign, which is Kristeva’s 
stated aim for ‘semanalysis.’
Before continuing, it is worth outlining a few distinctions that are required in 
a discussion of ‘the social’ so as to prevent confusion, namely distinguishing 
precisely what is meant by the concepts of ‘the individual’ and 'the social,’ and 
differentiating between ‘the social’ and ‘the collective,’ a distinction which Frith 
(amongst others) fails to make, or at least make explicit. The category of the 
social’ is a difficult one either to embrace or reject entirely, particularly for those of 
a le ftis t’ persuasion (so far as this is still a useful positional term). For while on the 
one hand there are those who would wish to rescue ‘society’ from the wastebasket 
of history that it was thrown towards by Margaret Thatcher’s now infamous 
proclamation that ‘There is no such thing as society,’ it is difficult at the same time 
to argue in favour of the heavy handed wielding of state power that is implied in the 
term ‘social order.’ The valorization of the individual in modern Western thought, 
often under the rubric of democracy, has been driven in recent times from two 
independent sources almost simultaneously, both in opposition to these differing 
conceptions of ‘society:’ namely in a ‘freeing’ of the self from an oppressive social 
order’ as a strain of the 1960s counterculture, and also in the withdrawal of the
10 Kristeva, J., The Semiotic Activity,’ Screen, 14, (1973), p. 34.
11 Ibid., p. 38.
12 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 153.
13 Ibid., p. 63.
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individual from social responsibility in late-1970s free marketeering, or 
monetarism.'14 Thus, the notion of ‘the individual’ became a catch-all term that 
acted as a lightning rod to a range of ideas united in their opposition to varying 
concepts of ‘the social,’ even though they were themselves often in opposition to 
one another. Although both hippies and Thatcherites set themselves against 
society and the state in the name of freedom, in each case their conception of the 
role and extent of society was distinct: the state power that constituted ‘social 
order’ was understood as an oppressive, or better, repressive force, functioning 
like a Freudian paternal ‘Superego,’ and indeed the Freud family was closely 
involved with both the British and American governments and corporations for a 
time before and especially after World War II. The state conceived of as an 
expression of society from the ‘bottom up,’ and seen by Thatcherites to infringe 
individual freedoms, and more particularly individual capital, bore little 
resemblance to the understanding of the 1960s counterculture, besides a general 
idea of an impersonal bureaucracy, but an unholy alliance between the two 
heralded the triumph of a form of individualism and a consequent decline in the 
status of the communal, the public. One might compare Benjamin's observation 
that ‘the masses are brought face to face with themselves,’15 in the newsreels of 
the 1930s with the contemporary fixation with individuated personalities on ‘reality’ 
shows such as ‘Big Brother’ on television. It is because both the ‘top down' and 
the ‘bottom up’ models fall under the term ‘the social’ that so much confusion 
arises, particularly in relation to the contradictory powers of music -  one might 
compare Plato’s ‘good’ modes to the ‘top down’ model of the social, and the 
disruptive modes such as the Phrygian to the ‘bottom up’ model. If one now 
divides ‘the social' into two distinct terms reflecting these two distinct models 
(regardless of their inevitable overlap in practice), into a top down ‘social ordering,’ 
and a bottom up ‘collective,’ a better understanding of these contradictory strains
14 These ideas were explored in much greater depth in the BBC television series ‘Century 
of the Self,’ broadcast in the Winter and Spring of 2002. The following discussion draws in 
part on these programmes.
15 Benjamin, W., The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ in Illuminations, 
ed. Arendt, H., trans. Zohn, H., (Fontana, London, 1973), p. 243n.21.
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in music becomes available. Thus the individualism of the 1960s opposed social 
ordering,’ whereas Thatcherite individualism was set against ‘the collective.’
Freudian theory suggested that social ordering was both necessary and 
desirable, repressing the base motives of the collective ‘id,’ or ‘the mob’ as it could 
equally be termed, in order to function in any kind of society (hence, Civilization 
and its Discontents). (It is interesting to note that the word ‘mob’ is derived from the 
Latin mobile, and semantically close to the Greek khoros.) Followers of Wilhelm 
Reich, a student of Freud’s who rejected this idea, including Adorno’s 
contemporary Herbert Marcuse, famously pronounced There is a policeman in our 
heads; he must be destroyed.’ However, the atomized individuals produced by 
this form of psychoanalysis lacked any kind of coherent political agency; as the 
Black Panther group realized when they were invited to participate at this school, 
as soon as one renounced collective identity, one lost the political power that the 
collective could call upon. Since the collective is not an object but a set of 
relations between individuals, it has a far greater resistive capacity to social control 
than any one individual, no matter how liberated. Conversely, however, a 
communal identity is difficult to direct, and thus liable to favour the status quo, but 
it does at least have the potential to challenge. The answer was not to destroy the 
policeman in our heads,’ but collectively to take control of it and restrict and 
redirect the power it held over the individual.
In this bifurcated vision of society, 'social reality,’ that is, the everyday 
circumstances of people, occurs at the interface of collective will, such as it is, and 
state power/social ordering (and by ‘state’ I shorthand both government, nominally 
itself an expression of collective will in a democracy, and also a range of non­
governmental corporate interests -  what was once known as the ‘military-industrial 
complex’), so that in the absence of any collective will expressed in the notion of 
‘the public’ there is only state power, and a utopia would be a destruction of the 
state, leaving only collective will in genuine and total consensus. Thus any attempt 
to produce an effect upon social reality must involve a stimulation of collective 
conscience, and here can be seen why Plato credited music, rather than any other 
art form, with the power to either support or destroy the social order. Music has 
the capacity to short circuit the officially sanctioned practices of aesthetic 
understanding, to bypass representation and translation into an ideal. As Frith 
puts it, ‘Music can stand for, symbolize and offer the immediate experience of
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collective identity. Other cultural forms -  painting, literature, design -  can 
articulate and show off shared values and pride, but only music can make you feel 
them .’16 The idea of music appealing directly to the nervous system, the waves of 
sound impacting upon the body as a purely somatic phenomenon, as with 
Nietzsche’s ‘physiological objections’1' to the music of Wagner, which caused his 
stomach to protest’ and his heart and bowels to ‘fret,’ is one illustrated in the video 
to Fat Boy Slim s Ya Mama.’ Here a tape of the track causes uncontrollable 
physical movement in the listener, an experience which people pay for via access 
to headphones. When the music is ‘set free,’ broadcast on normal speakers, 
social chaos results, and the police move in to put a stop to it and arrest those 
responsible. Comparisons between this video and the early ‘Acid House’ 
movement in the late 1980s are irresistible. When the holding of outdoor ‘raves’ 
began to attract groups of upwards of ten thousand people together in the summer 
of 1988, dubbed at the time a second ‘summer of love’ (after the late 1960s), there 
was a deliberate cultivation of a sense of communality through the new form of 
house’ music and its attendant culture, ‘One Nation Under a Groove,’ as a record 
of the time put it. Presented with large numbers of people basically dancing in a 
field, the response of the Conservative government was astonishing in its scope, 
swiftly passing draconian legislation as part of the Criminal Justice Act that 
prohibited the outdoor playing of music 'wholly or predominantly characterized by 
repetitive beats’ to even small groups of people. Large numbers of police were 
deployed to first force raves into indoor spaces such as warehouses, and then 
close them down altogether. Although undoubtedly a great inconvenience to the 
inhabitants of whichever rural community these raves might gather near to, the 
swiftness and scale with which the government cracked down on any uncontrolled 
musical gathering was educational. The social consequences of even a relatively 
small collective musical conscience forming outside established channels of
16 Frith, S., Towards an aesthetic of popular music,’ in Leppert, R. and McClary, S. (eds), 
Music and Society the politics of composition, performance and reception, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987), p. 140.
17 Nietzsche, F., ‘Nietzsche contra Wagner: The Brief of a Psychologist,’ in The Works of 
Friedrich Nietzsche: vol. Ill, trans. Common, T., (T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1899), p. 69.
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commerce (represented by the ‘superclubs’ that formed in the wake of this) was 
not something the state was prepared to sanction.
If music and music video then have this charge, this social power, can 
anyone explain why 'Top of the Pops’ doesn’t bring people out onto the streets, or 
why one’s local branch of HMV isn’t a hotbed of revolutionary fervour? The 
absurdity of the question is ample proof that one can easily overestimate the 
oppositional power of the collective, inclined as it is to reflect the status quo rather 
than rise up against it in a politically engaged way, but it is also a reminder that 
music is in no sense independent of social reality even while it may articulate an 
alternative to that reality. ‘Short-circuiting’ the straightforwardly representative 
artistic model of social reality does not necessarily evade the influence of the 
social entirely. This is of course the birthplace of critical musicology, and more 
particularly of the dialectical approach of Theodor Adorno. In Adorno’s aesthetic 
theory it is the very capacity of music to speak outside of the social that enables its 
relation to the social to be stated: ‘Works of art -  like all precipitates of the 
objective spirit -  are the object itself. They are the concealed social essence 
quoted as the phenomenon. ... While works of art hardly ever attempt to imitate 
society and their creators need know nothing of it, the gestures of the works of art 
are objective answers to objective questions.’18 It is not the case that one simply 
recognizes a replication of the social order in music, but a question of absence, of 
what the music is not, and can not be, that enables critical reception and Adorno’s 
‘negative dialectics.’ As Max Paddison puts it: The relationship between the social 
totality and the “autonomous” realm of art is thus misrepresented if reduced to any 
crude form of reflectionist theory, or to functionalism. The emphasis is rather on 
mediation,’19 The intensely dialectical nature of Adorno’s method of argument 
frequently resembles the actions of a tightrope walker, constantly checking himself 
and often giving the impression of self-contradiction: his attitude towards the 
relation of the individual to the collective is especially contorted, as when he writes 
In music, too, collective powers are liquidating an individuality past saving, but
18 Adorno, T.W., Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Mitchell, A.G. and Blomster, W.V., 
(Sheed & Ward, London, 1973), pp 131-2.
19 Paddison, M., Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory and 
Music, (Kahn & Averill, London, 1996), p. 49.
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against them only individuals are capable of consciously representing the aims of 
the collectivity.’20 At other times, as in his writing on Stravinsky, the collective is at 
once an attack upon 'comfortable conformity with individualistic society,’21 and also 
akin to a Freudian mob. What remains constant, however, is his commitment to a 
form of aesthetic engagement dependent upon the location and critique of musical 
meaning,’ to which end was developed his technique of ‘immanent analysis.’ The 
problematic character of Adorno’s ‘musical material,’ as identified by Carl 
Dahlhaus, is discussed by Paddison elsewhere,22 and there is little point in 
replicating his arguments here, but the very real achievement of Adorno here is to 
transpose the straightforward ‘what’ question of meaning into a ‘how’ question, an 
analysis of productive forces, a dialectical process that marks the dissolution of the 
distinction between ‘musical’ and ‘extra-musical.’ ‘The rudiments of external 
meanings are the irreducibly non-artistic elements in art. Its formal principle lies 
not in them, but in the dialectic of both moments -  which accomplishes the 
transformation of meanings within it.’23 Despite his many disagreements with 
popular musicologists, it is this insight, which underpins his critical project, that has 
been fundamental to a large part of recent musicology, and provided it with a 
critical edge that might otherwise have been lacking. Artistic endeavour is not 
merely a resultant of social order, but is also formative in one’s experience of that 
order, in an ongoing dialectic with the consumer of that art. As Adorno wrote in a 
criticism of Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire, The fetish character of the commodity 
is not a fact of consciousness; rather it is dialectical, in the eminent sense that it 
produces consciousness.’24
20 Adorno, T.W., ‘On the fetish character in music and the regression in listening,' op. cit., 
p. 52.
21 Adorno, T.W., Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 159. See the entire section Identification 
with the Collective.’
22 Paddison, M., Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, pp 117-24, and also in the same 
author’s Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993).
23 Adorno, T.W., ‘Commitment,’ trans. McDonagh, F., in Aesthetics and Politics, (Verso, 
London and New York, 1980), p. 178.
24 Adorno, T.W., ‘Letters to Walter Benjamin,’ trans. Zohn , H., in Aesthetics and Politics, p. 
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Given all of this, it becomes difficult to reconcile this analytic technique with 
his repeated insistence upon the complete and finished work of art’ as product 
rather than continuing process, the very idea that there might be such a thing as a 
separating out of the ‘message in a bottle’ and its instance of reception. The 
objectivity of art lies in the fixation of such moments. Works of art are similar to 
those childish grimaces which the striking of the clock causes to become 
permanently fixed.’25 Adorno’s dialectic only works in one direction -  all work is 
done in artistic production, what Nattiez terms poiesis. The object may be 
formative of the subject, but only the social composer-artist as subject is involved 
in the production of art-as-product. It is this belief in the fundamental passivity of 
the audience at the moment of reception that is the greatest flaw in Adorno’s 
thought (at least with regard to popular music26), most evident in his undervaluing 
of the impact of sensory perception and the difficulty of relating his theory to the 
somatic realm. His critique of Stravinsky in the Philosophy o f Modern Music27 is 
based almost entirely on the charge of a reification of sound material and its 
withdrawal from the dialectic, which is based in turn upon a questionable notion of 
the body in music (a notion which is by no means restricted to Adorno).
One can detect two rather different approaches to the issue of the body in 
music in Adorno's writings, in his earlier discussions of mass culture, and in his 
approach to Stravinsky respectively. The writings on mass culture are potentially 
more optimistic, insofar as this can ever be said of Adorno, for although he seems 
to repress the issue of the body, to avoid discussing it at all, when it does briefly 
appear it resembles the physiological site of resistance one encounters relatively 
frequently in writing on popular music. In his essay ‘On the fetish character in 
music and the regression in listening’ he pointedly distinguishes between the 
‘mendacity’ of aesthetic pleasure, and physical response (which is theoretically
25 Adorno, T.W., Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 132. Adorno was so fond of this analogy 
that he reused it in The Schema of Mass Culture,’ op. cit., p. 82.
26 For more detail on this point, and on the connection of this to Adorno’s reaction to 
fascism see Middleton, R., Studying Popular Music, (Open University Press, Milton Keynes 
and Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 34-63.
27 A better translation would be Philosophy of New Music, as Paddison chooses to call it, 
but I have retained the title as translated in the English edition throughout for the sake of 
consistency.
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tenable if hermeneutically questionable) in stating: ‘Enjoyment still retains a place 
only in the immediate bodily presence,’28 a striking phrase to which he makes no 
further reference. Later writings on jazz simply disavow any connection with bodily 
sensation: When people dance to jazz for example, they do not dance for 
sensuous pleasure or in order to obtain release. Rather they merely depict the 
gestures of sensuous human beings.’29 Implicit in this argument is the notion that 
were people to dance for 'sensuous pleasure’ alone, then jazz might harbour some 
critical potential, which is not a state of affairs that Adorno’s polemic against ‘light 
music’ is likely to countenance.
The suggestion that within some of Adorno’s work might be embedded an 
uncritical notion of the body in music is surprising, but it is certainly not the case in 
his Philosophy o f Modem Music. The basis of Adorno’s critique of Stravinsky’s 
music is his assertion that, unlike Schonberg, Stravinsky hypostatizes his material, 
refuses to engage with the dialectic of the social through musical form, and the 
consequent attaining of a ‘false authenticity.'
It is a matter of the chimerical rebellion of culture against its own essence as culture. 
Stravinsky undertakes such a rebellion not only in the familiar aesthetic game with 
barbarism [in Le Sacre du Printemps], but furthermore in the fierce suspension of that 
element in music which is called culture — the suspension, that is, of the humanly 
eloquent work of art. ... He is attracted to that sphere in which meaning has become so 
ritualized that it cannot be experienced as the specific meaning of the musical act.30
Adorno’s analysis of Stravinsky’s music is very often highly accurate -  his relation 
to the history of Western art music, his treatment of musical material and harmony, 
the ‘spatialization’ of time, all of which infuriate Adorno -  but his conclusions are 
flawed, because of the way in which he regards the body, and disregards Nattiez’s 
‘aesthesic realm.’ Adorno recognizes that there is little to be gained from the 
'immediate bodily presence’ of ‘On the fetish character,’ but fails to see that the
28 Adorno, T.W., ‘On the fetish character in music and the regression in listening,’ op. cit., 
p. 29.
29 Adorno, T.W., The schema of mass culture,’ in The Culture Industry, p. 82.
30 Adorno, T.W., Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 140.
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problem is not ‘bodily presence’ pe rse , but conceiving of it as being immediate,’ 
and this stems from his extreme pessimism, or perhaps condescension. In either 
case it results in his refusal to countenance the subject making meaning, and more 
importantly the sense of an ongoing process in the act of making itself. 
Remarkably he actually perceives the playing out of this issue in Stravinsky, 
noting: The goal of musical effects is no longer stimulation [of the psyche], but 
rather the “doing.” ... In the emancipation from the meaning of the whole, the 
effects assume a physically material character, becoming evident and almost 
athletic.’31 One might say that musical effect has in Stravinsky become plain 
affect. Adorno does not believe that this emancipation from meaning, from end 
product, might be liberating or have resistive capabilities because he is unable to 
conceive of the body as being an active participant in any way. As far as Adorno is 
concerned, in Stravinsky ‘the product is nothing subjectively produced, thus 
reflecting the human being, but rather something which exists per se.'32 The 
Adornian body of Philosophy o f Modern Music is in a direct line from the Cartesian 
(as opposed to the Deleuzean) body-as-machine. The body is treated by this 
music as a means -  an object which reacts precisely, it drives the body to its 
highest attainments.’33 The dialectic of subject and object, so crucial to all of 
Adorno's writing, is abandoned in an apparent moment of reification, a denial of 
the productive potency of the human body. The end point of Adorno’s thought is 
that Stravinsky's music, and popular music in general, ‘arous[es] only bodily 
animation instead of offering meaning,’34 as though these were two different and 
separable things.
31 Ibid , p. 173.
32 Ibid., pp 173-4.
33 Ibid., p. 173.
34 Ibid., p. 140.
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II
Adorno’s theories are both a challenge and a store of great promise: much of his 
despair with regard to mass culture and its reception is entirely understandable 
when viewed in the context of rising fascism in which it was written (even if his 
refusal to readdress these issues in the 1960s is less so), yet the toolkit he has 
furnished the critical musicologist with is invaluable. Perhaps the greatest 
disappointment, however, is the fact that he failed to apply his own principles with 
sufficient rigour to the concept of the human body -  one can only assume that this 
was an oversight caused by Adorno s own circumstances of production rather than 
lacking the courage of his own convictions -  but the idea that the body’s relation to 
music is immediate, somehow immune to the processes of mediation that take 
place all around it, is endemic (if not universal) in musicology, and has 
consequently mistaken the actuality of music reception’s means of resistance. 
Time and again one sees recourse to the idea of the body as some form of 
‘transcendental ground,’ absolutized as a guarantor of authenticity, but rarely does 
one see the full acknowledgement that a ‘form of life’ is in every sense a 
contingent entity, and functions as an absolute only in a particular context. Indeed,
I have already quoted authors in chapter two, such as Christopher Small, who are 
guilty of this, and even Simon Frith repeatedly draws on a somewhat romanticized 
and idealized notion of the body in music, as when he writes:
Music making and music listening, that is to say, are bodily matters; they involve what 
one might call social movements. In this respect, musical pleasure is not derived from 
fantasy -  it is not mediated by daydreams -  but is experienced directly: music gives us 
a real experience of what the ideal could be.35
I choose to address Frith on this issue not because he is a prime offender; if 
anything the reverse is true, for there are many writers given to a great deal less 
self-reflection and care when writing of music, and there is much in the above 
quotation with which I would readily agree. Frith has taken on board the work of
35 Frith, S., Performing Rites, p. 274.
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Adorno (indeed he was one of the first writers on popular music to do so, although 
with some obvious provisos with respect to popular culture), regarding the 
presence of productive forces and social mediation of the musical text, and if 
anything he applies these ideas more rigorously to the notion of the body than 
does Adorno. Frith counters Adorno’s passive and unengaged body-object, an 
object that reacts precisely,’ with the idea of the body as an active and productive 
entity, dialectically engaged with and formative of ‘the social.’ And yet at the same 
time he seems to be drawing on the same uncritical notion of an ‘immediate body,’ 
invoking the 'essentially human’ via its autonomic functions; he has his socially 
dialectical cake and eats it in positing the simultaneous existence of an ideal’ 
bodily location. As Brian Massumi puts it in discussing the related notion of 
‘intensity,’ this ‘inevitably raises the objection that such a notion involves an appeal 
to a pre-reflexive, romantically raw domain of primitive experiential richness -  the 
nature in our culture.’36
I will return to the question of autonomic response presently, but the 
problem with Frith’s model is not in its internal logic, but in the paradigm of both the 
body and music that it employs. Frith disassembles Adorno’s body-as-site-of- 
reception only to reconstitute it as a site of reception and production, when the 
problem was not the absence of product in itself, but the setting up of the body as 
a site, a location which serves as the origin of sound, or upon which sound acts. 
This becomes clearer in Frith’s discussion of voice, of which he writes: ‘The voice 
seems particularly expressive of the body: it gives the listener unmediated access 
to it.’37 As the astute reader will by now probably be aware, the key word here is 
‘unmediated.’ In order to maintain this idea Frith replicates one fundamental 
mistake in two ways: first the definition of the body as a discrete object-product 
(which retains this status regardless of whether it is fixed or unfixed) that might act 
as a source of sound, rather than as a medium that is itself en proces (to borrow 
Kristeva’s term), and second the misunderstanding of sound itself, reifying it as a 
concrete thing, product, rather than as the performing of an action, a modulation of 
atmospheric pressure, process.
36 Massumi, B., The Autonomy of Affect,’ in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Patton, P., 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), p. 223.
37 Frith, S., ‘The Body Electric,’ Critical Quarterly, 37:2, (1995), p. 1.
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The point at which both music and the body are objectified is the point at 
which they lose whatever resistive potency their intersection might have had. As 
Terry Eagleton notes in The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, the aesthetic project first 
outlined by Baumgarten was devised as a means of ideologizing that which lay 
outside the purview of the category of reason, such that The aesthetic springs into 
being as a kind of cognitive underlabourer, to know in its uniqueness all that to 
which higher reason is necessarily blind.’38 The aesthetic is a socialization and 
subjectification of affect in order to create meaning in the form of emotion, which in 
turn serves as a tacit explanation and justification of the social order: A t the very 
root of social relations lies the aesthetic, source of all human relations.’39 Thus any 
attempt to deterritorialize musical sensation in the guise of object-product, via the 
body as object-product, serves only to effect a massive reterritorialization40 onto 
the same old category of the ideal; there is no point in a movement to process if it 
is only done in order to restore meaning in a new site. To paraphrase an old 
cliche, it is not just that the travelling is important, rather than the arriving -  there is 
no arrival, nowhere at which to arrive. The body adopts the function of site, while 
retaining a status other than that of the unitary location. As Brian Massumi writes, 
The body doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts, it 
infolds volitions and cognitions that are nothing if not situated. Intensity is asocial 
but not presocial -  it includes social elements, but mixes them with elements 
belonging to other levels of functioning, and combines them according to different 
logic.’41 And in order to access the resistive power of the body in music this new 
paradigm is required, one in which the parameters of the body are altered and 
extended, an opening up of meaning-product in order to remain en proces, in 
jouissance.
Frith’s discussion of voice referred to above was formulated in response to 
the renowned essay by Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice,’ a text cited 
repeatedly in musicological approaches to the body. The definition of grain’ that is
38 Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, pp. 16-7.
39 Ibid., p. 24
40 Both the terminology, and the point made here, is owed to Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.,
op. cit., p 348
41 Massumi, B., The Autonomy of Affect,’ op. cit., p. 223.
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most often taken away is that of ‘the body in the voice as it sings,’42 but the 
subtleties of Barthes’ argument are frequently overlooked in the desire to claim this 
as a support for the straightforward expression of physicality in the voice, which is 
then tied to an ‘organic’ and ‘natural’ web of (Romantic) metaphor. A close 
reading, however, will reveal that this is almost exactly what Barthes is arguing 
against, as, for instance, in his stating: ‘Opera is a genre in which the voice has 
gone over in its entirety to dramatic expressivity, a voice with a grain which little 
signifies. ... The voice is not personal: it expresses nothing of the cantor, of his 
soul.’43 Indeed, given that Frith opens by describing Barthes’ The Grain of the 
Voice’ as ‘his argument that different timbral qualities have different bodily 
implications,’44 when Barthes explicitly states The “grain” of the voice is not -  or 
not merely -  its timbre,’45 one begins to suspect that there has been a systematic 
misreading of Barthes’ intentions. As Frith correctly notes, Th is point is usually 
taken up in music criticism as a celebration of “the materiality of the body,”’46 but 
the nature of ‘the body’ that is being celebrated here is not an issue that is in 
question, despite the fact that this is arguably the key concept of the essay. There 
is a powerful element of critics taking from Barthes what they want to hear, or 
rather read, regardless of what he has to say, and in doing so they have missed 
the formulation of an entirely new paradigm of the body in music that frees critique 
from the situated body of the aesthetic project.
Barthes begins The Grain of the Voice’ with a discussion of the problems 
faced in the translation of music into language through the form of the predicate, 
and the limitations that this places upon perception by situating the subject and 
tying him or her into an ethical (which is at once an aesthetical) system.
The man who provides himself or is provided with an adjective is now hurt, now 
pleased, but always constituted. .. . A historical dossier ought to be assembled here, for 
adjectival criticism (or predicative interpretation) has taken on over the centuries
42 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ in Image-Music-Text, p. 188.
43 Ibid., pp. 181-2.
44 Frith, S., The Body Electric,’ op. cit., p. 1.
45 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ op. cit., p. 185.
46 Frith, S., The Body Electric,’ op. cit., p 1.
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certain institutional aspects. The musical adjective becomes legal whenever an ethos 
of music is postulated, each time, that is, that music is attributed a regular -  natural or 
magical -  mode of signification.47
If one wishes to disrupt the system of exchange set in place by this mode of 
musical ‘understanding,’ the answer is not to be found in ‘struggling against the 
adjective,’48 as Adorno might be said to do, but instead by attempting ‘to change 
the musical object itself, as it presents itself to discourse, better to alter its level of 
perception of intellection, to displace the fringe of contact between music and 
language.'49 If the rules of the game are stacked against you, the answer is not to 
try to change the rules of the game in the teeth of opposition, but to play a different 
game. The nature of this displacement is not simply a change of location, but the 
opening up of an entirely new space, or more correctly space-time, 'where melody 
explores how the language works and identifies with that work. It is, in a very 
simple word but which must be taken seriously, the diction of the language.’50 
Diction, the manner of enunciation, the way in which something is done, action, 
process. ‘The grain is ... almost certainly signifiance,’51 and as such is concerned 
with the undoing of subjecthood rather than a constitution or expression of 
corporeal essence. Indeed, in The Third Meaning’ (which might be regarded as a 
companion piece to ‘The Grain of the Voice’ insofar as it addresses signifiance in 
the image, as opposed to sound) Barthes quite bluntly states of the obtuse (which 
is to say, signifiance): ‘Something in the two faces [on film] exceeds psychology, 
anecdote, function, exceeds meaning without, however, coming down to the 
obstinacy in presence shown by any human body.’52 There is little point in 
dissolving the art object and the subject into process, only to reinscribe them both 
in an objectified corporeality.
47 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ op, cit., pp. 179-80.
48 Ibid., p. 180.
49 Ibid., pp. 180-1.
50 Ibid., pp. 182-3.
51 Ibid., p. 182.
52 Barthes, R., The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills,’ in Image 
Music Text, p. 54.
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In order to comprehend the way in which Barthes conceives of ‘the body,’ 
one needs to approach it in terms other than that of either the socially determined 
entity or the self-contained, living, breathing organism; it is individuated, but it ‘has 
no civil identity.’53 His criticism of Fischer-Dieskau makes clear that he does not 
regard breathing as a genuinely ‘bodily’ activity: grain is not to be found in the 
lungs ('a stupid organ’54), contrary to the suggestion of both Frith and Middleton,55 
but rather in the throat, the sinuses, the resonant cavities of the body. Where the 
lungs might be regarded as a site of production of sound, that which Barthes 
designates as ‘body’ are those elements that modify the acoustic of the voice, a 
mediation of the sound of air rushing across the vocal chords. And yet the very 
instant of stating the phrase 'mediation of the voice’ is already to have made a 
mistake: voice is always-already mediated. To say that it has been mediated by 
the body, or indeed anything else, be that the listener’s ear-drum or the room in 
which it sounds, is to imply that vocal ‘essence’ has been lost, that there exists a 
primal ‘ur-voice’ that one might access if only the forces of mediation could be 
stripped away. As the surprise of hearing one’s own voice on a recording bears 
testament, there is no absolute characteristic of a voice; it is a mediate 
phenomenon, characteristic of the medium in and through which it sounds and 
nothing more. The Barthesian body is not an originary source of sound so much 
as a mediator through which sound passes, a system of resonance and feedback, 
and grain is the audible presence of that mediation. The point at which 'we catch 
ourselves listening to the modulations and harmonics of that voice without hearing 
what it is saying to us,’56 is the point at which grain is revealed to us. Thus it is the 
idea of mediation that is crucial to experiencing grain or signifiance; not the 
resultant of that mediation, nor the means of mediation, but an awareness of the 
act of mediation itself, a foregrounding of process. The body is a system of 
resonance that filters and distorts the sound that passes through it. In much the 
same way that the rare subatomic particles generated by the collisions that take
53 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,' op. cit., p. 182.
54 Ibid., p. 183.
55 See Frith, S., The Body Electric,’ op. cit., p. 2, and Middleton, R., op. cit., p. 261.
56 Barthes, R., ‘Listening,’ in The Responsibility of Forms, trans. Howard, R., (University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), p. 255.
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place in a particle accelerator are apprehended not by unmediated vision, but 
through a detection of the pattern of their mutual interactions (and this is a method 
repeated throughout the disciplines of cosmology and physics), so the body 
becomes available to comprehension through the way in which it modifies sound. 
‘W e know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words what 
its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, 
with the affects of another body.’57
The Barthesian body has ceased to be either an object that receives and 
processes, or else a secure site of sound generation, but is rather a performative 
intermediary through which sound passes. As Deleuze and Guattari have it: ‘We 
thus leave behind the assemblages to enter the age of the Machine,’58 and the 
Barthesian body is very close to the idea of the ‘sound machine’ proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari, which they concretize in the figure of ‘the synthesizer,’ 
noting that: The synthesizer makes audible the sound process itself, the 
production of that process, and puts us in contact with still other elements beyond 
sound matter.’59 Neither is the close connection between the technological’ and 
the rendering overt of the always-already mediated something of which Barthes is 
unaware: having deconstructed the body of Fischer-Dieskau, the terms in which he 
praises Panzera are decidedly machinic. The rolled ‘r’ has a ‘metallic brevity of 
vibration;’60 he describes Panzera’s vowel sounds in terms of ‘the purity — almost 
electronic, so much was its sound tightened, raised, exposed, held.’61 This does 
more than simply emphasize that the body is fundamentally a locus of mediation; it 
serves to show that the process of mediation itself is underwritten by ‘technology,’ 
for to suggest that something has been ‘technologized’ is to recognize that the way 
in which it interacts with the subject has been altered. The radical work done by 
grain’ is in the extension of this process into the subject itself.
57 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 257.
58 Ibid., p. 343.
59 Ibid., p. 343. I would, however, strongly disagree with the implications of the notion of 
sound matter, except insofar as it is recognized that matter is itself at once particle and 
wave formation, as discussed in chapter 2.
60 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ op. cit., p. 185
61 Ibid., p. 185. The emphasis is Barthes’ own.
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If I perceive the “grain” in a piece of music and accord this “grain" a theoretical value 
(the emergence of the text in the work), I inevitably set up a new scheme of evaluation 
which will certainly be individual ... but in no way “subjective" (it is not the 
psychological “subject" in me who is listening; the climactic pleasure hoped for is not 
going to reinforce -  to express -  that subject but, on the contrary, to lose it).62
The intertwining of the subject and its technologization is particularly 
pronounced and complicated in the field of popular music, simultaneously enabling 
and dissolving the myth of ‘authenticity’ in rock music and the positioning of the 
subject therein. As Frith has pointed out in his earlier work, it is paradoxical that a 
technologically sophisticated medium ... rests on an old-fashioned model of direct 
communication -  A plays to B and the less technology lies between them the 
closer they are, the more honest their relationship and the fewer the opportunities 
for manipulation and falsehoods.’63 This is the model that lay behind the booing of 
Bob Dylan by his audience when he went ‘electric.’ Frith demonstrates how this 
fundamentally nineteenth-century view of music as expression of the subject is 
woefully misapplied to pop and rock music -  not only is its existence based upon 
the technology of recording, the displacing of the performing subject, but through 
the development of studio technology it has enabled the subject to express him or 
herself more exactly, in ways that would have been impossible or unimaginable in 
direct performance. The myth of the authentic subject in popular music falls down 
on even on its own terms, but more importantly (at least in the current context), this 
technological supplementarity of the subject explicitly poses the question of where 
the technology, as process of mediation, ends and the subject begins.
The most telling example of this is the development of the electrical 
microphone, which was closely allied to the rise of popular music as a mass 
culture phenomenon. The amplification of a softly spoken voice enabled an 
entirely new style of singing to emerge, termed ‘crooning,’ and as Frith notes: Its 
general effect was to extend the possibilities of the public expressions of private 
feelings in all pop genres.’64 The mediating power of the technology begins to blur
62 Ibid., p. 188.
63 Frith, S., ‘Art versus technology: the strange case of popular music,’ Media, Culture and 
Society, 8, (1986), pp. 266-7.
64 Ibid., p. 270.
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both the relationship between putative sound production and sound receiver, which 
is to say the subject and the collective, and also blurs the boundaries between the 
singer and his or her technologization -  there is an interpenetration of the body of 
the singer and its mediation. Frith wrote this essay in 1986, but subsequent 
developments have only increased the extent to which the two have become 
confluent: witness the band Daft Punk, pioneers of the ‘filtered disco’ sound, who 
only appear in public in the form of two robots, conducting interviews through a 
Steven Hawking-style computerized voice processor.
These ideas are clearly of great interest to the Icelandic singer-composer 
Bjork, and one can see a repeated referral to these ideas in her music videos and 
the literature surrounding her work, particularly in the enigmatically titled Post, a 
companion book to her album of the same name. Sjon Sigurdsson tells the story 
of NovaBjork,’ a girl found buried in the forest and ‘mended’ through a process of 
amalgamation. He writes:
The composer gathered together instruments from the 01’ World and the Nu. With 
sure hands he placed harp strings, microchips, pieces of brass, tiny transistors and 
other Energies inside the girl’s body.65
We have here the clearest possible articulation of the notion of the ‘technological 
body,’ or as Steve Sweeney-Turner describes it in this context, a cybjork. The 
technologization or mediation of the organic is played out both in her lyrics, and in 
the computer modulation of ‘found sounds’ in her music, as well as an illustration 
of the cybjork in the video to ‘All is Full of Love.’ It is in the video to 'Hyperballad,’ 
however, that one sees a reflection-echo of the part played by the video itself in 
the further technologization of the musician.
The track opens with an ethereal tone cluster (Bb, C, Eb, F -  the tonality of 
the verse section hovers between C minor and Bb major throughout) played on 
synthesized strings, under which enters an electronically generated sound lacking
65 Sigurdsson, S., ‘The Birth of NovaBjork: a tale in the old style of Science Fiction,’ in 
Sigurdsson et at, Post, (Bloomsbury, London, 1995), quoted by Steve Sweeney-Turner in 
an unpublished paper Bjork and the Figure of the Machine.’
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any sort of attack, that slowly descends through a repeated Et>, D, C two octaves 
below middle C, mapping a wide sonic space. The image that accompanies this is 
of a modelled landscape of a plain and distant mountains, over which move 
computerized clouds, instantly picking up the motif of mediated organicism. As the 
scattershot drum break enters with a statement-echo pattern driving through each 
bar, similar in rhythm to the clatter of a railway, the camera pulls round to show an 
apparently lifeless Bjork lying amongst leaf litter, but with an electronic ‘haze’ 
crackling across her in time to the drum rhythm, in a parallel, superposed plane. 
With the entry of the vocal line a second, ghostly imprint of a singing Bjork 
appears, again superimposed upon ‘organic’ Bjork and the ‘electric’ plane. Not 
only does this serve to confound authorial presence, but it also illustrates the 
technologized, mediated voice, and the mediation of the Bjork-image in the video. 
A third, ‘computer-game’ Bjork appears with the chorus, running across the model 
landscape which is now also superposed with computer graphics, before enacting 
the line ‘I imagine what my body would sound like, slamming against those rocks’ 
(see Appendix), and returning to the dead Bjork/ singing Bjork composite, until all 
three are superposed in a simultaneously static and moving landscape. (It is 
difficult to describe the full complexity of the series of superimposed levels 
compressed into a single plane that form the image track to this video, but it 
involves at least three pieces of footage that are combined using motion tracking 
techniques.) In this problematization of movement in space-time, the combining of 
‘organic’ and ‘machinic’ sounds technologically with the singer-composer’s unique 
Icelandic inflected diction, and then routing all of this through a set of ‘bodies’ that 
are all moving in unison and all identifiably Bjork, any notion of a distinct, originary 
singing body as sound-source, opposed to its technological status, is completely 
overrun. What might at first appear to be the corporeal alienation of Bjork’s voice, 
instead becomes the means of reinscribing Bjorkness’ across a series of 
technologized corporealizations. To paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, Bjork and 
Michel Gondry, the director, make audio-visual the sound-image process, the 
production of that process, in a music-video machine.
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III
Could a machine think? -  Could it be in pain? -  Well, is the human body to be called
such a machine? It surely comes as close as possible to being such a machine.66
As with Barthes, the Wittgensteinian body can be considered as a machine, but 
what mechanisms does this body enact, and how might this ‘machine’ be related to 
the wider concept of technology? As outlined above, Barthes’ ‘machine’ is a 
complex set of interactions, the parameters of which are largely undefined: with 
respect to the voice, the machine-body is only one part of a wider field of 
technological forces; the extent of the mediation process is unfixed at both ends of 
the spectrum, so that the distinction body/non-body becomes a difficult one to 
draw. And it seems that similar problems arise with the Wittgensteinian body, 
which is above all a thinking body, processual: ‘But surely a machine cannot think! 
-  Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is 
like one that it thinks.’67 But when one begins to attempt to locate the thought 
process, whether it be in a human or any other sort of object, one starts to run up 
against the same problems seen earlier when trying to fix something that is 
fundamentally motile: The chair is thinking to itself: ... WHERE? In one of its 
parts? Or outside its body: in the air around it? Or not anywhere at all?’68 And as 
Wittgenstein suggests, situating thought either within or without the supposedly 
fixed boundaries of the body-object is a fruitless activity: “Thinking takes place in 
the head” really means only “the head is connected with thinking.” Of course one 
says also “I think with my pen" and this localization is at least as good.’69 Like the 
Barthesian body, the body as thinking-machine is an entity without a definite 
beginning and end, difficult, but not impossible, to discern from its background.
66 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, §359.
67 Ibid., §360.
68 Ibid., §361.
69 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rhees, R., trans. Kenny, A., (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1974), §64.
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Although both Wittgenstein and Barthes provide an effective deconstruction 
and problematization of the individual body, neither leaves a clear map as to how 
to reconceptualize the new relation between the body and the collective: the status 
of the subject within Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’ is decidedly vague. An analogy is 
provided, however, by Deleuze and Guattari in the form of the ‘tool,’ which seems 
an apt theorization of the technological body, so long as one is careful not to 
simply perform a reterritorialization of the idea of technology onto isolated tools. 
Deleuze and Guattari state:
The material or machinic aspect of assemblage relates not to the production of goods 
but rather to a precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all the 
attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, 
penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one 
another. ... Even technology makes the mistake of considering tools in isolation: tools 
exist only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or that make them 
possible. The stirrup entails a new man-horse symbiosis that at the same time entails 
new weapons and new instruments. Tools are inseparable from symbioses or 
amalgamations defining a Nature-Society machinic assemblage. They presuppose a 
social machine that selects them and takes them into its “phylum:” a society is defined 
by its amalgamations, not by its tools.70
This goes some way to clarifying the nature of the individual in theory -  the 
Barthesian singing voice is a fine example of a Nature-Society machinic 
assemblage' -  but still leaves open the question of the precise mechanism by 
which material bodies perceive, or at least interiorize, their own ‘state of 
intermingling.’
A clue as to how one might apprehend individuation without denying the 
continuity of individual and context is given by Ernst Bloch:
We do not possess it, that which all this around us ... is or signifies, because we are it 
itself and are standing too close to it. ... But the sound burns out of us, the heard note, 
not the sound itself or its forms. This, however, shows us our path without alien
70 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., op. cit., p. 90.
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means, our historically inward path, as a fire in which not the vibrating air but we 
ourselves begin to quiver and cast off our cloaks.71
There is an undeniable strain of mysticism and neo-Wagnerian romanticism to 
Bloch’s imagery in this essay, but the important distinction he makes between ‘the 
heard note’ and ‘the sound itself in the human body makes clear that the 
distinctiveness of individual resonance is in no way connected to the notion of the 
body as sound producer. And as Massumi describes, the autonomic processes of 
the body that perceive resonance provide a mechanism that binds the interior and 
exterior, subject and object, in such a way as to enable Barthes’ individuation that 
‘is not in the psychological subject' (see above). 'Brain and skin form a resonating 
vessel. Stimulation turns inward, is folded into the body, except that there is no 
inside for it to be in, because the body is radically open, absorbing impulses 
quicker than they can be perceived, and because the entire vibratory event is 
unconscious, out of mind.’72 The individual is autonomous only insofar as 
autonomic response retains 'the trace of past actions including a trace o f their 
contexts ... conserved in the brain and the flesh, but out of mind and out of body 
understood as qualifiable inferiorities.’73 The corporeal phenomenon that Massumi 
describes is proprioception: it is a characteristic of the flesh that infolds ‘the surface 
of contact between perceiving subject and perceived object,’74 and acts as a 
memory-bearing entity that operates in parallel to the emergence of subjectivity. 
‘Proprioception translates the exertions and ease of the body’s encounters with 
objects into a muscular memory of relationality. This is the cumulative memory of 
skill, habit, posture,’75 and one might well add the experience of sound to this list. 
Indeed, Freud's own mature theory of memory allows for such a suggestion, 
insofar as ‘the subject centres itself in consciousness on the site where memory
71 Bloch, E., The philosophy of music,’ in Essays on the Philosophy of Music, trans 
Palmer, P., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 1.
72 Massumi, B., The Autonomy of Affect,’ op. cit., p. 222.
73 Ibid., p. 223.
74 Massumi, B., The Bleed: Where Body Meets Image,’ in Welchman, J (ed.), Rethinking 
Borders, (Macmillan, London, 1996), p. 30.
75 Ibid., p 31.
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traces have established an infrastructure for such centring.’76 Massumi has simply 
displaced the social construction of the memory trace from the conscious brain to 
the wider nervous system in a way that is not unrelated to subjectivity, but neither 
is it dependent upon it.
Proprioception effects a double translation of the subject and the object into the body, 
at a medium depth where the body is only body, having nothing of the profundity of the 
self nor of the superficiality of external encounter. This asubjective and non-objective 
medium depth is one of the strata proper to the corporeal; it is a dimension of the flesh.
The memory it constitutes could be diagrammed as a superposition of vectorial fields 
composed of multiple points in varying relations of movement and rest, pressure and 
resistance, each field corresponding to an action.77
This network of nervous tissue is the technological body, the collectivized 
individual, moulding the passage of sound in such a way that ‘space-time is not 
external to the body but generated by it.’78 It reveals the fallacy of the idea that 
mediation opens a space between subject and object, which conceals the truth of 
their indissoluble enmeshment. It is a holding still of the musical moment en 
proces in the form of potentiality or incipience -  gesture yet to come and past 
gesture in one. But it is not the end of the story.
The collective is a body, too. And the physis that is being organised for it in technology 
can, through all its political and factual reality, only be produced in that image sphere to 
which profane illumination initiates us. Only when in technology body and image so 
interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective innervation, and
76 Mowitt, J., The sound of music in the era of its electronic reproducibility,’ in Leppert, R 
and McClary, S. (eds), Music and Society: the politics of composition, performance and 
reception, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987), p. 183. As Mowitt discusses, 
this particular point is made by Derrida.
77 Massumi, B., The Bleed: Where Body Meets Image,’ op. cit., p. 31
78 Lefebvre, H., see chapter 2, n. 61.
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all the bodily innervations of the collective become revolutionary discharge, has reality 
transcended itself to the extent demanded by the Communist Manifesto.79
This unusual passage of prose that closes Benjamin’s essay on surrealism 
anticipates the formation of the technological body, but perhaps overestimates its 
political agency. A similarly utopian vision is proposed by John Mowitt in his essay 
on the technologies of music reception: ‘If Marx could regard the proletariat as a 
concrete manifestation of theory, then perhaps contemporary music can be seen 
as a gateway to the new collectivity, since it situates subjects within an emergent 
structure of listening which offers experiential confirmation of social 
configuration.’80 The technological body is not a call for the wholesale rejection of 
the subject, but for a new conception of the subject that is implicitly collective. Its 
expression is not necessarily revolutionary, as Benjamin hopes; Massumi has 
discussed the ways in which the right has taken control of the postmodern body.’ 
Benjamin (via Eagleton) states that ‘the body must be reprogrammed and 
reinscribed by the power of the sensuous image;’81 Mowitt calls for a new 
inscription of popular memory’ through the collectivizing potential of popular 
music. Music video-ing is not a revolutionary art practise, but the reformulation of 
aesthetics that its study demands, its conjoining of popular memory with the 
sensuous image, might enable a shift from ‘being’ to ‘becoming,’ and open a new 
vectorial space-time where not just television, but the sign itself is music(k)ed, so 
that an interrogation of the sign, of representation, could take place.
79 Benjamin, W., 'Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,’ in 
Reflections, trans. Jephcott, E., (Schocken, New York, 1986), p 192. Also quoted in 
Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 336.
80 Mowitt, J., op. cit., p. 193.
81 Eagleton, T., The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 336.
Conclusion
“I’m confused. Is this a happy ending or a sad ending?’’
“It’s an ending. That’s enough.”1
M usic videos are neither intended, nor very often received as attacks on the notion 
o f capital, monologistic aesthetics, or anything else for that matter; more often they 
are precisely the opposite, calculated by corporations to maximize return on a 
cultural commodity. Anyone hoping to inspire revolution by subjecting the 
populace to large doses of boy bands and ‘nu-metal’ videos will be a long time 
waiting. It would be foolish to ignore the fact that both the denoted and connoted 
messages of the great majority of music videos (the Barthesian ‘obvious’ 
meaning), are supportive of the capitalist system almost to the point of 
propaganda. Whether one looks at the level of the individual video’s ‘pseudo- 
narrative,’ or the ‘star-text’ of the meta-narrative, the same set of ideals based 
around the notion of the ‘pop-star,’ and in particular his or her conspicuous 
consumption, predominate. Much of the foregoing argument has attempted to 
show how, despite this fact, the nature of the intertwining of music and image in 
music video simultaneously undoes the ideology represented, not by countering it, 
but by problematizing the very notion of representation. This refusal of meaning, 
obvious’ or otherwise, derived from the experience of music, only a short time 
after ‘new’ musicologists have worked so hard to bring it into the equation might be 
regarded as a controversial move, but it is borne of the belief that a critical project 
founded upon direct opposition to the status quo, although by no means worthless, 
is in the end unlikely ever to fulfil its aims. Its inevitable consequence is the 
reduction of music analysis to ‘the dilemma of either the predicable or the
1 Exchange between Lisa and Marge Simpson, The Simpsons, episode reference 
unknown.
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ineffable.1' The alternative proposed here, however, is no more certain to achieve 
critical consciousness, and indeed there are serious obstacles to this. Most 
notable among these is the acceptance that the process of comprehension, of 
clarification, must take place within one’s own ‘form of life,’ be based upon existing 
praxis, which inevitably nullifies any political agency beyond step by step extension 
of praxis from within the ‘blind spots’ of a culture. Hence Montefiore and Taylor’s 
suggestion, quoted above, that the Wittgensteinian appears to the critical theorist 
to be ‘preaching an obscurantist acceptance of the status quo,’3 and also the vital 
importance of Kristeva’s work, whatever its weaknesses might be. Given the task 
of formulating a practical and effective critical theory, I, like the country bumpkin 
called upon for directions, would not start from here, but here is where one must 
begin.
What then, is the relationship between theory and practice in the creation 
and experience of music video? If, as I have suggested, music videos perform a 
transformation of the object into activity, an event en proces, it is perhaps pertinent 
to ask what this activity is, what is it that is being done? In a sense this has been 
the thrust of this entire thesis: an attempt to embed an aesthetics of music video 
within the world, to understand the object in terms of the actions it performs, above 
all to clarify the nature of the affective charge I sense in the encounter with it. And 
yet it is undeniable that concrete instances of these events remain remarkably 
difficult both to locate, and to discuss in an illuminating way. There is certainly 
space here for some hard sociological analysis, to determine both how music 
videos are typically (and atypically) received, and the aesthetic criteria invoked in 
their production, in order to ascertain the extent to which these theoretical 
possibilities are being played out in actuality.
Ultimately the power of music or music video to effect material change is 
limited: when faced with the raw power of the barrel of a gun or a tank it is as 
impotent as any other art, regardless of its capacity to collectivize. What power it 
does have is the potential to alter one’s perception of material reality; to produce 
(be producing?) an ‘incorporeal transformation’ of the conditions of being. To take
2 Barthes, R., The Grain of the Voice,’ op. cit., p. 180.
3 Montefiore, A. and Taylor, C., op. cit., p. 21. See p. 92 above for full quotation.
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one of Deleuze and Guattari’s own examples,4 the action of a hijacker brandishing 
a weapon transforms the plane into a prison, the passengers into hostages, and 
yet the material conditions remain unaltered. The transformation applies to bodies 
but is itself incorporeal, internal to enunciation.’5 Similarly, in reformulating the 
m ode of interaction between sound and image, based upon aesthetic criteria 
derived from a consideration of music, one’s understanding of the world is 
instantaneously relativized. As with Wittgenstein s ‘duck-rabbit,’6 one is suddenly 
confronted with an alternative mode of cognition, in such a way as to require a 
reappraisal of one’s relationship to the entity in question, and generate a 
previously unimagined social reality and praxis.
One sees both of these possibilities explored (that is, conventional 
oppositional critique and incorporeal transformation), in the video to ‘Remind Me’ 
by the Norwegian ambient dance group Royksopp. Taking off from the title and 
repeated intonation of the chorus lyric ‘remind me,’ the video demythologizes 
aspects of everyday working life, by appropriating the format of the technical 
diagram and animating it -  a train journey is seen in terms of the relative statistics 
on modes of travel, as it passes through a cross-sectional image of tunnel 
construction, and via a diagram of the shifting patterns of signals and points. 
Similarly, a young woman’s lunchtime burger is transformed into a part of a cow, 
which is in turn part of a herd, and the industrial processing of the milk involved in 
the production of her milkshake is passed through. Although the video’s 
avoidance of naturalistic representation and appropriation of the imagistic tools’ of 
industrialization to the form of animation, as well as its highlighting of industrial 
processing itself, might be regarded as straightforwardly resistive, it is when these 
images are conjoined with music that they have a genuinely subversive potential. 
The stock market graphs and production charts that are presented as part of the 
office environment are musicked here, made to ‘dance’ and move to the rhythm of 
the music. The imagery of international finance is transformed at an affective 
level; it ceases to be representative and is made sensuous.
4 Given in Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 81.
5 Ibid., p. 82.
5 See Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, pp. 194-6.
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This strategy is not without risk: affect in itself is entirely lacking in critical 
capacity, and as Deleuze and Guattari note of sound, ‘since its force of 
deterritorialization is the strongest, it also effects the most massive of 
reterritorializations.'' There remains the possibility that the demythologizing 
rhetoric of the images in the ‘Remind Me’ video are neither reinforced nor 
superseded by their relation to the sound track, but are instead recommodified in a 
w ay that the music serves to conceal. There is a danger in overstressing the 
‘redem ptive’ capacities of music, and of tying it too firmly to the idea of an ‘aural 
paradigm ’ suggested above, for which an aesthetics of sound alone was only a 
prompt. One sees, on occasion, a favouring of the affective, the sensuous, in the 
realm of the image also, particularly in the films of directors such as Scorsese and 
Tarantino (often in association with prominent sound tracks), and in much 
photographic art. Aesthetic appreciation is predicated on the simultaneous 
presence of both ‘visual’ and ‘aural’ paradigms, their intermingling, not in an 
either/or relationship, but in their shifting patterns of emphasis.
There are times at which the ‘aural paradigm’ comes uncomfortably close 
to the nineteenth-century category of the transcendent, with a shiny new 
postmodern veneer. Reinscribing ‘the unsayable’ in signifiance, and then showing 
how ‘the aural’ has privileged access to this realm, may appear to reinstate music’s 
connection to ‘the ineffable,’ but this would be to misunderstand the profoundly 
socialized, if not entirely effable, character of signifiance, which Kristeva 
demonstrates is based precisely in the space of interaction between subject and 
society.8 My use of terms such as ‘musicalization’ may obfuscate instead of 
illuminating this point, but this is due to the difficulty of the problem faced, rather 
than a simple matter of terminology. ‘Gesture,’ as defined in chapter 2 above, is 
an attempt to bind the material and the social in a single entity, so as to facilitate 
material analysis that is at once a form of social critique -  the ‘holy grail’ of critical 
musicology. Although theoretically sound, again concrete examples of its 
application have proved frustratingly difficult to produce, and the fear must be that 
it becomes a means of endlessly delaying a genuine social analysis rather than 
enabling it. Whether ‘gesture’ is a useful model of musical, or any other material,
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 348.
8 Kristeva, J., Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 17.
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has still to be proven, but I remain hopeful that it may have avoided many of the 
problems encountered by musicologists on this issue.
An attack on what Barthes terms the ‘Organon of Representation’ that 
addressed it directly would involve addressing it on its own terms: in the realm of 
the ideal, where objects and music are only ever ciphers of something else, never 
sensuous and motile. Music video instead sidesteps this, musicks the image in 
such a way as to open it up to collectivization, rather than giving the autonomous 
individualized subject the palliative of the ideal. It is not so much what music 
videos do, as what they allow. It does not attempt to destroy the status quo, but to 
undercut it and set it adrift of its moorings, facilitating its undoing.
If at times I have seemed hostile to the psychoanalytic subject, it is 
because of the emphasis it places upon the individual at the expense of the 
collective, the private rather than the public. Atomizing the social poses no threat 
to hegemonic forces; it only weakens the capacity for resistance. Music video 
enables one to recognize, via affective charge, what Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
in stating:
There is no individual enunciation. There is not even a subject of enunciation. Yet 
relatively few linguists have analyzed the necessarily social character of enunciation.
The problem is that it is not enough to establish that enunciation has this social 
character, since it could be extrinsic; therefore too much or too little is said about it.
The social character of enunciation is intrinsically founded only if one succeeds in 
demonstrating how enunciation in itself implies collective assemblages9
The affectivity of music acts as a guarantor of the collective assemblage it forms, 
and music video can then extend this collectivity into areas where one would not 
expect to find it; its radical materiality ‘concedes nothing ineffable to the world.’10 
The aesthetics of music video is, among other things, a Benjaminian aesthetics, in 
that it has ‘subverted almost all of traditional aesthetics’ central categories (beauty,
9 Ibid., pp. 79-80. It is worth noting that they absolve Mikhail Bakhtin of any failings 
on this score.
10 Barthes, R., Sade/Fourier/Loyola, trans. Miller, R., (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1976), p. 37.
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harmony, totality, appearance),’"  and burrows within the form of the object in order 
to undo it, and to extract those means of resistance that are still available, but it will 
not do this unaided Like the Brechtian gestus, the critical potential that inheres in 
m usic video is given in order to be taken up, and it is only in its being taken up that 
its aesthetic might become manifest.
Eagleton, T., The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 338.
Appendix
Song Lyrics
R.E.M . -  Imitation of Life
Charades pop skill,
W ater hyacinths, named by a poet,
Imitation of life.
Like a koi in a frozen pond,
Like a goldfish in a bowl.
I don’t want to hear you cry.
That sugar cane, that tasted good,
That cinnamon, that’s Hollywood,
C ’mon, c ’mon, no-one can see you try.
You want the greatest thing,
The greatest thing since bread came sliced,
You’ve got it all, you’ve got it sized.
Like a Friday fashion show,
Teenager cruising in the corner,
Trying to look like you don’t try.
That sugar cane, that tasted good,
That cinnamon, that’s Hollywood,
C ’mon, c ’mon, no-one can see you try.
(No-one can see you cry.)
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That sugar cane, that tasted good,
That freezing rain, that’s what you could, 
C ’mon, c ’mon, no-one can see you cry.
This sugar cane, this lemonade,
This hurricane, I’m not afraid,
C ’mon, c ’mon, no-one can see me cry. 
This lightning storm, this tidal wave,
This avalanche, I’m not afraid,
C ’mon, c ’mon, no-one can see me cry.
That sugar cane, that tasted good,
Tha t’s who you are, that’s what you could, 
C ’mon, c ’mon no-one can see you cry. 
(repeat)
Bjork -  ‘H yper-ba llad ’
W e live on a mountain 
Right at the top.
There’s a beautiful view 
From the top of the mountain.
Every morning I walk towards the edge
And throw little things off
Like:
Car-parts, bottles and cutlery 
Or whatever I find lying around.
It’s become a habit,
A way
To start the day.
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I go through all this 
Before you wake up,
So I can feel happier 
To be safe up here with you.
It’s real early morning,
No-one is awake,
I’m back at my cliff,
Still throwing things off.
I listen to the sounds they make 
On their way down.
I follow with my eyes ‘til they crash. 
Imagine what my body what sound like 
Slamming against those rocks.
When it lands 
Will my eyes 
Be closed, or open?
I go through all this 
Before you wake up,
So I can feel happier 
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